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The Real Silent Majority: Denver and the Realignment of American
Politics After the Sixties
Abstract
“The Real Silent Majority” offers a new assessment of late-twentieth century U.S. political realignment,
overturning previous explanations focused on the supposed death of liberalism and rise of the New Right.
Instead, it traces the emergence of a pragmatic, self-interested, and only weakly partisan “quality of life”
politics in America’s metropolitan areas from the late-1960s onwards. A case study of Denver, Colorado, and
its surrounding metropolitan region, my study is a political and spatial history that incorporates perspectives
from cultural, intellectual, and policy history as well as the interdisciplinary fields of metropolitan and urban
studies. In examining the new definitions of citizenship and democracy that emerged in places like Denver, my
dissertation promises a thorough re-conceptualization of a pivotal period in U.S. history that has profound
implications for American politics and government today.
The transformation in Coloradans’ political attitudes and behavior were symptomatic of a broad, national
political realignment. This shift was not away from Democrats and towards Republicans, as is often described,
but rather away from the party system and conventional notions of liberal or conservative ideology altogether.
On issues ranging from school desegregation and metropolitan growth to taxes and gay rights, Coloradans
asserted their rights as tax-paying citizens to direct control over democratic decision-making. Moreover, they
began to define “quality of life,” an amorphous category encompassing everything from the protection of
public parkland to the location of public housing and the content of school curricula, as a fundamental right of
American citizenship. I emphasize both the constitutional and democratic means by which citizens sought to
institutionalize their new political culture at the state and local levels, examining grassroots efforts to pass
constitutional amendments and elect sympathetic candidates. These local battles, fought in the rapidly shifting
physical, demographic, and cultural landscapes of growing metropolises, had broad implications. I show how
the “quality of life” politics reverberated upwards over a forty-year period to influence the politics and policy
of both the Republican and, especially, Democratic parties.
The project is organized in two parts. Part I uses local case studies of issues such as school desegregation and
regional governance to trace the emergence of a grassroots quality of life politics that was, in the late-1960s
and early-1970s, largely off the radar of both major parties. It culminates in 1974 with the election of a cadre of
reform candidates, showing how the new ethos that had been percolating at the grassroots both shaped and
was transformed by formal politics at the state and national levels. At the same time, it shows how black and
Hispanic Coloradans engaged with this increasingly dominant political discourse.
Part II examines issues including anti-tax politics and family values that are generally viewed as unambiguous
parts of America’s conservative turn, showing instead how the new politics inflected these debates in complex
and surprising ways. In 1992, Coloradans’ support of both the Taxpayers Bill of Rights (TABOR) and anti-gay
Amendment 2 led observers to view Colorado as part of a national conservative vanguard. Yet that same year,
Coloradans decisively rejected George Bush and the GOP’s unabashedly conservative “family values”
platform, making Bill Clinton their first Democratic pick for president in thirty years. Exploring the deep
history of TABOR and Amendment 2, I reveal the predominance of market-oriented and quality of life
ideas—not a burgeoning cultural conservatism—in shaping public responses to both issues. This insight has
important implications, calling into question the pervasive understanding of Newt Gingrich’s 1994
Republican Revolution as a popular rebuke to the Democrats and a culturally conservative mandate for
Republicans. Indeed, far from representing opposing impulses in American politics, I argue, Clinton’s election
This dissertation is available at ScholarlyCommons: http://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/1749
and the Contract with America two years later together marked the fullest expression of the new market
paradigm in American politics.
Degree Type
Dissertation
Degree Name
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)
Graduate Group
History
First Advisor
Thomas J. Sugrue
Keywords
conservatism, Denver, liberalism, metropolitan, politics, postwar
Subject Categories
American Studies | Political Science | United States History
This dissertation is available at ScholarlyCommons: http://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/1749
	  
	  
THE REAL SILENT MAJORITY: DENVER  
AND THE REALIGNMENT OF AMERICAN POLITICS AFTER THE SIXTIES 
Rachel Guberman 
A DISSERTATION 
in 
History 
Presented to the Faculties of the University of Pennsylvania 
in 
Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the 
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
2015 
 
Supervisor of Dissertation  
__________________________ 
Thomas J. Sugrue        
David Boies Professor of History and Sociology      
Graduate Group Chairperson 
__________________________ 
Benjamin Nathans, Ronald S. Lauder Endowed Term Associate Professor of History 
 
Dissertation Committee 
 
Sarah Barringer Gordon, Arlin M. Adams Professor of Constitutional Law and 
Professor of History 
Amy Offner, Assistant Professor of History 
Robert O. Self, Royce Family Professor in Teaching Excellence, Professor of History, 
Brown University 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Real Silent Majority: Denver and the Realignment of American Politics after the 
Sixties 
COPYRIGHT 
2015 
Rachel Guberman 
 
This work is licensed under the  
Creative Commons Attribution- 
NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 
License 
 
To view a copy of this license, visit 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-ny-sa/2.0/
iii	  
	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For Bonnie and Nathan 
	  
	  
iv	  
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT 
This dissertation would not have been possible without the wonderful 
communities that have supported me, both within the academy and beyond. As a 
college freshman, I came to the University of Michigan full of questions about 
inequality and justice that seemed unanswerable. The history classes I took at U of 
M showed me new ways of thinking through these problems and set me on the path 
that has shaped my thinking and my work ever since. Gina Morantz-Sanchez and 
Matt Lassiter were guiding lights. Matt, in particular, introduced me to ideas about 
place-making and public policy that changed how I understood both the suburb I 
grew up in and the cities I later called home. Even after I left Ann Arbor, Matt 
continued to be a source of advice, encouragement, and ideas.  
At Penn, I have been fortunate to work with some remarkable scholars and 
teachers. Michael Katz’s interest in my project, incisive comments on my writing, 
and example in the classroom have made me a better historian and a better teacher. 
Elaine Simon and Mark Stern offered me a home in Urban Studies when I needed 
one. Sally Gordon and Amy Offner joined my committee at a critical moment. I’ve 
also been lucky to have Tom Sugrue’s enthusiastic support at every stage of this 
project. He’s provided a powerful model of what an advisor can be.  
One of the real joys of doing this work has been participating in a large and 
growing intellectual community that stretches far beyond my home department. 
Fellow students Sean Dempsey, Peter Pihos, Rebecca Marchiel, Anthony Ross, 
Anthony Pratcher, and many others have shared ideas, tales from the archives, and 
	  
	  
v	  
conference hotel rooms, as well as countless beers and cups of coffee. The members 
of the American History Workshop at Cambridge University welcomed me into the 
fold and provided intellectual mooring when I was far from home. Andrew Needham, 
Lily Geismer, Clay Howard, Nathan Connolly, and Jonathan Bell welcomed me into 
the profession. Their enthusiasm has been contagious and their support and 
friendship have kept me going and shown me how truly generous and humane our 
field can be. I owe a particular debt of gratitude to Robert Self, whose faith in me 
and my work began with my application to Brown nine years ago and has continued 
through his participation on my dissertation committee as an outside reader. 
As every historian knows, our work would not be possible without the help of 
archivists and librarians. The Denver Public Library’s Western History and 
Genealogy Division is an incredible place to do research and a remarkable, 
underutilized historical resource. Many thanks to the staff there, especially Wendel 
Cox, for pointing me towards sources I would never have discovered on my own. 
Thanks also to the folks at History Colorado, the University of Colorado Special 
Collections, and the Ford Presidential Library, as well as the librarians at countless 
small town libraries throughout suburban Denver who let me dig around in town 
scrapbooks and boxes of unprocessed documents. This dissertation was also made 
possible by generous funding from the Gerald R. Ford Foundation, the Charles Redd 
Center for Western Studies at Brigham Young University, the University of 
Pennsylvania School of Arts and Sciences, and the Penn Urban Studies Program. 
Friends far and wide kept me sane and (mostly) cheerful throughout 
graduate school. David Shneer and Gregg Drinkwater, Adrienne Russman, Robin 
	  
	  
vi	  
Springer, Nick Underwood, and Annabel Kaplan made me feel welcome in Denver. 
David Michaelson has been the best coffee shop writing buddy, travel companion, 
bourbon drinker, and cooking co-adventurer anyone could ask for. Max Helveston, 
Jennifer Yuan, Victoria Renfro, Liora Halperin, Raffi Krut-Landau, Hamish 
Hughes, and Nadea Mina have kept me in good spirits. David Schlitt has been a 
friend and confidant since long before we became colleagues and continues to be one 
of the very best sources of humor, commiseration, and perspective I know. 
One of the very best things about being at Penn is living in Philadelphia. I’ve 
grown to love West Philly and the amazing community of academics, artists, 
activists, policy wonks, and all around awesome people who’ve helped make this 
place home for nearly a decade. It wouldn’t be the same without Emily and Jon 
Gray, Ruth Rand and John Wentz, JJ Tiziou, Ariel Ben-Amos, Rowan Machalow, 
Tyler Colvard, Lauren Rile Smith, Lea Deutch, and all the Tangle aerialists. Abram 
Lipman and Amanda Bacich have become family. So have Dan Burke and Mary 
Catherine French. MC and I have been in this together since the very first day of our 
very first grad school seminar. It isn’t too much to say that, without her, I would not 
have finished. Our friendship was, from the beginning, unlikely, challenging, and 
wonderful. I’m lucky to have such a brave and fierce work spouse. Bets Beasley and 
Tiffany Holder have become the closest members of our Philly family. It’s been an 
unexpected joy. & 
Finally, I’m lucky to come from a very close-knit family. Even though we lead 
very different lives, my cousins are some of my very best friends. My aunts and 
uncles have offered so much support including giving me places to stay, asking 
	  
	  
vii	  
meabout my research, and helping me with my teaching. I’m especially grateful to 
my Uncle Charlie, whose pointed questions and editorial eye have improved my 
writing, both in my previous life as a journalist and now as a historian. My 
grandparents, Nate Kravetz and Milly Guberman Kravetz, have always been my 
biggest and most unconditional cheerleaders. One of the nicest things about 
becoming a grown up has been becoming friends with my sister Dalia. The seven-
year age difference that seemed so huge when we were kids isn’t so big now that we 
have kids of our own. My mom, Jayne Guberman, taught me the invaluable lesson 
that stories matter and has helped me tell mine in so many ways. Some of my 
earliest memories of my father, David Guberman, are of singing union songs in the 
car and going with him to vote as a little girl. His encyclopedic knowledge of 
American politics and his first-hand experience of so much of what this dissertation 
is about made him an astute reader, a rigorous editor, and the very best research 
assistant. 
Bonnie Aumann has lived with this project as long as I have. This 
dissertation wouldn’t have been written without her incredible project management 
skills, her stubborn insistence that I really could do this thing, and her constant 
reminders to Just Show Up. She makes my work and my life so much better. And, of 
course, Nathan, the best graduation gift of all.
	  
	  
viii	  
 
ABSTRACT 
 
THE REAL SILENT MAJORITY: DENVER AND THE REALIGNMENT OF 
AMERICAN POLITICS AFTER THE SIXTIES 
Rachel Guberman 
Thomas J. Sugrue 
 
“The Real Silent Majority: Denver and the Realignment of American Politics after 
the Sixties” traces the emergence of a new political culture at the metropolitan 
grassroots from the 1960s onwards. Whereas most studies of the late-twentieth 
century have emphasized the death of liberalism and the rise of the New Right, I 
argue that the era is better understood as a period of transition to a newly market-
oriented politics and policy across the political spectrum. Focusing on the Greater 
Denver area, I show how rapid metropolitan growth, the defining feature of 
American life and landscape in the late-twentieth century, led to a reshuffling of the 
political status quo at the state and local levels, creating a contested terrain in 
which citizens vied for increasingly scarce public resources and white suburbanites 
often set the terms of debate. Out of this crucible emerged a newly pragmatic and 
only weakly partisan political culture that eschewed conventional notions of liberal 
or conservative ideology. Instead, it embraced a moderate, consumerist language of 
“quality of life” and “common sense” that appealed to a growing majority of white 
	  
	  
ix	  
metropolitan voters disaffected from the party system and anxious about their 
economic futures.  
Through local case studies of issues, including school desegregation, gay rights, 
taxes, the environment, and even the scope and scale of government, I illuminate 
changes in how Americans regarded basic questions about citizenship and rights. 
Blending metropolitan history’s close attention to nuanced local experience and the 
grassroots with political history’s interest in national transformations, I show how 
this new political culture reverberated upwards throughout the Republican and, 
especially, Democratic Parties over a 30-year period. Archival documents and 
government records, journalistic sources, ephemera, and geographic information 
systems built from demographic and electoral data capture both the new ways in 
which citizens began to articulate their political identities and demands in this 
period and the ways in which reform-minded politicians responded. By 1992, when 
Bill Clinton took office as the “first New Democrat president,” the politics of 
markets, individualism, and consumer choice had firmly taken hold. 
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Introduction: 
Where Have All the Voters Gone? 
When President Richard Nixon coined the term "Silent Majority" in 1969, he 
did so to describe what he claimed was a majority of "good, law-abiding" and, he 
argued, fundamentally conservative Americans. These citizens, he suggested, had 
been abandoned by their government in its rush to attend to the clamoring demands 
of minorities, the poor, and other special interests. The Silent Majority, Nixon 
empathized, were "good people with good judgment who stand ready to do what they 
believe to be right" and who should not be made to feel guilty for enjoying the fruits 
of their labor in comfort and security.  
 Although Nixon hoped to capture these voters for the GOP, that outcome was 
far from assured. The early 1970s marked a moment of rupture in American society, 
as economic crises rocked the foundation of the nation’s middle class prosperity, 
calling into question the tenets of Keyenesian economics that underlay postwar 
policy, and a series of political shocks—beginning with Watergate and Vietnam but 
certainly not ending there—shook citizens’ faith in governing institutions and 
officials. The result was a period of profound unease when, as left-wing political 
activist Michael Harrington wryly observed, Americans were “moving vigorously 
right, left, and center all at once.”1 By 1972, many academic observers, journalists, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Michael Harrington, New York Times, May 14, 1972. 
	  
	  
2	  
and political analysts predicted an end to the two party system and the emergence of 
a multiparty system in its stead. And, although the Democrats and Republicans 
endured, fear for their future remained. As pollster Everett C. Ladd warned in a 
series of articles for Fortune Magazine and, later, a book entitled Where Have All the 
Voters Gone?, Americans were “unhappy with the performance of the principle 
institutions of their society” and, in the case of the Democratic and Republican 
parties, had “come to question the responsiveness of the parties to popular interests 
and expectations.”2  
 “The Real Silent Majority: Denver and the Realignment of American Politics 
after the Sixties,” traces the emergence of a new political culture at the metropolitan 
grassroots from the 1960s onwards. Whereas most studies of the late-twentieth 
century have emphasized the death of liberalism and the rise of the New Right, it 
argues that the era is better understood as a period of transition to a newly market-
oriented politics and policy across the political spectrum. Focusing on the Greater 
Denver area, it shows how rapid metropolitan growth, the defining feature of 
American life and landscape in the late-twentieth century, led to a reshuffling of the 
political status quo at the state and local levels, creating a contested terrain in 
which citizens vied for increasingly scarce public resources and white suburbanites 
often set the terms of debate. Out of this crucible emerged a newly pragmatic and 
only weakly partisan political culture that eschewed conventional notions of liberal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Everett C. Ladd, Jr., Where Have All the Voters Gone? The Fracturing of America’s Political 
Parties, (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1978), xiv, xxiii. Academic and journalistic concern 
over the fate of the two-party system during the 1970s was common. For two very different 
examples see Hunter S. Thompson, Fear and Loathing on Campaign Trail ’72, (New York: 
Fawcett Popular Library, 1973) and Douglas Price, “‘Critical Elections’ & Party History: A 
Critical View,” Polity, Vol. 4, No. 2 (Winter, 1971), pp.236–242. 
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or conservative ideology. Instead, it embraced a moderate, consumerist language of 
“quality of life” and “common sense” that appealed to a growing majority of white 
metropolitan voters disaffected from the party system and anxious about their 
economic futures. 
 Through local case studies of issues including school desegregation, gay 
rights, taxes, the environment, and even the scope and scale of government, I 
illuminate changes in how Americans regarded basic questions about citizenship 
and rights. Blending metropolitan history’s close attention to nuanced local 
experience and the grassroots with political history’s interest in national 
transformations, I show how this new political culture reverberated upwards 
throughout the Republican and, especially, Democratic Parties over a thirty-year 
period. "The Real Silent Majority" reveals the new ways in which citizens began to 
articulate their political identities and demands in this period and the ways in which 
reform-minded politicians responded. By 1992, when Bill Clinton took office as the 
“first New Democrat president,” the politics of markets, individualism, and 
consumer choice had firmly taken hold. 
Many studies of twentieth century political and urban history have 
persuasively demonstrated the collapse of the New Deal Order and the rise of a 
powerful conservative movement in the postwar United States, both within the 
major political parties and at the grassroots in the nation’s rapidly expanding 
metropolitan areas. Recent scholarship has substantially debunked the notion of a 
postwar liberal consensus, at least at the grassroots, and of racial backlash driving 
the post- sixties rightward shift. By focusing almost exclusively on a burgeoning 
	  
	  
4	  
conservatism, however, these works create a teleological view of recent political 
history, culminating in Ronald Reagan’s 1980 election, that overemphasizes the role 
of conservatives in fomenting political change. In so doing, they have failed to 
adequately account for the complexity of American politics in the late twentieth 
century, especially but not exclusively at the grassroots in the rapidly expanding 
metropolises that became home to a majority of the population in this period.3 “The 
Real Silent Majority” complicates this narrative. Surveying the broad range of 
Denverites’ political attitudes and behavior from the 1960s onwards, it shows how a 
diverse array of grassroots actors deployed their identities as homeowners, parents, 
taxpayers, and consumers towards an eclectic range of political and policy objectives, 
forging a language of individual freedom and market logic that defied partisan 
bounds. 
The new political culture that is the subject of this dissertation was the 
product of a significant transformation in metropolitan political economy in the 
decades after World War II. During the 1950s and sixties, government at every level 
from federal to local pursued an agenda that scholars have termed “growth 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 This trend marks a notable historiographical shift over the past twenty years. In his 1994 
essay, “The Problem of American Conservatism,” Alan Brinkley lamented the lack of 
attention to conservatism in scholarship on the postwar U.S. Since then, conservatism has 
become the near-exclusive focus of political historians, who have produced a rich and vast 
literature both challenging the idea of liberalism as monolithic or hegemonic in the postwar 
era and detailing the rise of conservatism as a dominant force in American political life. Yet, 
as Matthew Lassiter notes in a 2011 essay reflecting on this trend, “the recent pendulum 
swing has overstated the case for a rightward shift in American politics…inadvertently 
replicating some of the blind spots of the liberal consensus school that it supplanted, 
especially through a linear declension ascension narrative that has conflated the fate of the 
New Deal with the political triumph of the New Right.” See Alan Brinkley, “The Problem of 
American Conservatism,” American Historical Review, 99:2 (1994), 409–429 and Matthew D. 
Lassiter, “Political History beyond the Red-Blue Divide,” Journal of American History, 98:3 
(2011), 760–764. 
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liberalism.” It comprised a wide array of spending initiatives, from social welfare 
policies like social security and mortgage underwriting, to infrastructure projects 
like the construction of the interstate highway system, and a dramatic increase in 
government subsidies for defense-based research and development. These policies 
reflected their advocates' belief in the ability of state power, correctly applied, to 
create, subsidize, and stabilize private markets, creating economic prosperity while 
at the same time alleviating inequality. Growth liberalism had the direct effect of 
encouraging metropolitan growth everywhere, but especially in the Sunbelt South 
and West where most federal defense spending was concentrated and where 
“business friendly” tax and labor policies encouraged capital investment. Within 
this context, local governments across the country vied for industry, government 
spending, and population, using metropolitan growth in both number of residents 
and spatial footprint as a benchmark of success.4 
It is not surprising, then, that significant changes in the structure of 
American life during the postwar period and late twentieth century might have 
resulted in a major political reorientation too. Other scholars have highlighted the 
role that structural inequalities built into the landscapes of America's metropolises 
have played in shaping grassroots and national politics. Kenneth Jackson's 
pioneering research in Crabgrass Frontier demonstrated for the first time the role of 
government policy in building America's white suburbs and, concomitantly, its urban 
ghettoes. In Origins of the Urban Crisis, Thomas Sugrue took Jackson's insights a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Andrew Needham, “Sunbelt Imperialism: Boosters, Navajos, and Energy Development 
in the Metropolitan Southwest,” in Sunbelt Rising: The Politics of Space, Place, and 
Region, Michelle Nickerson and Darren Dochuk, eds. (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2011). 
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step further, uncovering the centrality of homeownership and the racial coding of 
urban neighborhoods to the political consciousness of urban whites in the postwar 
era. More recently, scholars have moved this analysis beyond the city limits, 
exploring the ways in which place, ownership, and the very structures of the modern 
American metropolis have been central to the political struggles and realignments of 
the late twentieth century. Their work indicates the importance of individuals' and 
communities' attachments to particular parts of metropolitan geography and their 
ideas about which people and places are “deserving” in shaping American politics.5 
At the same time, these scholars have showcased the nexus between 
metropolitan space and political economy and its potency as a driving political force.6 
In Colorado, the kinds of places people inhabited, whether the unincorporated 
communities of the affluent in the foothills of the Rockies, North Denver’s Chicano 
barrios and black ghettoes, or the miles of expanding suburban subdivisions that 
ring the city, influenced how Denverites understood the Games and whether or not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Only a handful of scholars have explored non-conservative politics after the 1960s. In 
his book, The Silent Majority: Suburban Politics in the Sunbelt South (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2006), Matthew Lassiter argues against the idea that 
conservatism was or became the dominant political ideology at the grassroots in the 
1970s and suggests instead a bipartisan ethos of “suburban populism” originating in the 
Sunbelt South and spreading to metropolitan areas across the country. Peter Siskind 
looks at the relationship between growth liberalism and grassroots politics in the 
Northeast Corridor during the same period. See Peter T. Siskind, “Growth and Its 
Discontents: Localism, Protest, and the Politics of Development on the Postwar Northeast 
Corridor,” (PhD diss., University of Pennsylvania, 2002). Lily Geismer’s “Don’t Blame Us: 
Suburban Liberals in Massachusetts, 1960-1990” (Ph.D. diss, University of Michigan, 2010) 
deals with liberalism in suburban Boston. By contrast, the literature on the rise of the 
New Right is vast. Notable recent examples include Lisa McGirr's, Suburban Warriors: 
The Origins of the New American Right (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001). 
6 This speaks to another aspect of Self's typology of space: space as property. Property, in 
Self's view, is money fixed in space. The political conflicts that play out within 
metropolitan space, then, reflect the jockeying of various groups for position as actors in a 
competitive metropolitan market for industry, tax base, and government resources a 
central place in our thinking is among his most important contributions. 
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they supported them. Throughout the 1970s and beyond, concerns about the use of 
space, as well as about the allocation of resources such as energy, water, and tax 
dollars to different constituencies and different locales, shaped both Coloradans' 
grassroots commitments and their choices on election day. These transformations in 
metropolitan geography and political economy were the impetus for these dramatic 
grassroots political shift after the 1960s, which scholars have until now only 
partially examined. By giving attention to what Robert Self has termed “space as 
political scale,” we see clearly the battles that extended from individual homes, to 
neighborhoods, to government at every level over the allocation of resources and 
decision making power across metropolitan areas and between metropolises and 
their hinterlands.7 Space as political scale puts these grassroots activists on a single 
continuum leading ultimately to the federal government. In so doing, it highlights 
the specific mechanisms available at each scale for influencing certain dimensions of 
public life. 
 Most of the literature on America’s post-1960s realignment focuses either on 
national elites or on communities in the Northeast, South, and California. By 
combining analyses of both grassroots activism and the responses of political elites 
and institutions, my dissertation bridges the usual gap between top-down and 
bottom-up narratives. Furthermore, its focus on greater Denver sheds light on the 
nation’s political transformation from the vantage point of an important but 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Self, introduction. Andrew Needham has written extensively about the relationship 
between metropolis and hinterland in his study of Phoenix, Az and its relationship with 
the outlying Navaho Reservation. See Todd Andrew Needham, “Power Lines: Urban 
Space, Energy Development, and the Making of the Modern Southwest,” (PhD diss., 
University of Michigan, 2006). 
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understudied region. Although largely ignored by political historians, in the last fifty 
years, the West has emerged as the fastest growing region of the country, with most 
growth concentrated in metropolitan areas. As such it has been both typical and 
prototypical of larger demographic, economic, and political trends sweeping the 
United States including massive Latino migration, the supplanting of older 
agriculture and industry with a robust service sector, and the dramatic rise of 
sprawling metropolises as political, social, cultural, and economic powerhouses. 
Metropolitan Denver and the Front Range of which it is the center have been at the 
forefront of these developments.8 Most notably, it was both a focal point for the 
emergence of the centrist “New Democrats” in the 1990s and, at the same time, 
became a major center for a newly politicized evangelical Christian right. Since the 
year 2000, the area has been heralded by pundits and political observers as ground 
zero for a supposedly new kind of centrist or populist Democratic politics that, in 
fact, reaches back to the political transformations of the late-twentieth century. 
“The Real Silent Majority” argues that Coloradans’ political attitudes and 
behavior were symptomatic of a broad, national political realignment, not away from 
Democrats and towards Republicans, as it is often described, but rather away from 
the party system and conventional notions of liberal or conservative ideology 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 There is a significant literature on Western history. The most well known to scholars 
outside the field deals with the nineteenth century expansion of the United States and 
the encounters between white Americans, native peoples, and other Europeans. On the 
twentieth century, there is a significant body of well-known scholarship about California 
that has been incorporated into more general understandings of key issues like 
immigration, grassroots politics, race, etc. Other Western states, however, and especially 
the Mountain West, are almost entirely absent from the literature that has shaped our 
understanding of major twentieth century historical developments. One notable exception 
is Carl Abbott’s The Metropolitan Frontier: Cities in the Modern American West, 
(University of Arizona Press, 1993), which won the Urban History Associations prize for 
best book in North American urban history. 
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altogether. It examines not only the transformations in political culture and 
grassroots activism in Denver and its suburbs, but also the ways in which those 
changes reverberated upwards over a thirty year period to influence the politics and 
policy of both the Democratic and Republican parties. Exploring the overlapping 
arenas of race, growth and development, sex, the family, the environment, and 
taxes, I recast the conventional narrative of liberal decline and the rise of the New 
Right as one of neoliberal realignment and show how political struggles in 
metropolitan areas like Denver helped reshape politics at both the local and national 
levels. 
In explaining the transformation of American politics after the sixties, 
scholars have tended to focus either on the connections among social and economic 
factors like race, inequality, and metropolitan expansion or on “culture war” issues 
such as sex and the family. By bringing these histories together, “The Real Silent 
Majority” argues that they are fundamentally intertwined. It shows how the 
upheavals of metropolitan expansion—which threw into question how resources 
should be allocated across a rapidly changing political-economic, demographic, and 
spatial landscape; who should have the power to make those decisions; and 
ultimately who should be included within the bounds of these newly-drawn 
communities—framed citizens’ engagement with a host of local and national issues. 
As my dissertation reveals, this was especially true on questions pertaining 
to what many voters and party strategists dubbed “quality of life”: issues such as 
environmental protection, taxes, education, and whether or not to extend access to 
previously disfranchised groups like minorities and gays. As Matthew Lassiter 
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points out, this colorblind and class-driven political discourse, popularized in the 
spaces of the metropolitan Sunbelt, resonated nationally among self-identified 
liberals and conservatives alike, offering what he describes as “a bipartisan political 
language of private property values, individual taxpayer rights, children’s 
educational privileges, family residential security, and white racial innocence.”9 
Liberalism and conservatism, then, were not stable or coherent categories, but 
rather, as Nathan Connolly puts it, ideologies of convenience strategically employed 
by political actors at different times and to different degrees. Quality of life politics, 
as I dub this new political culture, crossed traditional ideological boundaries. 
Although it was an amorphous category, that very indeterminacy was, in part, what 
gave “quality of life” politics its power, since anyone could adopt the rhetoric and 
wrap themselves in its mantle. 
The trans-partisan political ethos of individualism and quality of life that 
emerged in metropolitan Denver was part of a seismic shift in American, and indeed 
global, politics away from the Keynesianism of the immediate postwar years and 
towards a new paradigm. Scholars in a variety of fields are increasingly using the 
concept of neoliberalism to describe this political and economic orientation, which 
preferences individualist, market-based solutions to a wide range of social and 
economic problems and that views government’s proper role as one of supporting 
market activity. Historical sociologists like Stephanie Mudge have persuasively 
demonstrated the shift towards neoliberal policies within all Western democracies in 
the last forty years. Most striking is that, while neoliberalism is typically understood 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Lassiter, The Silent Majority, 304. 
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to be a product of the right, the greatest movement has in fact been within center-
left parties including the Democrats in the U.S. But while such studies provide 
concrete, quantitative evidence that neoliberalization is taking place across the 
political spectrum in America and elsewhere, they cannot explain why or how. My 
dissertation does just that. While Mudge’s work identifies three faces of 
neoliberalism—intellectual, political, and bureaucratic—it is a central contention of 
this dissertation that neoliberalism has a forth, equally important cultural face. 
Through a bottom up, community study approach, “The Real Silent Majority” shows 
how a majority of metropolitan residents—Democrats, Republicans, and unaffiliated 
voters alike—came to view themselves and their relationship to society and 
government in individualist, market terms. The embrace of quality of life politics 
provided the necessary cultural foundation for political and economic neoliberalism 
to take hold.10 
* * *  
 The dissertation is organized in two parts. Part I, “Sell Colorado,” begins by 
describing the material development of metropolitan Denver. It then examines a 
series of intensely local struggles that emerged out of this context, including battles 
over regional governance and municipal annexation, busing for school desegregation, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Stephanie Mudge writes about the shift towards neoliberalism in Western democracies, 
especially Anglo-liberal democracies, in two articles: Stephanie Lee Mudge, “What’s Left of 
Leftism?: Neoliberal Politics in Western Party Systems, 1945-2004,” Social Science History, 
Vol. 35, No. 3 (2011), 337–380 and Stephanie Lee Mudge, “What is Neoliberalism?” Socio-
Economic Review, Vol. 6, No. 4 (2008), 703-731. For more on the “culture of neoliberalism,” 
see Andrew J. Diamond, “The Long March toward Neoliberalism: Race and Housing in the 
Postwar Metropolis,” Journal of Urban History, Vol. 20, No. 10 (2010), 1–7 and Mean Streets: 
Chicago Youths and the Everyday Struggle for Empowerment in the Multiracial City, 1908–
1969, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009). 
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and whether Denver should host the 1976 Winter Olympics. Through these case 
studies, it traces the emergence of a new, grassroots “quality of life” politics that 
was, in the late-1960s and early-1970s, almost entirely off the radar of the major 
political parties. It culminates in 1974 with the election of a cadre of reform 
candidates, mostly Democrats, showing how the new political ethos that had been 
percolating at the grassroots ultimately both shaped and was transformed by formal 
politics at the state and national levels. At the same time, it shows how black and 
Hispanic Coloradans engaged with this increasingly dominant political discourse. 
 In the 1960s and seventies, amidst dramatic growth and a major reshuffling 
of political power within Colorado, residents of metropolitan Denver engaged in a 
protracted debate over the future of their metropolis. Chapter one examines the 
range of ways in which Denverites sought to make sense of their rapidly changing 
landscape. Municipal annexation and school desegregation were two crucial, 
interlinked arenas in which these struggles played out. On both issues, residents of 
the Front Range debated the boundaries of their communities and their mutual 
responsibility along lines of race and class as much as geography. Urban arguments 
in favor of annexation often held a none-too-subtle suggestion that the suburbs 
“owed” Denver for making possible their racial exclusivity. It was, meanwhile, the 
Supreme Court’s 1973 ruling in Denver’s school desegregation case that ultimately 
persuaded a majority of suburbanites to vote for an end to future Denver 
annexations, effectively sealing themselves off from the possibility of having to bus 
their children. Black and Hispanic residents, meanwhile, mostly urban, asserted 
their own claims both to the landscape and to a share of public goods. Throughout, a 
	  
	  
13	  
rhetoric of taxpayer rights, entitlement to certain public resources, and the fairness 
(or not) of the tax structure permeated the debate. Ultimately, the triumph of a 
particular, racialized, suburban vision for the metropolitan future contributed to a 
larger project of naturalizing political boundaries such as school districts and city 
lines in Greater Denver. In the process, it enabled white Coloradans from diverse 
ideological perspectives to coalesce around an individualist, consumerist, and 
ostensibly race-neutral political language while forcing blacks and Hispanics to 
adopt a similar vocabulary in pressing their own agendas. 
 Chapter two follows the story of the 1976 Winter Olympics and Denver's ill-
fated bid to host the Games. In 1972, Denver became the only city in history to win a 
bid to host the Olympics and then reject hosting the Games when citizens passed, by 
overwhelming margins, a constitutional amendment banning public funding. This 
episode marked the powerful emergence of a nascent grassroots political culture in 
Colorado, especially metropolitan Denver, around the concepts of quality of life, 
citizen participation, and government transparency. The anti-Olympics coalition 
that emerged joined urban and suburban, white, black, and Hispanic, affluent and 
working-class voters in an effort to block the Games. The success of this movement, I 
argue, signaled the growing importance of this new political sensibility, creating the 
conditions for the dramatic success of candidates who adopted it in the 1974 
elections. At the same time, the fragility of the coalition and its inability to 
substantively address citizens’ concerns across racial and class lines highlights the 
centrality of a color-blind mythos to this emerging politics. 
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 The 1974 election in Colorado brought a raft of politicians, mostly Democrats, 
into power on the strength of their espousal of the new quality of life politics so 
visible at the grassroots during the anti-Olympics fight. Tracing the rising 
prominence of this rhetoric within both major parties nationally, with particular 
attention to the Democratic politicians who swept Colorado in 1974, is the work of 
chapter three. Most notably, these reform politicians included Governor Richard 
Lamm, Congressman (and later Senator) Tim Wirth, and Senator Gary Hart who 
came to office fresh from defeat on the campaign trail as manager of George 
McGovern’s unsuccessful 1972 presidential bid. Following these politicians forward 
into the 1980s, I show how the politics of quality of life and government 
accountability were, in the hands of ostensibly liberal politicians, readily 
transformed into a pro-market politics that appealed to Colorado’s majority of 
moderate voters while, simultaneously, undercutting traditional liberal policy 
concerns for economic and racial equality. Placing these Colorado politicians in 
national context, I further show how Colorado’s political realignment was both part 
of and a driver for a broad, national transformation. 
 In Part II, "The Real Silent Majority" turns to a series of issues that are 
generally viewed as unambiguous parts of America’s conservative turn. Instead, it 
show how the new politics inflected these debates in complex and surprising ways. 
In 1992, Coloradans’ support of both the Taxpayers Bill of Rights (TABOR) and the 
anti-gay Amendment 2 led many observers to view Colorado as part of a 
conservative vanguard. Yet, that same year, Coloradans decisively rejected George 
Bush and the GOP’s unabashedly conservative “family values” platform, making Bill 
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Clinton their first Democratic pick for president in nearly thirty years. Part II 
explores the deep history of TABOR and Amendment 2. In doing so, it reveals the 
predominance of market-oriented and quality of life ideas—not a burgeoning 
cultural conservatism—in shaping public responses to both issues. This insight has 
important implications, calling into question the pervasive understanding of Newt 
Gingrich’s 1994 “Republican Revolution” as a popular rebuke to the Democrats and a 
culturally conservative mandate for Republicans. Indeed, far from representing 
opposing impulses in American politics, I argue, Clinton’s election and the Contract 
with America two years later together marked the fullest expression of the new 
market-oriented paradigm in American politics. 
 Chapter four focuses on Colorado's long and halting history of anti-tax 
politics. The tax revolt that began in the late 1970s is generally understood as a 
conservative popular movement, proof of the nation’s rightward shift in these 
decades and of the triumph of conservative economic orthodoxy. Yet the long and 
slow progress of anti-tax politics in Colorado reveals a more complex history. Over a 
twenty-five year period beginning in 1966, a variety of anti-tax groups succeeded in 
putting a total of eight proposed constitutional amendments on the state ballot. 
Each went down in defeat, rejected by voters, until the eventual passage of the Tax 
Payers Bill of Rights (TABOR) in 1992. This chapter chronicles the broad skepticism 
of most Coloradans towards tax limits throughout the 1970s and 1980s. It further 
examines the combination of changing political sensibilities and economic 
circumstances that contributed to TABOR’s eventual success. Moreover, it 
demonstrates the importance of catalyzing events (most notably widespread public 
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frustration over the use of tax money to build a new baseball stadium and airport in 
Denver), rather than a dramatic increase in ideological conservatism, in 
precipitating TABOR’s passage. Ultimately, it argues that this popular frustration, 
combined with a widespread shift in economic thinking towards an individualist and 
market-based approach, was the key to the amendment’s success. 
 Even as Coloradans contemplated TABOR, two other issues dominated the 
1992 election cycle. The three-way presidential contest between Republican 
incumbent George Bush, Democratic newcomer Bill Clinton, and independent 
insurgent Ross Perot was, of course, paramount. Almost as important in Colorado, 
however, was Amendment 2, a proposed change to the state constitution that would 
ban any form of legal protection for gays, lesbians, and bisexuals in the Rocky 
Mountain State. Both Amendment 2 and Clinton won. While most commentators 
have understood this as paradoxical, I argue that, in fact, both the election of a self-
styled New Democrat and passage of the anti-gay amendment were extensions of the 
new political culture that had been percolating among the electorate since the late 
1960s. At the ostensible height of family values fervor in the United States, family 
values arguments were remarkably unsuccessful at attracting voters. Instead, the 
amendment’s success relied on a series of racialized arguments about privilege and 
economic access. Moreover, both the Republican and Democratic parties were aware 
of this shift in political sensibilities and their efforts to engage what they saw as a 
new breed of voter. Chapter five chronicles the history of gay rights politics in 
Colorado and the central role of quality of life politics, not rising conservatism, in the 
	  
	  
17	  
passage of Amendment 2 and in shaping American politics more broadly during this 
period. 
Although Richard Nixon coined the term “silent majority” in an effort to 
claim the mass of white, middle-class and lower-middle-class voters for the GOP—a 
population that came to be seen as a bulwark of a growing conservative, Republican 
majority— my dissertation demonstrates that adherents of this new, trans-partisan 
quality of life politics formed the real silent majority of late-twentieth century 
America. Their emphasis on quality of life issues and its concomitant, local citizen 
control, are central to understanding the trajectory of American democracy and 
political democracy in the last third of the twentieth century. By placing these 
Americans and their concerns at the center, my dissertation offers an important 
corrective to the conventional narrative of conservative ascendance and liberal 
decline that has dominated both popular and scholarly conceptions of the period. 
 
	  
	  
18	  
 
 
Chapter 1:  
"Preserving Our Way of Life": Annexation, Political Power, and the 
Color Line in Greater Denver, 1962–1974 
In 1966, residents of Greenbelt, a small community bordering Denver to the 
east, held a special election to decide whether to become part of the neighboring 
town of Greenwood. To outsiders, the stakes may have seemed small, but for 
Greenbelt residents, the future of their community and their very way of life hung in 
the balance. A flyer produced by the pro-annexation Greenbelt Steering Committee 
presented the question in stark terms: below a drawing of a white man cowering 
behind a large eight ball, the text warned, “In the near future, we’ll HAVE to annex 
either to Denver or to Greenwood. We CANNOT afford to stay as we are.” Another 
flyer featured a white woman holding her head in confusion and asking, “What’s All 
This Noise About Annexation?” In response, the Committee explained, “IT’S NOT 
NOISE, MA’AM! IT’S VITAL TO YOU AND YOUR CHILDREN” to vote for 
annexation to Greenwood in order to keep the Greenbelt way of life and “our orderly 
growth.” The flyer continued, suggesting that Greenbelt and Greenwood should put 
aside their previous differences and join forces to confront a common enemy: 
Denver.11 The flyer ended in bold print and capital letters, “Protect our 
schools…Protect our tax base…Join the New Greenwood.” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Greenbelt Steering Committee, “What’s All This Noise About Annexation?” (c. Nov, 1966), 
Tom Currigan Papers, Box 16, Folder 32, Denver Public Library, Western History & 
Genealogy Division. 
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Figure 1. Flyer: “What’s all this noise about annexation?”  
Other materials from the same campaign were even more alarmist: A third flyer, 
this one titled “INVASION BY INTERSECTION!,” used angry red and black 
illustrations and an explosive font to warn that, “Denver IS invading us down the 
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highway!” and that, unless Greenbelt became part of Greenwood, it would lose its 
tax base, its schools, and, again, its “way of life.”12 
 
Figure 2. Flyer: “Invasion by Intersection!” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Greenbelt Steering Committee, “INVASION BY INTERSECTION,” (c. Nov, 1966), Tom 
Currigan Papers, Box 16, Folder 32, Denver Public Library, Western History & Genealogy 
Division. 
	  
	  
21	  
The “way of life” to which the Greenbelt Steering Committee referred was a 
suburban one of quiet streets, good schools, high property values, and prosperous 
young families. In short, the postwar American dream. And, although they rarely 
articulated it in such explicit terms, it was, without exception, a white one, 
predicated on racial exclusivity and the invisible yet tightly drawn, vigilantly 
patrolled lines that separated suburban Denverites from their urban neighbors. As 
in other metropolitan areas across the rapidly urbanizing Sunbelt South and West, 
federal housing policy and capital investment in industry and military installations, 
combined with the political efforts of local boosters, created metropolitan Denver’s 
explosive growth. They did so in ways that intentionally extended and strengthened 
racial and socioeconomic divisions that already marked the region’s landscape. 
The Greenbelt annexation vote was on the leading edge of a thorough-going 
renegotiation of the political, economic, and racial status quo across metropolitan 
Denver during the 1960s and 1970s. It sat at the intersection of several tectonic 
shifts underway throughout the Front Range and, indeed, the state. As the Greater 
Denver area grew exponentially, citizens and their leaders debated the appropriate 
relationship between the city and its new suburbs on matters ranging from cultural 
amenities, to essential public services and infrastructure, to education and social 
provision. 
Although many issues played into these fights over annexation, school 
desegregation became the battlefield on which they were most fiercely fought. At the 
time of the Greenbelt annexation vote, Denver had just begun to discuss the 
possibility of a school desegregation plan. By 1974, when Coloradans finally passed a 
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constitutional amendment that effectively ended Denver’s ability to annex suburban 
territory, the city was under order from the United States Supreme Court to use 
busing to correct the extreme racial imbalance within its public schools. The violent, 
militaristic language with which the Greenbelt Steering Committee discussed 
annexation and the threat that Denver, particularly its public schools, posed to 
suburban children highlights the intensity of feeling that citizens brought to the 
debate and their understanding of the link between the demarcation of political 
boundaries and the (also linked) economic and cultural security of their 
communities. 
During the decade and a half of their duration, the “Annexation Wars,” as 
they were dubbed by Denver’s two major local newspapers, the Rocky Mountain 
News and the Denver Post, provided a focal point for a far-reaching debate among 
citizens of metropolitan Denver—residents of both the city and the suburbs—about 
the future of their metropolis: Did Denverites imagine their metropolis as some sort 
of cohesive whole—a community spanning municipal boundaries, united by a shared 
pool of natural resources, economic engines, cultural institutions, and social 
obligations? Or did they view the region as a patchwork of politically, economically, 
and socially autonomous communities, defined by clearly marked and closely 
guarded municipal boundaries? These were questions whose importance stretched 
far beyond the immediate issue of whether to allow Denver to incorporate outlying 
suburban territory into the city limits; they were also the unspoken questions 
underlying debates about access to water, the location of industrial and nuclear 
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facilities, construction of affordable housing, school desegregation, and many more 
issues that gripped the region over the ensuing decades.  
* * * 
 A visitor to Denver at the start of the 1960s would have found a city that, in 
many ways, still felt like a small town. Nestled on the high plains just east of the 
Rockies, with a population of not quite 500,000, the Mile High City still served 
primarily as a clearinghouse for the products of miners and ranchers on the far side 
of the mountains. Great expanses of prairie extended to the north, south, and east, 
while a smattering of mountain towns dotted the foothills to the west. But signs of 
change were all around. Arriving at Stapleton International Airport, this visitor 
would have landed at one of the nation’s first jet-ready facilities, where a rapidly 
expanding roster of flights connected travelers to New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, 
and London. The drive towards downtown would have passed by the city’s growing 
network of parks, skyscrapers under construction, major slum clearance and urban 
renewal projects underway, and a vibrant cultural scene including museums, a zoo, 
and even a ballet. Perhaps the visitor came for meetings at one of the new corporate 
headquarters beginning to populate the city’s business district or treatment at 
Denver’s world-renowned National Jewish Health, a premier center for treatment 
and research of respiratory disease and allergies. Then again, the visit might have 
been prompted by the allure of the mountains and the area’s famously clean air, 
blue skies, and alpine beauty. 
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Driving out of town, our visitor would have encountered yet more signs of 
change. While Denver itself was bustling with new economic activity, it was the 
suburbs that experienced the most dramatic growth. In 1940, nearly three-quarters 
of the metropolitan area's population lived within the Denver city limits (indeed, to 
call the vast and almost entirely undeveloped area surrounding Denver 
“metropolitan” might have raised eyebrows among the city’s old guard). Over the 
next decade, however, the suburbs boomed. Denver’s own impressive population 
growth of thirty percent—twice the national average—paled in comparison to the 
remarkable 73.5 percent increase in neighboring Adams, Arapahoe, and Jefferson 
Counties. And the disparity only grew. During the 1950s, the rate of suburban 
growth doubled as corporate executives, government employees, scientists and 
engineers, and military personnel flocked to new housing developments on the urban 
fringe in search of economic opportunity and Colorado’s much-touted quality of life. 
By 1960, Greater Denver was home to almost a million people, more than half of 
whom lived in the suburbs.13 
All this development and bustle marked a dramatic shift. Prior to World War 
II, Denver was a sleepy cattletown with a small business elite servicing the state’s 
dominant mining and ranching industries.14 By 1960, however, the rapid influx of 
newcomers to the metro area had made the Rocky Mountain State one of the ten 
fastest growing states in the nation. Over eighty percent of Coloradans lived in the 
increasingly urbanized Front Range corridor that extended from Ft. Collins in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Stephen J. Leonard and Thomas J. Noel, Denver: Mining Camp to Metropolis, (Denver: 
University of Colorado Press, 1990). 
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north to Colorado Springs in the south with Denver at its center. These newcomers 
were drawn by new economic opportunities in Colorado’s burgeoning corporate, 
government, and tourism sectors. At the same time, rural counties that depended on 
the state's dwindling extractive industries lost population, creating a new imbalance 
between metropolitan Denver and the rest of the state (Figure 3).15 
 
Figure 3. Population Growth in Colorado, 1960–1970. 
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Our visitor no doubt would have been impressed by all this construction and 
new infrastructure, the product of Denver’s rapid transformation from small town to 
modern city, from prairie to expansive subdivisions and highways lined with new 
businesses. But the landscape was also marked, if less visibly, by the intense 
political contests that brought the new metropolis into being. Growth was not 
accidental nor was it uncontested. Rather, as in so many Sunbelt cities, it was the 
product of an intentional business strategy designed by Denver boosters and the 
chamber of commerce, in concert with local, state, and federal policies. During the 
1950s and ‘60s, government at every level, from federal to local, pursued an agenda 
that scholars have termed “growth liberalism.” It comprised a wide array of 
spending initiatives, from social welfare policies like social security and mortgage 
underwriting, to infrastructure projects like the construction of the interstate 
highway system, and a dramatic increase in government subsidies for defense-based 
research and development. These policies reflected their advocates’ belief in the 
ability of state power, correctly applied, to create, subsidize, and stabilize private 
markets, creating economic prosperity while at the same time alleviating inequality. 
Growth liberalism had the direct effect of encouraging metropolitan growth 
everywhere but especially in the Sunbelt South and West where most federal 
defense spending was concentrated and where “business friendly” tax and labor 
policies encouraged capital investment. Within this context, local governments 
across the country vied for industry, government spending, and population, using 
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metropolitan growth in both number of residents and spatial footprint as a 
benchmark of success.16 
While growth liberalism spurred development and shaped local policy 
imperatives across the country, it had its greatest impact in the Sunbelt. Federal 
policies moved capital and resources to the south and west, encouraging businesses 
and people to follow. In addition to building the highways and funding the water and 
energy development projects that made possible the region’s explosive economic and 
metropolitan growth, many federal agencies established major offices in Colorado, 
and military bases built during wartime continued to serve as important training 
and research facilities. Veterans returning from Europe and Asia in 1945 recalled 
with fondness their training in Colorado and settled there after the war. They were 
joined by a steady stream of military personnel, scientists, and engineers working at 
Lowery Air Force Base in Denver, Buckley Air Force Base in suburban Aurora, and 
the chemical weapons manufacturing center at Rocky Mountain Arsenal. Indeed, in 
the postwar years, Greater Denver became a major military and federal government 
hub, drawing thousands of workers to the area.17 
 Denver boosters, like their counterparts in Phoenix, Charlotte, and Atlanta, 
sought not only to take advantage of favorable government programs but to actively 
shape policy to their interests. Economic growth was, boosters argued, inherently 
competitive, and it was the role of the state to use taxation, land use policy, and 
labor law as recruitment tools to attract capital that would otherwise flow to 
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metropolises with more favorable business climates. Just as proponents of growth 
liberalism measured national progress in terms of increases in gross domestic 
product, so boosters measured success locally by Denver’s ability to attract new 
companies and residents and by the physical expansion of the metropolis.18 As then-
governor John Love explained to an interviewer a decade later, “We wanted 
industrial parks, factories—all the economic growth we could get.”19 To “Keep 
Colorado growing!,” Love launched a “Sell Colorado” campaign in 1966, sending local 
businessmen on “missions” across the country and around the world, with the 
objective of convincing major corporations to relocate to or open regional 
headquarters in Colorado. Local business associations like the Colorado Ski 
Information Center, big businesses including major airlines with Western hubs in 
Denver, and ranchers looking to cash in on an emerging land boom all joined the 
effort. Meanwhile, with winter sports becoming a national obsession, Colorado 
businessmen were quick to dub their home state “Ski Country USA.” Traditional 
Colorado industries like mining and ranching gave way to tourism, recreation, and 
finance. Overall, boosters and their supporters in state government evoked a heavily 
corporate and pro-growth vision for the state’s future with an expanding 
metropolitan Denver as the economic driver.20 
* * * 
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20 On growth liberalism see Needham, Power Lines; Lassiter, The Silent Majority; Elizabeth 
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The fundamental political-economic challenge of the postwar era was 
negotiating access to resources and the distribution of the tax burden that supported 
them. In metro Denver, this took many forms, from struggles over access to basic 
services like sewerage, fire, police, and schools, to battles for control of vital natural 
resources such as water. These challenges animated politics not just within the 
metropolis between Denver and its suburbs and among the suburbs themselves but 
also between the metropolitan Front Range as a whole—symbolized by Denver—and 
the rest of the state. This was most clearly illustrated in the case of water. As the 
state’s largest (indeed, only) major population center, metro Denver used close to 
eighty percent of Colorado’s water resources, almost all pumped in from reservoirs 
across the mountains, far the west. In this context, voting against Denver in a host 
of seemingly unrelated state-wide ballot initiatives became a vehicle for “out state” 
Coloradans to express their displeasure with Denver’s control of resources drawn 
from within their communities and with what they perceived as the city’s growing 
political supremacy. Within the metropolis, meanwhile, suburban counties accused 
Denver of wielding access to water as a cudgel, charging suburbanites higher rates 
than Denver residents paid in an effort to extort money from the more affluent 
suburbs and, ultimately, to coerce them into petitioning for annexation to the city, 
where they would bolster the dwindling urban tax base and thus help support an 
array of programs for the benefit of poor and minority Denverites. In response, the 
Denver Water Board argued that differential water rates were a fair recognition of 
the fact that Denver residents paid for the construction, maintenance, and operation 
of the water system through their taxes, while suburbanites did not. 
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In 1962, at the height of the boom, a revision of Colorado’s municipal annexation 
laws made the process of adding new territory into the Denver city limits markedly 
easier, with the result that annexation petitions soared and large swaths of formerly 
suburban territory were incorporated into the city itself. Tensions between Denver 
and the surrounding counties ran high, as city and suburbs battled for control. That 
same year, the Supreme Court’s ruling in Baker v. Carr brought Colorado’s long-
simmering malapportionment crisis to a head. Activists in metro Denver, led by the 
League of Women Voters, had long argued that the existing system of legislative 
apportionment in Colorado was outdated and undemocratic, concentrating political 
power in the sparsely populated western counties while the growing majority of 
voters in the Front Range surrounding Denver lacked sufficient representation (See 
Figures 4 through 6). Now, with the Court’s blessing, they filed suit in federal 
district court, demanding reapportionment of the state legislature and Colorado’s 
congressional districts. 
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Figure 4. Population of Districts, 1960 Census. 
 
Figure 5. Colorado Senate apportionment: 1962 and 1964.  
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Figure 6. Colorado General Assembly apportionment: 1962 and 1964. 
 The legislative reapportionment case, Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Colorado 
General Assembly, eventually made its way to the Supreme Court and, in 1964, as 
part of a series of high-profile “one man, one vote” rulings, the justices found that all 
state legislatures must be based on population.21 Suddenly, the balance of political 
power in Colorado shifted dramatically. Control over decision making and the 
allocation of public resources was wrested from the hands of the cattlemen and mine 
operators who had wielded power since the state’s founding and was turned over to 
the great mass of the population living within the six counties of metropolitan 
Denver. These Coloradans were often newcomers to the state, well-educated white-
collar workers who came as part of the postwar boom. Others were part of Denver’s 
longstanding black, Hispanic, and Japanese communities. All had competing 
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33	  
interests, and the promise of new-found political power in the reapportioned state 
legislature intensified contests among these groups.22 
* * * 
Since statehood, annexations in Colorado have only been possible when 
initiated by residents or landowners in the areas to be annexed. Until 1962, 
Colorado law made this process extremely difficult. That year, however, the state 
government took a variety of steps to reform the annexation laws, annexation easier. 
Annexation petitions soared, bringing thousands of additional acres of new 
residential, commercial, and industrial land into the city limits by the late 1960s. 
But as the city grew, so did opposition to continued annexation, led by county 
commissioners and school officials in neighboring Adams, Arapahoe, and Jefferson 
counties. A group called FAIR (For Annexation Inequality Repeal) formed and tried 
twice without success—first in 1962 and then again in 1964—to put an initiative on 
the Colorado ballot to amend the state constitution to effectively prevent Denver 
from any future annexations. They never collected enough signatures to get the 
initiative on the ballot, though, highlighting the intense disagreement among even 
suburban voters on this issue. Given the virulent anti-annexation sentiment 
expressed by many suburban residents and officials by the early 1970s and the 
ultimate passage of an anti-Denver annexation constitutional amendment, it is 
important to note that the property owners in suburban areas—whether that meant 
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land developers or residents—had to petition the city for annexation. Denver could 
not legally initiate annexation proceedings. 
Throughout the mid-1960s, both urban and suburban officials pushed for a 
resolution to these “Annexation Wars.” The conflict spawned a governor’s 
commission to explore the issue, along with calls from various groups either for a 
moratorium on Denver annexations, reorganization of the metropolitan area under a 
unified regional government, or more rarely both. This led eventually to another 
major overhaul of state annexation laws in 1966. By decade’s end, annexation had 
become the overwhelming political issue in metropolitan Denver, fueled by the city’s 
initiation of a school desegregation plan, which had the potential to involve any area 
annexed by Denver in busing for integration. 
The conflict between Denver and its suburbs continued until 1974, when 
Colorado voters, by a sizable majority, passed the Poundstone Amendment, ending 
Denver annexation. The text was essentially unchanged from the earlier FAIR 
amendments. What had changed, however, were the circumstances: The 1974 
election came close on the heels of two crucial Supreme Court rulings. The first in 
1973, Keyes v. School District No. 1, effectively ended the fight to stop school 
desegregation in Denver, finding that the school system there was, in fact, 
segregated and that busing should be used to remedy the situation.23 The second 
case, Milliken v. Bradley, from Detroit, held by a 5–4 vote, that suburban school 
systems could not be forced to participate in busing or other remedies designed to 
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alleviate segregation in the core-city schools.24 Coming just before the vote on the 
Poundstone Amendment, Milliken v. Bradley was critical to the amendment’s 
success. By exempting suburbs from school desegregation mandates, the Supreme 
Court gave sudden urgency to white, suburban parents’ desires to remain outside 
the bounds of both the city of Denver and its school system. In this highly charged 
context, the Poundstone Amendment sailed to victory.25 
* * * 
 The official Denver position on annexation was, essentially, a booster vision. 
From the editorial boards of the otherwise-politically opposed Denver Post and Rocky 
Mountain News to mayors Tom Currigan and Bill McNichols, who governed the city 
throughout the 1960s and into the 1970s, city leaders forcefully argued for Denver’s 
central and expansive role within the region, the state as a whole, and, indeed, 
throughout the Mountain West. In a statement on annexation circulated in August 
1973, Mayor McNichols made the case: “Denver is the heart of the front range region 
of our state.” Denver held not only classic urban resources, like “the libraries, the 
zoo, the Art Museum... the convention centers, and the sports arena;” it was also 
responsible for funding the construction of many of the Front Range’s most beloved 
attractions outside the city limits, including the Red Rocks Amphitheater just west 
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of Denver and the Mountain Park system, which together attracted hundreds of 
thousands of visitors from throughout Colorado and around the country each year.26 
Mayor McNichols reminded suburbanites that the water system Denver paid 
for made the very existence of their communities possible, while the public transit 
system constructed through a property bond on Denver homes extended far out into 
the suburbs, making the core city and its amenities more accessible. Finally, he 
argued, 
it is Denver as the “little Washington” of our nation, which acts not 
only as a magnet to attract tourists who then proceed to visit all 
portions of Colorado but also makes it possible and feasible for federal 
installations to be located in the counties adjacent to us. 
 The international airport built and operated through Denver taxes was the “focal 
point of the entire Rocky Mountain region and one of the prime reasons the 
metropolitan area and the State of Colorado enjoy a viable economy.”27 Boosters and 
city officials made the case for mutual dependence between Denver and its suburbs 
on broad terms. Their arguments reflected a vision for the metropolitan future that 
was regional in scope. Denver and its suburbs, in this view, were symbiotic, 
naturally operating not as a series of separate and fragmented entities but as a 
unified whole with the city as the political, economic, and cultural center. 
As the pro-annexation rhetoric of Denver’s mayors and boosters made clear, 
the city’s boosters had an expansive vision for the future of their region. 
Significantly, this vision was predicated on an understanding of the entire 
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metropolitan area as a unified whole. As the Rocky Mountain News put it in a four-
part 1966 series titled “Annexation: Key to Our Future,” “There’s a close 
interdependence between the core city and its suburbs.”28 A mid-sixties study of 
annexation produced by the City Club of Denver described the city’s cultural pull 
throughout the metropolitan area, noting that suburbanites traveling outside 
Colorado would typically identify themselves as being from Denver when asked. “In 
the larger sense,” the City Club argued, “the suburbs are but a part of Denver” and 
“Government policy, laws and proposals for change which fail to recognize the fact of 
interdependency and which aim at a goal other than the greater good of the 
metropolitan area can only lead to the wrong solution of a given metro area 
problem.”29 
City officials like McNichols as well as boosters made the case for mutual 
dependence between Denver and its suburbs on broad terms. After describing 
Denver as the economic engine and cultural center of the Front Range and, indeed, 
all of Colorado, McNichols went on to chastise the suburbs for their thankless 
attitude towards the city, which he claimed they threatened with “dismemberment.” 
He then denounced calls from suburban lawmakers for a special session of the 
legislature to address annexation as an effort with the “sole purpose of destroying 
Denver and its future.” As “Mayor of this great city,” he pledged to “do all in my 
power to thwart those who intend to harm Denver or its citizens.”30 
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Nowhere was this interdependence more important than on matters of race 
and poverty. In a story instantly familiar from metropolitan areas across the 
country, the bulk of Denver’s growth from the 1950s onwards took place on the city’s 
suburban periphery. A combination of white flight and the migration of white 
families from out of state directly to the Denver suburbs meant that, by the 1970 
census, the majority of greater Denver’s population resided outside the core city. 
And yet the vast majority of the metro area’s poor and minority residents—roughly 
eighty percent, according to a 1972 study by the Denver Regional Council of 
Governments lived in Denver itself. In his 1973 statement on annexation, Mayor 
McNichols ran through a litany of the suburban counties, highlighting their share of 
the total population and comparing it to their share of affordable housing units: to 
the north and east, 200,000 residents in Adams, with 1,870 affordable housing units 
and 200,000 residents in Arapahoe County with only 387 units; in the west, nearly 
250,000 residents in Jefferson County, and only 495 total units of affordable 
housing. By contrast, Denver’s population in 1972 was 525,000—less than 50% of 
the metro area’s 1.2 million total—but the city provided 77% of all affordable 
housing units in the region.31 
McNichols was not the first Denver mayor to highlight this disparity in the 
distribution of minority and poor residents and the city’s outsized role in providing 
them with housing and basic services. Both Tom Currigan and Ben Stapleton, 
McNichols’ predecessors in office, made the same case. That all three of Denver’s 
postwar mayors connected the issue of providing for low-income citizens of 
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metropolitan Denver (who were often assumed to be either Black or Hispanic) to the 
question of annexation goes far towards illuminating their general understanding of 
how the metropolitan area functioned: that is, as a single organism. Rather than 
describe the poor and minority populations of each county, for example, McNichols 
was careful to discuss the poor and minority populations of the metropolitan area as 
a whole and each county’s “share” of that total. To a significant degree, his argument 
in favor of regional government or, failing that, annexation, was that Denver was 
doing more than its fair share of providing these types of services—just as it 
provided more than its fair share of parks, museums, hospitals, water, and other 
amenities—and that the other counties of the metro area needed to contribute in an 
equitable way. 
This cohesive, regional vision is strikingly different from the typical ways in 
which politicians and citizens frequently approach the question of amenities and 
service provision within metropolitan areas, particularly on questions of race and 
poverty. Where the tendency is often to naturalize political boundaries, viewing 
them as insurmountable features of the landscape that then justify policies of class 
and racial containment by making each distinct county or municipality’s population 
strictly its own affair, Denver boosters and politicians argued precisely the opposite. 
Given their organic and interconnected understanding of the metropolis, it is 
unsurprising that both the Currigan and McNichols administrations actively 
advocated for the creation of a unified metropolitan government. Both saw 
annexation as only a “stop-gap measure” for bringing regional issues like water 
provision, fire protection, zoning, and resource allocation more generally under a 
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central authority. Regional government, they both argued, would ultimately be 
necessary in order to resolve what Currigan described as the “chaos of multiple and 
often overlapping jurisdictions gripping the metropolitan area.”32 
The alternative, boosters argued, was grim. The Rocky Mountain News listed 
other Sunbelt cities with which Denver perceived itself to be in competition—
Houston, Phoenix, Wichita, Oklahoma City—and warned that all of them were 
outpacing the Mile High City in terms of acres annexed.33 The Denver Post’s editorial 
board predicted gloomily that, without continued annexation, the city would become 
“completely closed in by incorporated communities, sealing its own fate.” It went on 
to caution that continued suburban expansion without growth in Denver itself would 
put “an ever-increasing burden on the core city’s streets, parks and other public 
facilities,” hastening Denver’s decline and producing “ever-increasing urban renewal 
problems and a declining tax base.” Suburban communities would also suffer, forced 
to provide essential services for themselves for the first time at what the Post 
presumed would be far greater cost than they currently paid to Denver for the same 
services.34 
Denver residents and boosters who supported annexation were not 
necessarily liberals or even Democrats. Though their core arguments stemmed from 
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34 “Sometimes ‘Trouble’ Stands for ‘Progress,’” Denver Post, July 27, 1962. 
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a conviction that Denver and its region could function only as a cohesive whole, 
many also feared, like long-time conservative city councilman Ted Hackworth, that 
unless new suburban developments were incorporated into the city, Denver would be 
overrun by minorities and the poor. At the same time, there were Denver citizens 
who resisted the booster vision altogether. These Denverites argued, as Mrs. Betty 
Morris did in a July 1963 letter to Mayor Currigan, that Denver schools were 
already over-crowded and that adding new students from annexed areas would only 
worsen the problem. Others, like Mrs. W. A. Callagan, wrote to complain that 
annexations create “more expense on Denver tax payers for improvements, schools, 
and everything else it includes” in the newly annexed areas.35 On the whole, though, 
support for annexation was high among Denverites, as evidenced by their 
resounding vote to defeat the anti-annexation Poundstone Amendment in 1974. 
Conversely, some percentage of suburbanites supported a more expansive 
view of Denver’s role in the growth of the metro region, actively seeking their own 
annexation. As both Mayors Currigan and McNichols were at pains to point out, 
Denver never initiated annexation proceedings. Only suburban residents and 
landowners themselves could initiate a petition for annexation to Denver,36 and the 
extensive annexations during the 1960s—thousands of acres annually—testified to 
the desire of some suburbanites to become part of the city. These residents usually 
cited access to lower water rates and lower taxes as benefits of becoming part of 
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Denver. Some, for example many residents of the Sheridan development in 
suburban Adams County who sought annexation in 1963, were frustrated with what 
they perceived as a chaotic and inadequate suburban school system.37 In 1966, when 
a commission to study possible revisions of the annexation laws threatened to 
restrict Denver’s ability to annex, the city was inundated by a glut of annexation 
petitions from suburban areas, all clamoring to be incorporated into Denver ahead of 
any change.38 
* * * 
Despite some suburban support for Denver annexation, the metropolitan 
vision articulated by suburban county and school officials—and the one that came to 
be espoused by homeowner associations and other civic groups as well as, ultimately, 
the majority who voted in favor of the Poundstone Amendment—was distinctly 
different. While Denver officials and boosters viewed the city and its suburbs as a 
unified whole, anti-annexation suburbanites argued strongly for the distinct 
character of suburban communities and their political, economic, and above all social 
and cultural separation from the core city. In this view, Denver annexation 
threatened the suburban “way of life” and “quality of life,” along with the all-
important suburban property values. Op-eds in suburban newspapers, statements 
by suburban officials, “fact sheets” and flyers produced by suburban county 
commissioners and homeowners’ associations all depicted Denver as a stagnant and 
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chaotic city—a “bully” conspiring to “black jack” suburbanites into paying exorbitant 
taxes and forfeiting their right to a lifestyle of their choosing. 
Anti-annexation advocates generally declined to be explicit about what they 
meant by suburban “quality of life,” but the implication was clear. Essentially, their 
complaint amounted to “not Denver” and, although they rarely expressed it in so 
many words, not Hispanic or black. The specter of a menacingly “chaotic” and 
“disorderly” Denver requires imagining Denver’s suburbs as an orderly and 
harmonious alternative, which they were not. Colorado had, and still has, some of 
the most lax land use regulations of any state in the country, and suburban 
development in the 1960s and ‘70s was, essentially, a free-for-all. This fixation on 
Denver’s supposed “chaos,” then, was less a response to a real urban threat than an 
evocation of long-standing tropes about the unsavory, disorderly, and even 
unhealthful nature of cities tied directly to their minority and immigrant 
populations.39 
Against this background, the campaign to keep Denver from annexing 
Greenbelt and Greenwood Village by uniting the two suburban communities shows 
that, as early as the mid-1960s, when Denver first began to address the problem of 
school segregation, residents of the suburbs sought to draw bright lines between 
themselves and the core city. While suburbanites rarely acknowledged the racial 
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content of their concerns for their “way of life,” these fears lay only barely below the 
surface. One pamphlet titled, “What the Greenwood Village Annexation Means to Us 
and Our Way of Life” came closest. The cover depicted a white man holding his child 
on his shoulders, the child covering the father’s eyes. On the next page, the 
pamphlet warned that “they”—meaning Denver—“are coming at us by way of the 
Valley Highway—with a bankrupt (bare bones) city budget, split-session schools, a 
long bus ride away, large problems of crime in the streets and extra sales tax.” The 
pamphlet went so far as to compare Denver to an invading Nazi army, warning that, 
“If we keep our heads in the sand and keep thinking nothing will change, they will 
out-flank us just like Hitler outflanked France’s Maginot Line.” Mixing metaphors 
somewhat, it concludes by predicting that, if this is allowed to happen, “Denver just 
won’t go away. Instead Denver will come our way…pick our ostrich plumes…take 
our schools, our tax base and our way of life.”40 In this context, as in the other pro-
Greenwood materials, “protecting our way of life” was but a thinly veiled suggestion 
that Denver posed an existential threat to white families—especially children. 
As these flyers from Greenbelt reveal, protecting the suburban “way of life” 
was, to a very large extent, about keeping white, suburban children out of the 
Denver schools. The same pamphlet that compared Denver to Hitler’s invading Nazi 
army went on to proclaim, “There is no disagreement that the residents of this area 
would like to keep intact the [suburban] School District, of which we are so proud.” 
The only alternative, it warned, was becoming part of the Denver schools, which 
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were “already over-crowded, looking for more capital funds, running split sessions, 
and in many cases bussing children—they could be your own children—to far-
distant schools for a variety of questionable reasons.”41 Of course the “questionable 
reasons” for busing had to do with school desegregation, with which the Denver 
School Board had just begun to grapple that year. The reference to busing here is 
particularly noteworthy because in 1966, when the pamphlet was written, busing 
had not yet begun and was still in an early planning stage. Nevertheless, the specter 
of mandatory integration was sufficient to scare a majority of Greenbelt residents 
into voting to avoid being annexed to Denver. 
Where others hedged, Cherry Creek Schools Superintendent Otis Dickey was 
unusually blunt. In an interview with the Denver Post, he argued that the desire to 
remain outside the Denver school system had already motivated white suburban 
parents, many recently arrived scientists and engineers employed in Denver’s new 
“think” industries, to vote against many annexation proposals. Drawing a direct link 
between racial exclusivity and economic growth, Dickey asserted that maintaining 
the color line was vital to the continued prosperity of the metropolitan region as a 
whole. Well-educated newcomers, he explained, “do not want their children exposed 
to the minority and slum problems of core city schools,” but rather demand small 
suburban districts that can “concentrate on excellence.” He contended that 
conditions in the Denver schools had already cost the region, as some industries 
chose to bypass Denver in favor of other cities with more “favorable” conditions.42 
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Putting the “Annexation Wars” in the context of Denver’s school 
desegregation struggle brings the racial nature of the annexation controversy—and, 
indeed, the entire debate over the future of the metropolis—into stark relief. School 
integration in Denver did not become a matter of discussion until the mid-1960s. 
Before that time, schools hardly factored in anti-annexation rhetoric at all. In 1962 
and again in 1964, the anti-annexation group FAIR could not muster enough 
signatures even to get their anti-annexation amendment on the state ballot—never 
mind to get it added to Colorado’s constitution. But 1964 was also the year in which 
civil rights activists in Denver began pushing to integrate the city’s schools. By 1966, 
when the Greenwood/Greenbelt annexation issue came to a vote, pressure for reform 
from both African Americans and Hispanics had reached high intensity and busing 
seemed imminent. 
In 1968, at the urging of Denver’s first black school board member, Rachel 
Noel, the board passed Resolution 1490, mandating the desegregation of the Denver 
schools through busing among other means. A lengthy, headline-grabbing 
controversy ensued, punctuated by the implementation (and then cessation) of a 
busing plan and, ultimately, a Supreme Court ruling in 1973 mandating busing for 
desegregation within the Denver schools. The next year, the Supreme Court’s ruling 
in the Detroit busing case, Milliken v. Bradley, held it unconstitutional to forcibly 
involve suburban areas in solutions to urban school segregation—effectively siding 
with those like the suburban Denver anti-annexation activists who viewed 
metropolitan regions not as unified wholes but rather as a patchwork of autonomous 
political entities without obligations beyond their own city lines. As the Detroit case 
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made its nationally publicized way to the Supreme Court, Greenwood Republican 
activist and future Greenwood Village mayor Freda Poundstone resurrected the old 
FAIR amendment to make future Denver annexations essentially impossible and the 
initiative, now dubbed the Poundstone Amendment, won decisively. 
While anti-annexation activists insisted that race and class were unrelated to 
their desire to restrict Denver’s growth and, consequently, its power within the 
metropolitan region and the state, Denver boosters sought whenever possible to 
bring this unsightly feature of anti-annexation sentiment into view. In August 1973, 
for example, just after the Supreme Court’s ruling in the Denver busing case, a 
suburban newspaper, the Lakewood Sentinel, quoted an anonymous Denver official 
as saying, “The plain fact is some people in the suburbs just don’t want their kids 
going to school with minority races.” Alan Canter, director of the Denver planning 
office, made much the same point, responding dismissively to suburban claims that 
taxes and municipal services were the true issues: “You don’t really think that’s the 
main problem,” he chided, “The real trouble is the school problem, and the white 
flight to the suburbs only exacerbates the problem.”43 
Of course, school busing was also controversial within Denver itself. And 
supporters of Denver annexation and of Denver school integration were not alone in 
observing the covert racial character of the “Annexation Wars.” Members of the 
Denver anti-busing group CANS—Citizens Association for Neighborhood Schools—
were quick to point out the hypocrisy of white suburbanites who denounced the 
working-class, white Denver anti-busing activists from the safety of their suburban 
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homes. A December 1974, CANS cartoon commenting on the passage of the 
Poundstone Amendment depicted two Denver children, both white, looking on sadly 
as white men wearing shirts labeled “Arapahoe” and “Englewood”—one a suburban 
county, the other a town—built a brick wall to keep them out. On the wall, a sign 
proclaimed “Achtung! You are entering Das Arapahoe Zone. Only authentic White 
Flight allowed.” The cartoon’s caption, written from the perspective of the wall-
builders, read, “We certainly don’t want any of those little Denver bigots going to 
school with our kids.”44 Much like the Berlin Wall that it invoked, the cartoon 
suggested that suburbanites had, with the Poundstone Amendment, built a durable 
boundary between themselves and Denver. Despite the best efforts of suburban anti-
annexation activists to appear race neutral, the racial content of their campaign was 
abundantly clear. 
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Figure 7. CANS Poundstone Amendment cartoon. 
* * * 
In 1976, two years after the Poundstone vote, members of League of Women 
Voters chapters throughout metropolitan Denver met in small groups to discuss 
their feelings about a variety of challenges facing the region. The ultimate question 
before them: was metropolitan governance desirable and, if so, how could it be 
achieved? While nearly all the League groups agreed that a comprehensive, regional 
government was the way forward on matters of environment, economy, 
infrastructure, and even inequality, ultimately, they believed regional governance 
was doomed to failure. Reporting back to the state LWV headquarters, one board 
member from Adams County noted, “Most members agreed that education is the one 
thing the region could never get together on.” Similar reports emanated from across 
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the region. In Arapahoe, “there was strong opposition to the creation of a single 
school district; busing played a major role in maintaining that fear.” Leaguers in 
Aurora, the large suburban municipality to Denver’s east, were nearly unanimously 
of the opinion that a single regional school district was “totally undesirable,” citing 
busing as “the main reason people would never accept a regional system.” Even in 
Denver itself, few Leaguers held out hope that the problem would ever be resolved. 
Noting that any meaningful solution to the city’s racial problems would necessarily 
be metropolitan in scope and encompass economic integration too, they noted that, 
“busing, of course, was the real issue.” Most Denver members doubted whether their 
suburban neighbors would agree to set aside the boundaries they had so 
meticulously constructed and reinforced. 
In Greater Denver, as in numerous metropolitan areas nationally, matters of 
race, growth, regional balance of power, and quality of life were inextricably linked. 
Suburban racial exclusivity was understood as central to the metropolis’s ability to 
attract new industries and the young, educated families they brought with them, 
thus underwriting the Front Range economic boom. Willingly or not, Denver was 
also conscripted into this project. By containing and providing for the region’s poor 
and minority residents, the core city made possible the reality of suburban 
exclusivity and, with it, the illusion of suburban racial innocence. 
The submerged racial content of conflicts like the Denver Annexation Wars 
becomes visible when considered in terms of broader questions about why certain 
boundaries and consolidations of political power and resources are deemed 
acceptable while others are not. Suburbanites resisted being brought into Denver, 
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ostensibly on the grounds of retaining local control over their “way of life,” yet, at the 
same time, many of these unincorporated subdivisions lobbied to consolidate in their 
own, new, suburban municipality so as to “protect” themselves from any future 
Denver annexation attempt. The desire to retain the most local possible level of 
control was not, then, their vital concern. Instead, the unspoken issue was a specific 
not to be forced to grapple with the challenges of serving its large low-income and 
minority populations. In many ways, then, annexation encapsulated what Robert 
Self has identified as the fundamental political-economic problem of the postwar era: 
reconciling the demand for public services with the distribution of tax burdens.45 The 
debate over fragmentation versus regional cooperation made visible in the landscape 
of the Front Range the often-unseen tension inherent between a patchwork of local 
autonomy and the obligations of mutual care. 
The end of annexation in Denver had important, tangible repercussions. With 
the exception of the hard-won deal to annex territory for a new airport in the mid-
1980s, Denver’s geographic boundaries have remained unchanged since 1974. But 
the true significance of the annexation debates and of the ultimately successful 
effort to limit Denver’s growth lay in the institutionalization of a perspective that 
naturalized metropolitan fragmentation. It put the subject of where to draw political 
boundaries and when it might be appropriate to cross them to achieve policy 
objectives, such as integration, beyond legitimate political debate. As a result, 
suburban voters in particular were empowered, regardless of where they fell on the 
political spectrum, to view questions about taxation, zoning, school funding, and the 
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like as fundamentally market-based questions driven by property values and 
“quality of life” concerns over the safety or physical beauty of their neighborhoods 
rather than as questions about the equitable distribution of resources to all of their 
metropolitan region’s residents.  
The annexation controversy has broader implications for thinking about race 
and policy, demonstrating how the language of racial neutrality could often be used 
to legitimate racially differential outcomes. When viewed in the context of other 
simultaneous controversies like school desegregation, it becomes easier to tease out 
the racial and class dimensions of what might otherwise appear to be race-neutral 
issues like water rates, zoning, or taxes. Naturalizing political boundaries—as 
though they were immovable features of the landscape like the Rocky Mountain—
allowed residents of metropolitan Denver to write off the core city and its citizens as 
beyond the scope of their responsibility. This insistence on the neutrality of political 
boundaries accounts for the broad consensus on these issues from people at 
otherwise distinct ends of the ideological spectrum. 
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Chapter 2:  
“Don’t Californicate Colorado!”: Quality of Life Politics & the 1976 
Winter Olympics 
In 1972, Denver became the first city in history to give up the right to host 
the Olympics after having been awarded the 1976 Winter Games. An intense 
campaign had pitted environmentalists, minorities, and anti-growth quality-of-life 
activists against local boosters and business elites in a protracted battle over state 
funding for the games. Ultimately, many of the same Coloradans who had initially 
expressed great excitement at the coming of the games opposed public funding by 
overwhelming margins in a statewide ballot initiative. Growing fears about tax 
hikes, pollution, and a potential stampede of newcomers to the Rocky Mountain 
State fueled anti-Olympic sentiment, overwhelming the state’s dominant pro-growth 
and pro-business political ethos. At a time of tremendous racial tension in 
metropolitan Denver, residents from across the political and demographic spectrum 
forged an unlikely alliance to beat back booster ambitions. The controversy over 
Denver’s Olympics bid also provided a powerful springboard for local Democrats, 
while at the same time revealing the generally pragmatic, non-partisan, and yet still 
hotly contested nature of Colorado politics. 
The controversy over the 1976 Olympics reveals previously invisible fissures 
in Colorado’s political culture. It also provides a new window into important 
questions about the relationship among place, the built and natural environments, 
the interactions of various demographic groups within metropolitan areas, and 
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political engagement in late-twentieth century America. The success of the anti-
Olympics movement, which had far-reaching implications for Colorado, reflected the 
emergence by the 1970s of a new kind of politics in metropolitan Denver and other 
metropolises across the United States. This new, pragmatic, self-interested, and 
non-ideological ethos became a prominent, perhaps predominant, political 
orientation for many Americans. 
That the anti-Olympics side ultimately won marked a significant shift in 
local political culture away from the rubber stamp the booster agenda had 
previously enjoyed. It also suggests that, even as a pro-growth dynamic has often 
dominated recent American politics, citizens have often disagreed about exactly 
what form growth should take and what growth should look like at the local level. 
Significantly, to the extent that current scholarship has recognized the importance 
to political engagement of changes in metropolitan space, it has tended to see such 
spatial differentiation as a boon to Republicans, who successfully capitalized on 
grassroots suburban politics to attract suburban voters to their fold. The Colorado 
Olympics case, however, suggests that the politics of place are more complex, and 
that, far from being inevitable, the rise of the GOP after the 1960s was the product 
of a series of contests played out in the spaces of metropolitan America. Moreover, a 
focus on metropolitan Denver uncovers the ways in which the new metropolitan 
realities influenced both identity and political engagement for Americans of all 
stripes, not just suburban whites.46 Recent American political history cannot be 
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understood outside the context of the major structural changes in metropolitan 
geography and political economy that transformed American life at that time. The 
evidence from Denver points to a far more nuanced, less partisan politics than has 
yet been realized. 
* * *  
The Denver Olympics controversy pitted a broad coalition of local residents 
against Colorado’s newly-ascendant corporate elite. These boosters, who largely 
controlled state government, emerged rapidly in the aftermath of World War II, 
transforming Denver from a small, staid city into one of the fastest growing 
metropolitan areas in the country. They espoused a key corollary of growth 
liberalism, “metropolitan growth politics,” which understood economic development 
as inherently competitive and argued that the state should use taxation, land use 
policy, and labor laws as recruitment tools to attract capital. Where growth 
liberalism used measures such as GNP and GDP to track growth at the national 
level, proponents of metropolitan growth politics measured local success both by a 
metropolis’s ability to attract new companies and residents and by the physical 
expansion of the metro area.47 In this view, a successful bid for the 1976 Winter 
Olympics would give metropolitan Denver competitive advantages by attracting a 
huge influx of new businesses and residents. 
In the immediate postwar years, Denver had a reputation as a sleepy, self-
satisfied city.48 By the early 1960s, however, a new energy suffused the city and 
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state. Winter sports were becoming a national obsession, and Colorado businessmen 
were quick to dub their home state “Ski Country USA.”49 Traditional Colorado 
industries like mining and ranching gave way to tourism, recreation, and finance. 
As Governor John Love explained to an interviewer a decade later, “We wanted 
industrial parks, factories—all the economic growth we could get.”50 In order to 
“Keep Colorado growing!” the governor launched a “Sell Colorado” campaign in 1966, 
sending local businessmen on “missions” across the country and around the world. 
The objective was to convince major corporations to relocate to or open regional 
headquarters in Colorado. Local business associations—including the Colorado Ski 
Information Center, ranchers looking to cash in on an emerging land boom, and 
major Denver-based corporations such as Samsonite—all joined the effort. 
“Sell Colorado” worked, and between 1960 and 1970, despite shrinking 
populations in rural counties that depended on the old mining and ranching 
economy, the state’s overall population increased by twenty-six percent making 
Colorado one of the five fastest growing states in the country. The overwhelming 
majority of this growth took place in the six Front Range counties of metropolitan 
Denver, fueled by a rush of corporate executives, government workers, and others 
out to cash in on the boom and enjoy the area's much-touted quality of life. The six 
counties surrounding Denver—including Jefferson County, where many Olympic 
events were slated to be held—grew by fifty percent or more and attracted by far the 
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most newcomers in absolute terms.51 Most of these newcomers were business people 
and professionals in tourism, technology, airlines, and other industries that 
established western headquarters in Denver. As a result, the state’s political center 
of gravity shifted towards corporations and affluent, white- collar, suburban 
workers, and away from the traditional influence of agricultural and extractive 
industries like mining, forestry, aquaculture, and energy development. This 
transformation in Colorado reflected broader trends throughout the Mountain West, 
where the percentage of citizens who made their living directly from the land 
dropped from twenty-eight percent at the end of World War II to just six percent by 
1980.52 
Plans to host the 1976 Winter Olympics, although not officially connected to 
Sell Colorado, were part and parcel of this booster strategy. The same Chamber of 
Commerce members who championed the governor’s promotional campaign were 
instrumental in lobbying for his support of Denver’s Olympic bid and then in 
running the Denver Olympic Committee (DOC).53 Efforts to bring the Olympics to 
Denver first began in 1956, when a group of executives from the then-small 
recreational ski industry launched a bid for the 1960 Winter Games. This first 
attempt, which was entirely privately funded and received neither state support nor 
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publicity, failed.54 The 1976 bid, by contrast, drew on both public and private 
resources and enjoyed the full backing of both the city of Denver and state of 
Colorado. Once Denver became the official United States candidate city, the federal 
government also got involved, pledging millions in Olympic support. Although the 
mayor and governor were officially members of the DOC, the 1976 bid was still 
overwhelmingly a booster effort. Throughout the process of becoming the designated 
city and then developing and implementing Olympic plans, Governor Love and 
Mayor Bill McNichols remained marginal figures, attending only a few meetings and 
generally signing off on whatever the executive committee members proposed. 
Executive committee members, for their part, were primarily senior executives in 
major local corporations who had been granted extended leaves of absence from their 
respective companies in order to facilitate their work on the Games.55 
The interweaving of business interests with local, state, and federal politics 
evident in the Olympic planning highlights the prominent role that business has 
played in shaping policy and setting political agendas throughout the Sunbelt and 
West. As in many states where the chamber of commerce effectively became a 
shadow government, in the 1950s Colorado business associations became the largest 
campaign contributors to both parties. State legislators themselves were heavily 
involved in land development and many new economy industries, as were the 
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Denver mayor and members of Colorado's Congressional delegation.56 The boosters’ 
metropolitan growth agenda thus informed and was re-enforced by the official policy 
agenda of the state.57 
In addition to the core group of Denver businessmen who led the Olympics 
effort and convinced both the governor and state General Assembly to support it, 
businesses and business associations were the Olympics’ most enthusiastic 
advocates. Chambers of Commerce in Denver and surrounding counties wrote to 
congratulate the DOC on winning their bid, saying that the Olympics would be a 
“community inspiration” and a “boon to tourism and job creation.” The Colorado 
Association of Real Estate Boards, Colorado Motel Association, Consulting 
Engineers of Colorado, Sales and Marketing Executives of Denver, and Advertising 
Club of Denver all offered their endorsements. So did the Jefferson County Board of 
Commissioners, the mayor of Aurora (a Denver suburb), and Bill Chavez, a 
Republican candidate for Congress in Colorado Springs.58 These politicians clearly 
positioned themselves as allies to the business community and adopted their 
priorities. 
Local politicians’ early enthusiasm for the Olympics reflected Colorado’s 
broader pro- growth business and political climate. The state had extremely lax, 
locally controlled land use and zoning regulations, making it difficult to block what 
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opponents called “strip” and “spot” zoning, resulting in rapid and unplanned land 
development throughout Denver’s surrounding suburban counties. The array of 
Olympic supporters spread across the multi-county Front Range also highlighted 
Denver’s economic and political pull throughout the region, strengthening the notion 
of the Front Range as a single, connected metropolitan entity. 
Business priorities permeated the promotional materials produced for 
Denver’s Olympic bid. Promoters of the Games presented their state to the world as 
a booming and vital center for industry and culture, with the excitement of both the 
Old West and of cutting edge innovation at its core. Themes of Western 
exceptionalism dominated the pro-Olympics discourse. A 1969 brochure titled “The 
Denver Story” boldly proclaimed 1976 “Denver’s Year to Host the World.” Denver, as 
the DOC described it, embodied the contrasts that made the West distinctive and 
exhilarating: “Skyscrapers and spaces, youth and traditions, sunsets over the 
majestic Rocky Mountains, Old West and New West, sunshine and people. That’s 
Denver Colorado.”59 
In the official Denver bid book submitted to the International Olympic 
Committee (IOC) in 1970, these contrasts were heightened through both text and 
images. The bid emphasized themes of Western hospitality, innovation and 
entrepreneurship, and the energetic Denver lifestyle. Colorado’s history, promoters 
suggested, was ever-present in the Mile High City, a cultural heritage that drove the 
city’s boundless growth and enthusiasm. Denver, the bid explained, was the very 
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heart of the frontier, “the Old West where great buffalo wandered, followed by the 
Indians, the trappers, the frontiersmen, the homesteaders.” In Denver, the ambition 
and the “western spirit and fervor” of the pioneers “helped Denver grow from a 
gangly, rambunctious town into a sophisticated metropolitan area—a city that likes 
to make things happen.” Boosters proclaimed that this entrepreneurial spirit was 
Denver’s economic engine and its cultural heritage, “the common thread that binds 
the people of Denver together.”  
High quality color images on every page of the bid book reinforced these 
themes. Photographs of families, all white, enjoying winter sports, rodeos, the ballet, 
fine dining, and modern architecture were juxtaposed with full-page reproductions of 
famous paintings depicting scenes of the Old West. The book opened with an image 
of a visionary Mayor McNichols, staring purposefully into the distance. On the 
facing page, an aerial view of metropolitan Denver extended outwards from 
downtown to meet the far-off mountains on the horizon. This image of the infinitely 
expanding metropolis as a sign of vitality and fulfillment encapsulated the boosters’ 
expansionist vision for the future of Denver and the Front Range and their 
understanding of success and the good life with economic growth at its core.60 
Growing the metropolis was among the Olympics promoters’ explicit goals. 
Portions of the bid book and other promotional material read like real estate 
brochures for Denver. “Denver attracts people from all walks of life and from all 
parts of the nation,” DOC chair Robert Pringle explained, “because it ranks as one of 
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the most desirable places in America to live.”61 According to the bid book, while the 
first Denver residents chose the area for its accessibility and natural beauty, modern 
Denverites chose the Mile High City “because it is a well-balanced city with the most 
extensive public park system in the world, deep blue skies, abundant sunshine and 
many- colored sunsets that silhouette the magnificent Rocky Mountains which tower 
west of the city.” Just as the mountains once attracted trappers and miners, “now 
the mountains beckon to winter sports enthusiasts, campers, fishermen, and 
hunters.” Metropolitan Denver, the DOC hastened to point out, was among the five 
fastest growing metro areas in the nation, a fact they attributed to the area’s natural 
beauty, “the pleasant living factor and year around sports activities, coupled with 
the enthusiasm of the Denver citizens, which was attractive to new residents.” The 
DOC trumpeted the city’s modern jet-ready airport, its culture, its climate, and its 
beauty in the hopes of drawing more residents and more business to the Area.62 
Growth was good for business and therefore, the boosters presumed, good for the 
people of Colorado. 
Indeed, just as business priorities became state priorities in Colorado, so 
were business preferences projected onto the public at large by the business 
community and government officials. “Denverites,” the DOC proclaimed, “feel the 
XII Winter Games will give them a chance to let the rest of the world know what 
they have known for many years—that Denver is a beautiful and friendly city and 
that the Rocky Mountains are unexcelled as a winter sports center.” Organizers 
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argued that the Games would “give Denver a chance to acquaint people from 
throughout the world with true Western hospitality.” They proclaimed local 
enthusiasm for the Games to be universal, a natural outgrowth of the Denver 
lifestyle. Since “most of the 1.2 million people in Denver are not only avid sports fans 
but also participate in sports themselves,” they reasoned, it was “easy to see why 
these people desire to stage the Winter Games in 1976 so strongly.63 Not only did the 
DOC cast Denverites as enthusiastic supporters of the booster vision, they made 
clear that that vision was a metropolitan one. Denver itself had only about a half 
million residents in 1970—the 1.2 million referenced in the bid book made up the 
population of the entire seven county metro area. 
Although boosters touted the enthusiastic support of metropolitan residents, 
their vision for Denver’s future and the central role of the Olympics in bringing it 
about was, in fact, sharply contested. As early as 1966, residents of Aspen, just over 
200 miles from Denver, objected to the use of their town as a site for alpine skiing 
events. This forced the DOC to look elsewhere, despite having been specifically 
offered the location by Aspen’s mayor and the local ski industry—an early 
foreshadowing of the differences between residents and business leaders that soon 
would dominate the Olympics debate.64 Closer to Denver, residents of the Front 
Range communities in the Rocky Mountain foothills were also among the earliest 
objectors, citing fears of growth and the degradation of the natural environment that 
had been among the area’s greatest draws for them and their neighbors. Minority 
rights advocates in Denver itself objected to their lack of representation Olympic 
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planning, while the Colorado Labor Council demanded without success that the 
DOC adopt fair labor practices. 
Paramount among all these objectors’ complaints was the lack of 
transparency in DOC decision-making. DOC meetings were not open to the public, 
citizen input was not solicited, and accurate information about Olympic plans was 
often hard to come by. Moreover, when they chose to address Coloradans at all, 
which was rarely, the DOC tended either to dismiss outright or simply ignore citizen 
concerns about the environment, urban renewal, labor, and taxes. Instead, DOC 
members emphasized the economic benefits they claimed the Games would bring to 
the state as a whole, despite serious skepticism from area residents. Their attitude 
demonstrated Olympic boosters’ confidence in both the rightness of their cause and 
the strength of their position vis a vis both the public and the government officials 
and institutions whose support the effort required.65 As late as the winter of 1972, 
just months before these disparate groups would coalesce behind the effort to place 
anti-Olympics initiatives on state and city ballots, representatives of all three 
constituencies stressed to both the DOC and IOC that they did not object to Colorado 
hosting the Olympics per se but rather to the particular sites under consideration 
and the secretive manner in which decisions were being made. Unable to win any 
meaningful concessions from the DOC, these activists would ultimately launch and 
win a campaign to remove the Olympics from Colorado altogether. 
* * * 
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Residents of the Front Range mountain communities outside Denver were 
among the earliest Olympic objectors. The DOC had planned many Olympic events 
in or immediately adjacent to these areas throughout the Front Range. Residents, 
catching wind of the plans, worried that the pristine landscape of their mountain 
enclaves, already under threat from rampant growth and unregulated real estate 
development, would be destroyed by the construction of luge and bobsled runs, the 
deluge of spectators and press, and the hordes of newcomers they felt sure would 
flock to Colorado and take up residence after seeing the state’s natural beauty. In 
the years leading up to the 1970 Amsterdam meeting at which Denver was 
designated the host city, Front Range residents grew increasingly vocal about these 
concerns. 
Opposition to the Olympics came from a wide array of Front Range groups. Local 
conservationists, like the Evergreen Naturalists, the Wilderness Society, the Sierra 
Club, and the Hill and Dale Society, were natural allies. The Colorado State Grange, 
an agricultural association with local chapters, joined in opposition. Representing 
the greatest number of Coloradans were homeowner associations, which opposed the 
Games for a variety of reasons, ranging from concerns about water rights, traffic 
congestion, and public safety to more general fears about how environmental 
damage caused by Olympic construction and spectators would affect homeowners’ 
property values and quality of life.  
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The Buffalo Park Improvement Association was typical, citing not only the 
usual worries about environmental degradation and safety but also more 
generalized concerns about the inability of local public services from police and fire 
to water and sewerage to handle either a mega-event or the hordes of newcomers 
that they imagined would flock to the area and take up residence thanks to 
Olympics publicity. Their misgivings also reflected concerns about long-term threats 
to community stability. Members wondered who would pay for the upkeep of 
Olympic facilities after the Games left town and whether the areas around the 
sites—formerly hunting and park lands that added to the area's residential 
desirability—would become havens for motorcycles and trailers.66 
The threat of sharply increased taxes to pay for an event that appeared to 
have serious costs and few local benefits emerged time and again in homeowners’ 
newsletters, polls, and entreaties to both Olympic and elected officials.67 A survey 
taken by one local newspaper in early 1971 revealed that more than sixty percent of 
the residents of Evergreen, an unincorporated Front Range community in Jefferson 
County slated to host several Olympic events, opposed the games. At the same time, 
hundreds of area residents sent cards to Governor Love and to the Jefferson County 
Board of Commissioners demanding that the Games be removed from the area. This 
opposition coalesced into an organization called Protect Our Mountain Environment 
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(POME), signaling the importance of the mountain lifestyle to local homeowners. 
Founded in the wake of Denver’s selection by the IOC, it grew largely out of local 
conservationist organizations, which had deep roots in the area and substantial 
support, but the grievances it articulated addressed the concerns of the area’s varied 
Olympic critics.68 
One anti-Olympics resolution passed by the Sierra Club’s Rocky Mountain 
chapter captured locals’ most frequently expressed fears. The resolution denounced 
“a lack of realistic state land-use planning which will encourage land speculation 
with disastrous environmental results” as well as the DOC’s failure to develop any 
sort of regional transit plan to prevent damage to the environment and private 
property through the extension of highways, use of meadows for parking, and 
increased traffic. In an oft-heard refrain, they worried about the “considerable 
investment of state tax funds” in the Games, “which could be spent in areas of more 
immediate social concern” and regarded the DOC’s reluctance to meet with citizen 
groups with suspicion.69 POME also raised the specter of rampant rezoning for 
“liquor outlets, restaurants, service stations wherever the Olympians want them,” 
massive deforestation to make way for new power and telephone lines, and litter. 
Public safety, they argued, was also under threat, both from increased crime as a 
result of the expected influx of spectators and from dangerous Olympic events 
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themselves. Residents particularly worried that the biathlon, in which competitors 
on skis shoot at moving targets, was slated to pass through heavily residential 
areas.70 
For many who opposed the Games, the biggest objection of all, stressed over 
and over in letters to the IOC and international sports federations, was simply that 
the Front Range was a lousy place for winter sports, with warm winters, minimal 
snowfall, and insufficient water to create and then refrigerate manufactured powder. 
“Denver is not ski country,” POME leaders warned. “This area is entirely 
inappropriate for any sort of winter athletic events, particularly of the great scope 
and importance of the International Olympics.” They exposed the DOC for having 
painted snow onto the pictures of several proposed sites in order to trick the IOC 
into accepting the bid.71 
For most suburban Denverites on the Front Range, environmental concerns 
were part of a larger set of issues directly tied to their status as homeowners. 
Homeowners’ fears were perhaps best summed up in the popular bumper sticker: 
“NO OLYMPIC TAXES! Save Your Money Save Your Mountains STOP THE 
OLYMPICS.”72 All these concerns, including environmental ones, ultimately came 
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back to a single underlying issue: suburbanites’ fear that the Olympics would 
diminish the quality of life for which they had chosen their communities in the first 
place. The subject was especially fraught, as it highlighted some of the 
inconsistencies, and potential incompatibilities, among the various issues that fell 
under the quality-of-life rubric. For example, homeowners on the metropolitan fringe 
often objected to raising taxes, yet the land use protections and environmentally 
sensitive policies they championed often required tax hikes. Similarly, these 
residents typically made their demands in the name of citizen participation and local 
control, yet the slow-growth policies they advocated frequently required the 
expansion of the state’s regulatory power at the local level. 
Coloradans were not alone in their ambivalence towards metropolitan 
growth. The objections of suburban Denverites to the Games not only reflected 
changes in Colorado and the West, but also broad national shifts in Americans’ 
relationship to changing metropolitan geography and political economy. With those 
changes came a transformation in citizens’ political consciousness in the early 1970s. 
As America became increasingly suburban, a new culture of suburban populism 
developed. It was a bipartisan ethos that emphasized, among other things, the 
sanctity of private property, the rights of individuals as taxpayers and parents, 
residential security, and consumer free choice.73 At the heart of this new political 
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consciousness lay a paradox: It depended upon the suburbanization that growth 
liberalism produced but, at the same time, necessarily resisted further metropolitan 
development as a threat to the quality of life that current residents enjoyed. Indeed, 
by the early 1970s, quality of life had become a rallying point for Americans who 
were increasingly rejecting growth.74  
Environmentalism was a key part of that effort, emerging first as a radical 
alternative to the dominant growth ethos and ultimately being incorporated in its 
less radical manifestations into the suburban quality of life political agenda.75 By the 
early 1970s, millions of white, middle-class Americans who had followed the postwar 
promises of prosperity and homeownership to new suburban communities were 
beginning to question the wisdom of the very growth liberalism that had made their 
own lifestyles possible. Instead of assuming the value of continued expansion, the 
Urban Land Institute reported that, “The ethic of growth…is increasingly being 
challenged; no longer is it accepted unquestionably as a premise of progress.” A 1973 
Rockefeller Brothers Fund report on metropolitan growth and land use concurred, 
concluding that, 
[T]oday, the repeated questioning of what was once generally unquestioned—
that growth is good, that growth is inevitable—is so widespread that it seems 
to us to signal a remarkable change in attitudes in this nation.76 
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Residents of metropolitan Denver shared in this growing skepticism. Denver was 
nationally known as a quality-of-life destination city, with white-collar professionals 
drawn to the area because of its combination of lucrative corporate job opportunities, 
laid back style, and natural beauty. Yet the very metropolitan growth agenda that 
made these things possible also threatened to destroy them through overcrowding 
and uncontrolled development. Olympic boosters who prescribed growth, growth, 
and more growth for the Mile High City failed to recognize this inherent tension. 
The Olympics was not the only issue to attract suburban Denverites’ 
attention for their potential impact on growth and quality of life. POME and other 
conservation groups also took action on zoning, pollution, roads, and water.77 They 
persuaded the Jefferson County Board of Commissioners to make it more expensive 
for developers to begin new subdivisions and to undertake an “ecologically based 
land use study” to develop a systematic plan for the area’s future development.78 
They warned that metro Denver and the surrounding Front Range counties were 
fast on their way to becoming a “future megalopolis” that would be among the 
“largest in the land” and urged for state-level planning and controls to ensure that 
growth would not outpace local services and deplete natural resources.79 The 
Olympics, in their view, were merely a catalyst to a dangerous process of growth and 
development already underway throughout the region. 
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Suburban Denverites concerned about growth were themselves part of the 
dramatic demographic shift that was remaking the metropolis. By 1972, the peak of 
the anti-Olympics movement, over 1,000 land development corporations were in the 
process of subdividing upwards of two million acres, mostly in the expanding 
metropolitan corridor along the Front Range between Ft. Collins and Colorado 
Springs.80 Although theoretically controlled at the county level, in practice, this 
explosive growth went virtually unregulated. By the early 1970s, residents were 
already beginning to see the adverse consequences of rapid growth. Once known for 
its crystalline mountain air, metropolitan Denver ranked as the sixth smoggiest city 
in the nation, thanks in large part to increased traffic. Experts warned that 
haphazard land development and pollution would be particularly detrimental to the 
Front Range's fragile mountain ecosystems.81 
To combat what they saw as threats to their mountain way of life, Denverites, 
especially in the suburbs, founded several environmental organizations in the 1960s, 
most notably the Rocky Mountain Center on the Environment and the Colorado 
Open Space Council. By 1970, in response to pressure from environmentalists, the 
Colorado General Assembly created a state Land Use Commission, Environmental 
Commission, and Coordinator of Environmental Policy. These new agencies lacked 
enforcement power and funding, however, rendering them largely ineffective. Efforts 
to introduce tough new statewide land-use and zoning legislation also foundered as 
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the General Assembly, Republicans and Democrats alike, prioritized booster 
concerns over environmental ones.82 Many suburban anti-Olympics activists were 
part of this larger environmental awakening in metro Denver. As such, they saw the 
Olympics as part of a general disregard that quality of life and the rights of 
homeowners suffered in favor of a short- sighted booster agenda. 
Such fears of growth reflected a central paradox of metropolitan America and 
the West in particular. Ever in search of a private retreat removed from the chaos of 
urban life, suburbanites moved to the farthest edges of metropolitan development, 
only to find that they had brought with them the very crowding and chaos they 
hoped to avoid. In the West, this tension has been heightened by cycles of boom and 
bust, booster expansion versus the ethos of rugged individualism and unfettered 
open space. Denver had not been a booster-oriented place until after World War II, 
such that those Denverites who insisted that the metropolis move away from booster 
policies did not in fact demand a radical new direction in local policy but rather a 
return to the status quo ante.  
The greatest irony arose from the fact that the residents in the vanguard of 
anti-growth crusades were often themselves newcomers to the area, participants in 
the very expansionist trends they later fought. Thus, while anti-Olympics sentiment 
in Front Range communities was an expression of genuine concerns about good 
governance and the environment, it also stemmed from Coloradans’ complex 
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relationship to the expanding metropolis. As Peter Siskind has noted, a precipitating 
event was often necessary to make suburbanites in a given community recognize the 
threats that growth and environmental degradation might present to their quality of 
life.83 For suburban Denverites, the bid for the 1976 Winter Olympics was that 
event. While conservation groups had been active in the state for decades and some 
committed activists had begun agitating for better land-use controls in the 1960s, 
environmental concerns were only beginning to capture widespread grassroots 
support before the Olympics controversy jolted area residents into action. The 
ultimate success of the anti-Olympics movement signaled the importance of 
environmental concerns to state officials, and they remained a central part of 
Colorado's political debate long after. 
Until 1972, when voters soundly defeated the Olympics, both Olympic 
planners and elected officials at every level largely ignored citizens’ environmental 
and anti-growth concerns. DOC policy was not to disclose any specific information 
about Olympic costs or site selection unless an organization specifically asked to see 
it. Moreover, in October 1970, the planning committee disbanded its speakers 
bureau, leaving citizens with virtually no access to information about the Games.84 
Despite numerous attempts by POME and other citizens’ groups to meet with the 
DOC, officials refused, insisting that until all the site selections had been finalized, 
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“a meaningful discussion…would not be productive.”85 POME was able to meet with 
Governor Love to discuss site selection for the Olympics in early 1971, but the 
group’s concerns fell on deaf ears. At the same time, POME petitioned the Jefferson 
County Board of Commissioners to oppose Front Range sites. To placate concerned 
residents, the board, made up largely of local chamber of commerce members, agreed 
to an investigation but ultimately did little.86 
Throughout the Olympic planning process, as opposition grew, DOC and 
government officials continued to emphasize what they claimed would be the Games’ 
economic benefits to the exclusion of all other interests. As one DOC member later 
acknowledged, “No thought was given at all to the environment by the committee. 
The word, in fact, did not even exist for us.”87 Although the DOC did little to address 
the concerns expressed by suburban Denverites, they were certainly aware of the 
opposition. As early as 1968, then DOC chair Richard Olson advised committee 
members “not to get involved with controversies such as the Indian Hills situation,” 
in which residents of the unincorporated Indian Hills development in the Rocky 
Mountain foothills mobilized very loudly against Olympic events slated to be held in 
their community.88 In an interview not long after the Olympics controversy ended, 
another DOC member admitted that planners had misjudged the reasons for 
residents’ skepticism, and then hostility, about the Games. For while citizens 
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worried about long-term changes to their communities, the DOC viewed their 
objections as “fear of hot dog stands, large crowds, and so forth.”89 
This miscalculation ultimately proved fatal to boosters’ efforts. As the 
planning process wore on and citizen objections from POME and others grew louder, 
the IOC began to recognize the extent of the problem facing the Games if they 
remained in Denver. By the end of 1971, when Colorado state representative Dick 
Lamm, a key champion of the anti-Olympics cause, wrote to IOC president Avery 
Brundage in opposition, Brundage was forced to acknowledge that the deluge of 
anti-Olympics mail inundating the Olympics’ governing body “revealed an alarming 
situation.”90 Only a frantic last minute trip by Denver boosters to the IOC’s early 
1972 meeting in Sapporo, Japan stopped the international committee from stripping 
Denver of its host city designation. 
* * * 
Suburbanites were not alone in their concerns about the Games: most 
Coloradans ultimately rejected the Olympics. Organized support for the anti-
Olympics cause, however, came primarily from minority rights and labor activists. 
Their objections differed substantially, both from each other and from the 
environmental and anti-growth suburban activists who dominated the movement 
and spearheaded the eventual campaign to put public funding for the Games to a 
popular vote. Together, these groups formed an uneasy alliance of convenience, 
brought together by a mutual interest in keeping the Games out of Colorado rather 
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than any broader, shared political agenda. Organized labor, for example, had little 
interest in the environment or the threat of sprawl. Indeed, the Olympics would 
have brought a substantial number of construction and other blue-collar jobs to the 
state. But growing frustration over the DOC’s refusal to adopt fair labor practices, 
meet with labor leaders, or involve labor in decision making over land-use and 
construction ultimately soured the Colorado Labor Council and AFL-CIO on the 
Games.91 
For their part, minority activists’ objections to the Olympics were not initially 
about the Games per se, but rather about housing, spending priorities, and the lack 
of minority representation in metropolitan decision-making. In particular, 
community activists worried about DOC plans to build housing for the press corps 
using funds from Denver’s Model Cities, a federal program explicitly intended to 
promote community-driven development within poor communities. The plan would 
also have required razing a significant number of existing housing units in minority 
and low-income neighborhoods. According to DOC, the press housing constituted an 
acceptable use of Model City funds because it could later be repurposed as low-
income housing. Residents, however, objected that such units, concentrated in two 
press “villages,” would effectively increase ghettoization in Denver rather than 
promote the dispersed affordable housing options that community activists 
preferred.92  
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Denver was also a national center of Chicano activism, and members of that 
community objected to the Olympics as part of their sweeping critique of what they 
viewed as American capitalist and imperialist policy, of which they saw themselves 
as victims. Reclaiming spaces within Chicano neighborhoods for the Chicano 
community was an important part of this political project. Throughout the late-
1960s and 1970s, Chicano activists vied with city officials over the naming of local 
community centers, policing of neighborhood parks, employment opportunities in 
neighborhood public facilities, and control of curricula and discipline in schools with 
heavily Chicano student populations. Opposition to the Olympics emerged out of 
such struggles, as several major event sites would have required the demolition of 
Chicano schools or residential neighborhoods. The expense of the Olympics, which 
was to be paid for substantially through local taxes, was also a specific source of 
anger to Chicanos and other minority residents. When, in 1972, Denver Chicanos 
drafted a platform for the Colorado branch of the nationalist Raza Unida political 
party, it included an anti-Olympics plank, declaring that, “We fail to see any 
resulting benefits for Chicanos and the poor, and therefore we oppose the diversion 
of badly needed financial resources from education and other crucial human 
issues.”93 
DOC did little to address these concerns, appointing several black and 
Chicano members to a largely symbolic planning committee while leaving the 
decision-making executive committee entirely white and booster-oriented. In 
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response, Black and Chicano residents formed the United Residents Planning 
Committee (URPC) and Citizens Interested in an Equitable Olympics (CIEO) to 
protest Olympic decision making. Existing advocacy organizations like the Denver 
Westside Coalition joined in pressuring the DOC but with little effect.94 
Despite their differences, all those arrayed against the Olympics had one 
thing in common: a strong belief that citizen participation in local and state decision-
making was an essential component of American democracy and, indeed, a 
fundamental right of all Americans. Whatever their specific concerns—metropolitan 
growth, property damage, union hiring, urban renewal, taxes—opponents saw the 
DOC’s unwillingness to meet publicly or to incorporate residents’ desires as a 
violation of their right as citizens to control the decision-making process on matters 
that affected their communities. As they understood it, hosting the Olympics 
reflected the desire of corporate boosters, abetted by state and local government, to 
set the public agenda without regard to the needs and preferences of local 
communities. POME representative Catherine Dittman wrote to Governor Love in 
early 1971, denouncing the “so-called leaders of Denver” who “brought [the 
Olympics] upon us through secrecy and misrepresentation.”95 POME activists 
argued to the international sports federations that Denver’s entire Olympics bid was 
illegitimate because “citizens were never consulted regarding the use of their 
property” (emphasis in original), while homeowners’ associations passed resolutions 
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opposing the Olympics on the grounds that “democratic principles” demanded it.96 In 
Denver itself, minority activists insisted that they, not Olympics planners or state 
legislators, should have control over development projects in low-income 
neighborhoods. These objections stemmed from forceful convictions about the 
primacy of engaged citizens and local communities in governance. Throughout 
metropolitan Denver, residents chanted the familiar refrain of local control. 
The alliance between white and minority Denverites over the Olympics issue 
indicates the complex and shifting nature of grassroots politics during this period. 
Even as black and Chicano leaders came together with whites to criticize and, 
ultimately, oppose hosting the Winter Games, they were divided over other major 
issues. Denver proper was intensely segregated throughout the postwar decades, as 
was the largely white surrounding metro area.97 Rapid growth in Denver throughout 
the 1960s had already led to a significant shortage of affordable housing. In 1971, 
the League of Women Voters reported that sixty-seven percent of families statewide 
could not afford even the cheapest of new housing being built. The shortage was 
particularly acute in metropolitan Denver, where the Denver Regional Council of 
Governments (DRCOG) estimated that at least 19,000 additional units were needed, 
even as urban renewal projects demolished existing homes without providing 
adequate resources to relocate displaced families.98 
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Denverites in both the city and its suburbs fought over ending residential 
segregation, while a local school desegregation case made its way to the Supreme 
Court. In 1973, just one year after the Olympics battle ended, the Court ordered the 
Denver schools to desegregate, making the Mile High City the first outside the 
South to fall under such a mandate and the first anywhere to involve not just blacks 
and whites but other racial groups as well.99 In response, as discussed in chapter 
one, voters passed the Poundstone Amendment the following year, which ended 
Denver’s annexations of adjacent suburban territory, thus insulating new suburban 
developments from the threat of integrated schools. This had the predictable result 
of speeding middle-class and affluent whites’ exodus from the city, further 
heightening the spatial isolation of different racial and ethnic groups in the Denver 
area.100 
Although minority and white Denverites could work together to stop the 
Olympics, at the same time, the controversies over residential and school 
desegregation reflected and intensified bitter racial divisions within the city and 
throughout the metropolitan area. On each of these issues, different groups within 
metro-Denver mobilized politically to enact their own particular visions for the 
future of the metropolis. In the case of segregation, whites, blacks, and Chicanos 
fought to protect or challenge the existing balance of power. Because access to 
resources and decision-making power were localized within particular race- and 
class-coded parts of the metropolis, the resulting conflicts took on a clear spatial 
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dimension: Residents of the ghetto and inner-city barrios clashed with working-class 
whites within Denver, and whites themselves divided along class lines that often 
followed the city limits.101 
Given the sharp racial and class tensions in Denver at the time, the alliance 
among these groups against the Olympics and their success in appealing to a 
majority of Coloradans is striking. It points to a far more pragmatic, less ideological 
political ethos than is generally imagined to have existed at the grassroots in this 
period. Where scholars have tended to see a dramatic rightward shift taking hold in 
the 1970s, both at the level of national party strategy and the grassroots, Denver’s 
experience with the simultaneous school desegregation and Olympics battles 
suggests a less straight forward political trajectory. Whites and minorities, 
Republicans and Democrats, the vast ranks of Colorado’s independent or 
“unaffiliated” voters—all these groups fell in and out of political alliances according 
to the specifics of each case. The Olympics provided a very narrow common ground 
on which these otherwise divided groups could unite. Leading opponents were able 
to put aside their differences to forge a functional coalition and, in turn, to articulate 
an anti-Olympics rhetoric that appealed to both liberal and conservative Coloradans 
as well as to those without strong ideological convictions. 
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Leaders of the anti-Olympics effort acknowledged these tensions and worked 
assiduously to maintain their fragile coalition. Shortly after the Sapporo meeting in 
early 1972, a group of white Denver progressives launched a campaign to put 
prohibitions against public funding for the Olympics into the Colorado state 
constitution and Denver city charter. With the help of Democratic State 
Representative Dick Lamm, they founded Citizens for Colorado’s Future (CCF) to 
spearhead the effort. Although the organization’s young, white leaders were 
themselves primarily concerned with limiting growth and protecting the 
environment, they recognized the need for a broader base of support if they hoped to 
get enough signatures to put the initiative on the 1972 ballot and to win a statewide 
election. To that end, CCF consciously drew in minority and labor activists, working 
with them to raise awareness about the Games and gather signatures in those 
communities. 
They succeeded by focusing very narrowly on removing the Winter Games 
from Colorado and divorcing that campaign as much as possible from any of the 
larger concerns that motivated the coalition's various members. To appease 
minority rights activists, for example, CCF wrote to members of Colorado’s 
Congressional delegation, seeking federal appropriations for low and moderate 
income housing in Denver, but they specifically requested that the money not be 
contingent in any way on the Olympics. The Colorado Labor Council, meanwhile, 
made clear that it would support CCF’s ballot initiative but did not want to be 
associated with any broader environmental or anti-growth agenda. Conversely, 
POME worked actively to collect signatures but refused to be involved in any of the 
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issues that drew organized labor and minority opposition to the Games, limiting 
themselves instead to the immediate concerns of the Front Range.102 CCF leadership 
understood that their supporters were, on issues other than the Olympics, often 
diametrically opposed, and they made strenuous efforts to avoid any action that 
might fracture the tentative coalition.103 
* * * 
Having thus wrangled their own coalition, CCF set out to convince 
Coloradans at large. Going door-to-door for the cause in a manner that was then 
unusual but is now standard operating procedure for such campaigns, by July they 
had gathered close to 9,000 signatures for the Denver-only initiative and over 77,000 
signatures for the statewide constitutional amendment—far more than the legally 
required number.104 Yet despite CCF’s success at putting both initiatives on the 
ballot, as late as September 1972, only 45% of Coloradans reported they would vote 
to stop funding for the Games.105 In a survey conducted that month, a majority of the 
state’s residents said that, while they believed that the Games would bring 
significant economic benefits to the state, they also worried about cost and growth. 
Coloradans were also evenly split over allegations of DOC mismanagement of the 
planning process and environmental concerns.106 With voters thus divided, CCF 
crafted a rhetoric that would appeal to a broad swath of the electorate, framing the 
Olympics as both a tax issue and as a question of basic democratic principles: the 
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right of citizens to have a say in decisions that would have a major impact on them 
and their communities. 
CCF argued that all recent Olympic Games had cost far more than 
anticipated, with taxpayers stuck footing the bill. At a rally in front of the Colorado 
state house, Lamm told the crowd that citizens’ support for the ballot initiative 
“represent[s] a majority of both the old values and the new values,” both demanding 
that tax money be spent frugally and proclaiming that “we’re too proud of Colorado 
to sell it; we’d rather conserve it.”107 In speeches and campaign literature, CCF 
stressed the themes of misplaced spending priorities, mismanagement at the DOC, 
and lack of public accountability as reasons to oppose the Games. These themes 
were then picked up by the local press, whose editorials called for an end to the “‘pie 
in the sky’ approach to the Olympics and the [DOC’s] plea of ‘just give us the go 
ahead and leave all the details to us.’”108 These tropes resonated across the political 
spectrum, appealing to committed liberals and conservatives along with the 
substantial numbers of unaffiliated voters who were in fact the plurality in many 
Colorado counties.109 
Lamm himself, the anti-Olympics movement’s leading spokesman, captured 
the highly charged political language of the controversy in a widely circulated open 
letter to the people of Colorado. Noting that 1976 was both the country’s 
bicentennial and the state’s centennial year, Lamm proclaimed that, with regards to 
the Olympics, Colorado was experiencing a “quiet revolution” similar to the 
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American Revolution two hundred years before. “The people themselves,” he wrote, 
“are changing the goals and policies of a Colorado government which itself refuses to 
change those goals and policies.” The anti-Olympics movement, then, was a 
“recommitment of our people to the principles of democracy upon which our nation 
was founded.” Many Coloradans, Lamm noted, found their state’s government 
unresponsive to the new realities of explosive growth and the crushing financial 
burdens it exacerbated. Rather than address these problems, government seemed to 
move “in the opposite direction,” traveling around the country to “sell Colorado” 
instead of selling the legislature on sound land use policies and improved quality of 
life. “Rather than make ‘Olympic’ efforts to come to grips with our problems and our 
limited tax base,” Lamm lamented, “Colorado’s leaders are attempting to spend 
limited tax dollars hosting an Olympics which promises both to be a large drain on 
state funds and counterproductive to the serious growth problems Colorado is 
already experiencing.” He compared the current Colorado leadership to the British 
General Burgoyne, who clung so blindly to the status quo that he marched into 
battle during the Revolutionary War toting silver tea service and chests of china.110 
If Lamm’s rhetoric seemed overblown, it was in fact a direct response to the 
arguments being made by Olympic boosters throughout 1972. As public opposition 
to the Games grew, the governor and DOC stepped up their efforts to sell the event, 
but in a characteristically tone-deaf manner. Governor Love formed the Spirit of ‘76 
Committee to lead an expensive ad campaign in support of the Olympics. 
Unsurprisingly, this committee did not take seriously the reasons for citizen 
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opposition. Instead, committee members saw their task primarily as assuaging any 
doubts that the IOC might have about Denver’s ability to host the Games as a result 
of the local turmoil. Their rhetoric emphasized patriotism as a central theme, 
suggesting that those who supported the anti-Olympics constitutional amendment 
brought international shame upon their state and their nation. In one characteristic 
speech, former Denver mayor Thomas Currigan likened hosting the Olympics to 
settling the western frontier or putting a man on the moon. He derided Coloradans 
for passing up a “golden opportunity…to show the world the true pioneering spirit 
that is the heart and soul of our people” and lamented that, “if our forefathers had 
adopted this type of attitude,” there might not be a Denver at all. He further accused 
those who opposed hosting the Games of believing that the United States was 
somehow inferior to other countries like Japan that had recently played host. 
“Where is our Yankee pride and ingenuity?” he exhorted. “We, as a nation, rebuilt 
Japan and Germany after World War II. We certainly have the capability and the 
capacity, financial and otherwise, to host an Olympic celebration that will be second 
to none.”111 To the extent that they addressed any of the opposition’s substantive 
concerns, boosters like Currigan argued that growth was, in fact, a boon to the state, 
that environmental damage would be minimal and the economic benefits 
widespread. 
By mid-October, voters were beginning to lose patience with what they saw 
as the DOC’s arrogance. Although some Coloradans shared the boosters’ view, most 
flatly rejected their arguments and bristled at the slights to their patriotism. 
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Emerging evidence of mismanagement at the DOC and conflicts of interest among 
its executive committee members fueled voter outrage and an incipient tax revolt. “I 
am unchangeably and intensely opposed to the use of even one penny of taxpayer 
money to produce any athletic event, regardless of its purported beneficence,” wrote 
one citizen to Mayor McNichols.112 In a letter to both McNichols and Governor Love, 
Denverite Marian van de Griendt suggested that opposition to the Games was 
indicative of a broader “taxpayer revolt” and the DOC’s lack of credibility with the 
public. “Unfortunately for you,” she wrote, “citizens are more concerned about their 
pocketbooks and the quality of their lives than saving your faces.”113 Grace Merz, 
another Denver resident, demanded to know “What kind of a democracy do you call 
this?” (emphasis in original) and went on to berate the mayor for what she and many 
others saw as their selfish motives.114 
Denverite Leonard Davis agreed, warning Governor Love that, “you are 
just trying to sell this deal to the people for reasons other than the good of the state 
and its people. You are getting a lot of free rides out of this thing, and the people 
know this.”115 Scorning DOC suggestions that failure to host the Olympics was 
unpatriotic and “welshing” on a deal, Mrs. Ray Scavezze thundered, “LET ME 
REMIND YOU—The People of Colorado had made no promises to the I.O.C. or 
anyone…so please don’t place the blame on the citizens of Colorado for humiliating 
you.” She continued, “We the PEOPLE never broke a promise to anyone because—
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REMEMBER WE HAD NEVER COMMITTED OURSELVES TO BE HOST TO 
SUCH AN EVENT” (emphasis in original).116 Whatever else divided them, 
Coloradans at large and residents of metropolitan Denver in particular were united 
in their assessment that the DOC, mayor, and governor had violated the trust of the 
electorate and the rights of their constituents.  
These residents were far from alone in their skepticism of taxes and 
invocation of fundamental American values. In the 1970s, the “rights revolution,” 
touched off by the New Deal and intensified by the success of civil rights activists in 
the previous decade, became a dominant political force at the grassroots and a 
potent rhetorical device for politicians and party strategists of all stripes. The spate 
of tax revolts that swept the country often drew on this rights rhetoric, arguing 
against existing tax policy on the basis of claims of “fairness” and the primacy of 
community control over spending priorities.117 Scholars and pundits have tended to 
associate the connection between anti-tax activism and rights discourse only with 
the rise of the New Right. While these did form the core of New Right doctrine, anti-
tax attitudes were not the exclusive province of conservatives. Indeed, anti-growth 
liberalism was particularly amenable to such arguments, as residents who opposed 
growth resisted paying additional taxes to subsidize metropolitan expansion.118 
Among opponents of the 1976 Winter Olympics, both liberal and conservative 
reasons for opposing new taxes held tremendous sway. Among whites, the tax issue 
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cut across lines of class, political affiliation, and urban versus suburban residence. 
Recognizing the salience of taxation with such a broad swath of the electorate, CCF 
emphasized both the tax issue and the concerns about the DOC’s subversion of 
Coloradans’ rights as democratic citizens.119 
By election day in November, a majority of Coloradans, nearly sixty percent 
statewide, had become convinced that Denver should not host the 1976 Winter 
Games.120 CCF’s rhetoric, combined with the DOC’s poor handling of the controversy, 
appear to have made a significant impression on voters. An analysis shortly after 
the election by a political scientist at the University of Colorado found cost to 
taxpayers and concerns about growth and the environment—the very issues CCF 
had pushed most strongly—to be the primary factors motivating Coloradans to vote 
against the Games.121 Indeed, the two appeared to be equally critical to the 
initiative’s success. Neither, the study concluded, was strong enough to carry the 
election alone, but together they swayed a decisive majority.122 Only seven of the 
state’s sixty counties, mostly in rural western Colorado, voted to retain public 
funding for the Olympics. Another nine counties, including those in the Front Range 
immediately surrounding Denver, passed Proposition 8 by fifty-seven percent or less. 
Everywhere else, the margin was even greater, with voters rejecting by more than 
sixty percent in most counties and, in some, more even more (Figure 8).123  
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It seems likely that the vote was so evenly split in the Front Range because 
residents in these areas, which were slated to host many Olympic events, had the 
most to lose in terms of quality of life but also, potentially, the most to gain 
economically. These closer—although still decisive—results suggest that questions 
about quality of life, the desirability of either business or residential growth, 
environmental degradation, taxation, and good governance were being fiercely 
contested in metropolitan Denver and that they crossed party lines. Indeed, 
Republicans outnumbered Democrats in all but one of the six metro-Denver 
counties, and unaffiliated voters surpassed members of either party throughout the 
region, with each group splitting over the Olympics question.124 Yet Proposition 8, 
which has often been understood as a case of liberal environmentalists against 
corporate conservatives, ultimately passed in all six suburban counties and Denver 
itself.125 
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Figure 8. Proposition 8 By County. 
The controversy over the 1976 Winter Olympics had an immediate impact 
on Colorado politics. Dick Lamm, a Democrat, rode the wave of anti-growth 
sentiment from the state legislature to the governor’s mansion, which he occupied 
from 1975 to 1987. Many state and federal legislative districts also changed hands, 
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as voters expressed their displeasure with the way their representatives had 
handled the Olympics question. Yet the Games’ effect on any broader electoral 
trajectory remains unclear. On the eve of the vote in 1972, more Coloradans were 
Republicans than Democrats, and substantially more were registered unaffiliated 
than were members of either party.126 This trend continued over the next several 
decades, so that even as issues like the environment and growth, typically 
associated with Democrats, became increasingly important in Colorado politics, 
Democrats did not see an attendant jump in their share of voter registration. 
And yet, upon closer scrutiny, the characterization of Colorado as a solidly 
Republican and conservative state, fails. Focusing on national electoral cycles, most 
political histories of the 1970s and beyond have argued that this period was wholly 
defined by the decline of postwar liberalism, the birth of modern conservatism, and 
the rise of the New Right. In Colorado and other Sunbelt states across the South and 
West, this assessment has been bolstered by presidential election returns. For 
example, in the twelve presidential elections since 1964, Coloradans chose the 
Republican all but three times. Scholars and pundits have pointed to this nearly 
unbroken string of Republican presidential picks as evidence of the state’s abiding 
conservatism.127 But, as in so many states with similar presidential histories, 
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Colorado politics at the local level have always been more mixed. In the nearly half 
century since Colorado went for LBJ, three of the state’s six governors and seven of 
its twelve senators have been Democrats.128 The state legislature has been similarly 
divided.  
The paradigm of liberal decline and conservative ascendance that has defined 
the literature thus far cannot explain either this electoral history or the form that 
local politics took in the twentieth century’s closing decades. Most problematically, it 
ignores the pragmatic and less partisan politics that in fact predominated, both in 
the Rocky Mountain State and elsewhere. In so doing, it fails to adequately account 
for the complexity of American politics in the final third of the twentieth century, 
especially but not exclusively at the grassroots in the rapidly expanding 
metropolises that became home to a majority of the population in this period.129 
The outcome of the two Olympics ballot initiatives and Colorado’s divided 
electoral history strengthen the emerging picture of Colorado as a state in political 
flux, where partisanship was of limited importance and where the center was 
continuously contested. As Matthew Lassiter has suggested, voters’ populist 
identification as homeowners and taxpayers often took on greater salience than 
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partisan affiliation.130 For the first time, fears about the environment and growth 
took on major political importance and became a force to be reckoned with, even if 
only as lip service. Going forward, Colorado politicians of all persuasions would 
tread carefully around environmental and anti-growth concerns, with several high-
profile examples like Governor Love’s successor in the governor’s mansion, 
Republican John Vanderhoof, belatedly adopting anti-growth rhetoric in an 
unsuccessful attempt to pacify voters as the 1974 election drew near.131 For many 
Coloradans, the anti-Olympics movement, with its emphasis on good governance, 
the rights of property owners, and the importance of quality of life, provided a potent 
new language for describing their place within the modern metropolis and for 
pressing an articulate policy agenda. The Olympics controversy became a lightning 
rod for the myriad tensions within growth liberalism among corporate boosters, 
suburban populists, urban minorities, and other constituencies. Party affiliation 
proved an exceptionally poor indicator of voting behavior. 
* * * 
 The Olympics battle encapsulated the tensions inherent within growth 
liberalism between booster expansionism and populist quality of life politics. It 
reflected a moment in American politics and policy in which boosters, government 
officials and institutions, and citizens of all demographic and political backgrounds 
encountered a new metropolitan geography and political economy and vied to ensure 
favorable positions within the new order. From the brochures touting Colorado's 
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“Western hospitality” and “booster spirit,” to bumper stickers urging Coloradans to 
vote down the Olympics so as not to “Californicate” their state, to dozens of 
pamphlets and editorials warning about the dangers of unfettered metropolitan 
growth, contests over space and its uses drove the Olympics debate. 
Denver’s bid for the 1976 Winter Olympics and the ultimate success of anti-
Olympics activists in barring the Games from their state opens a window into the 
messy, contested world of metropolitan politics in the early 1970s. Rather than 
adhere to strictly partisan or reflexively ideological positions, residents of 
metropolitan Denver mobilized to defend intensely local ideas about how their 
communities should be developed. Whether in the affluent, white enclaves in the 
Rocky Mountain Foothills or the black and Chicano neighborhoods of inner-city 
Denver, residents demanded their right to control over decision making and public 
policy and rejected the corporate-led vision of metropolitan growth and expansion. 
Although the Games themselves ultimately came to a vote in the context of a single-
issue ballot initiative, the debate over whether or not to host them created a shift in 
the political discourse of Colorado writ large. “Environment” and “growth” became 
buzz words for politicians of all stripes. With growing proportions of residents 
registered as unaffiliated and both the governor’s mansion and Congressional 
delegation changing parties on a regular basis, Coloradans made it clear that 
politicians ignored constituent concerns at their peril. 
The Olympics controversy and its fallout point to many of the ways in which 
late- twentieth-century American politics have been more pragmatic and more 
attuned to local concerns and quality of life issues than is generally realized. It also 
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highlights the existence of seemingly unlikely coalitions among diverse demographic 
groups. Scholars have tended to view the politics of race as inextricably linked to the 
geography of neighborhoods and municipal boundaries within the metropolis. Yet 
the Denver story reveals a more complex history. For even as whites, blacks, and 
Chicanos struggled—sometimes violently—over the geography of school districts and 
busing, they joined in an uneasy alliance in opposition to the Olympics, another 
issue deeply rooted in individuals’ identification with the physical spaces their 
communities inhabited. Indeed, Denverites’ relationships with each other across the 
bounds of race, class, and geography shifted pragmatically in response to each 
specific political issue that emerged. Rather than partisan fealty, ideological purity, 
or even racial animosity, the underlying principle that directed these citizens’ 
political engagements was that of community participation and local control. Under 
this rubric, quality of life became the ultimate right. 
While the Olympics controversy was confined to Colorado, the political forces 
at work existed throughout the United States. Denver may have been among the 
fastest growing metropolitan areas nationwide, but the transformations it 
experienced from the 1950s onwards were also underway in numerous other places. 
National-level studies conducted at the time indicate the broad reach of a political 
ethos centered on quality of life and community involvement. This is a history 
without the neat inevitability of rising conservatism that most tellings have imposed 
on this recent period in America’s past. Instead, it suggests the state of flux in which 
boosters, activists, and government officials at every level found themselves as they 
struggled to adapt to the new realities of metropolitan geography and political 
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economy in late twentieth century America. It points towards a new political history 
with the interplay among changing metropolitan structures, every day life, and 
political action at the center. 
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Chapter 3:  
“Someone Who Can Win!”: Reform Democrats and the Remaking of 
the Political Mainstream 
 
 For many Coloradans, the anti-Olympics movement, with its emphasis on 
good governance, the rights of property owners, and the importance of quality of life, 
provided a potent new language for describing their place within the modern 
metropolis and for pressing an articulate policy agenda. While the anti-Olympics 
movement was an important catalyst for developing this new political sensibility, 
the Olympics were far from the only issue in which it took shape. At the same time 
that Coloradans debated and resisted hosting the Games, they also were embroiled 
in the Annexation Wars. On that issue, too, many Coloradans expressed displeasure 
with the business community’s perceived role, this time in spurring Denver 
annexations and attempting to play municipalities off of each other for their own 
best advantage in zoning, taxes, and other concessions at the expense of what 
residents sought to protect as their “way of life.” Indeed, a host of concerns, ranging 
from busing for school desegregation to nuclear testing and Denver’s plans to 
develop new water resources across the Rockies, led many Coloradans to question 
the roles of government and corporate interests in shaping the future of their state. 
 By the mid-1970s, Coloradans, like many Americans, were pushing back 
against the notion that what was good for big business was always best for the 
citizens of their state. They had grown skeptical of the ethos of continuous growth 
that lay at the heart of postwar political culture and policy-making both locally and 
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nationally. Outrage over the secrecy and expense of the Olympics bid—its lack of 
concern for citizen input and its chauvinistic insistence that the boosters spoke for 
all Coloradans—caused many citizens to lose faith in business and the Chamber of 
Commerce as representatives of the public interest. That loss of faith carried over 
into electoral politics, too. In 1972, the same year that the anti-Olympics 
amendment was on the ballot, Colorado voters also passed a “sunshine law” 
requiring politicians to disclose all of their corporate ties. Two years later, in 1974, 
Coloradans cleaned house, ousting elected officials who had supported the Games 
and electing a raft of self-styled “reform” candidates, mostly Democrats, in their 
place. 
 Colorado was at the leading edge of a national trend. Citizens’ faith in 
governing institutions and officials was shaken by a series of political shocks—
beginning with Vietnam and Watergate, but certainly not ending there—at the same 
time that economic crises rocked the foundation of the nation’s middle class, calling 
into question the tenets of Keynesian economics that underlay postwar policy. The 
result was a moment of profound unease when, as left-wing political activist Michael 
Harrington wryly observed, Americans were “moving vigorously right, left, and 
center all at once.”132 By 1972, many academic observers, journalists, and political 
analysts predicted an end to the two-party system and the emergence of a 
multiparty system in its stead. And although the Democrats and Republicans 
endured, fear for their future remained. As pollster Everett C. Ladd warned in a 
1978 series of articles for Fortune Magazine and Where Have All the Voters Gone?: 
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The Fracturing of America’s Political Parties, Americans were “unhappy with the 
performance of the principle institutions of their society [and] questioned the 
responsiveness of the parties to popular interests and expectations.”133 Both parties 
scrambled to respond to these shifting political currents. 
 While GOP strategist Kevin Phillips predicted an emerging Republican 
majority in the political tealeaves, others were not so sure. In the pages of scholarly 
journals, in political magazines like the New Republic, and in the Nixon White 
House, experts worried about what they perceived as a marked increase in voter 
disaffection and a resultant weakening of the American party system. In The Real 
Majority, which came out in 1970 and was widely seen as a rebuke to Phillips, 
political scientists Ben Scammon and Richard Wattenberg used data from the 1968 
presidential election, along with various polls, to argue that Americans were, 
fundamentally, centrist in their views. They contended that the party that was most 
successful in attracting this large and growing group of moderates would emerge 
victorious. Although they were Democrats, Scammon and Wattenberg’s work found a 
hearing across the political spectrum, even becoming fodder for intense strategy 
debate within the Nixon administration.134 While some within the GOP advocated 
embracing Phillips’s call to tack sharply right, other influential party insiders, like 
pollster and senior strategist Robert Teeter, urged the adoption of a more centrist 
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platform in order to compete successfully with Democrats, particularly at the state 
and local levels where Republicans struggled to attract votes.135 
 Among Democrats, meanwhile, the transformation was especially profound. 
Reflecting in 1973 on McGovern’s crushing defeat at the hands of Richard Nixon, 
McGovern campaign manager Gary Hart offered a scathing assessment of the 
Democratic Party’s failure. The party was, he declared, woefully out of touch, 
beholden to special interests and an outmoded, ideologically driven policy agenda. 
“The traditional sources of invigorating, inspiring, and creative ideas were 
dissipated,” he wrote in Right from the Start, his postmortem of the campaign.136 
Although McGovern had succeeded in drawing forth a new generation of energetic 
party activists, he had failed, Hart argued, to inspire new ideas and, “by 1972, 
American liberalism was near bankruptcy.” Already gearing up for his own 1974 
Senate bid, Hart spoke of new ideas and the need for an activist but less intrusive 
government.137 
The Democratic politicians who succeeded in 1974, like Hart, were those who 
most successfully tapped into the new popular mood, translating a nascent political 
culture oriented towards quality of life into a flourishing national politics. A 
combination of local concerns, national crisis, and what many perceived as the 
institutional failures of the Democratic Party spurred reformers. Many were 
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young—almost all were male—and they shared an approachable, friendly personal 
style along with a commitment (at the very least rhetorical and, often, actual) to 
making government more transparent and standing up for “the people” against “the 
interests.” Often dismissed as the “Watergate Babies” of 1974, who rode a wave of 
anti-Nixon sentiment into office, in fact these young reformers offered a distinct 
political vision that was centrist and fiscally conservative, that embraced free trade, 
and that elevated private enterprise and markets, rather than government 
programs, as the solution to social problems. When, on the eve of his election to the 
Senate in 1974, Gary Hart stood on the steps of the Colorado capitol and announced 
the “end of the New Deal,” it was a sentiment shared by many in this group. What 
had begun in the late 1960s and early 1970s as the New Politics quickly evolved into 
a full-fledged reform movement within the Democratic Party. Known variously as 
progressive, neopopulist, and later Atari Democrats, by 1980, the reformers were 
dubbed neoliberals.138 Over the ensuing decade, they remade the Democrats from 
the party of postwar liberalism into a “third way” party of New Democrats.139 
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Neoliberals were a varied group, hailing from every region of the country. 
Colorado’s reform Democrats were central players in the national movement. Along 
with Missouri’s Dick Gephardt, Tim Wirth, who had served as deputy assistant 
secretary for education in the first Nixon administration and who went on to 
represent Colorado’s second district, led the effort of Congressional Democrats to 
develop a new statement of party principles along pragmatic, centrist lines. In 
“Rebuilding the Road to Opportunity,” they urged federal investment to promote 
economic growth via high technology, entrepreneurship, and job training, along with 
cuts in spending for social welfare. In both houses of Congress, Wirth and Hart were 
joined by a host of like-minded colleagues, including Paul Tsongas, Norman Mineta, 
Leon Panetta, and Al Gore. Together with Dick Lamm, young Democratic governors 
like Massachusetts’s Michael Dukakis, Arkansas’s Bill Clinton, Arizona’s Bruce 
Babbitt, and others articulated new visions for their states along similar lines. All 
presented themselves, to use future Vice President Al Gore’s words, as “raging 
moderates,” bent on promoting equality and social justice through business and 
markets. Rather than court constituencies, the traditional interest groups that made 
up the Democrats’ New Deal coalition, they invested their energy in issues, 
appealing to a younger, more educated, and more suburban voting demographic. 
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Across the United States, this young generation of new Democratic leaders 
embraced the grassroots rhetoric of government transparency and quality of life. 
Capitalizing on growing popular skepticism, both towards government and civic and 
political institutions, they came increasingly to dominate their party and shape its 
direction.140 
It may seem counterintuitive to describe a group of Democrats as neoliberal. 
The term is most often associated with a politics of the right that emphasized the 
tenets of classical nineteenth-century liberalism: limited government, individual 
liberty, and laissez faire economics. In this account, neoliberalism began to gain 
traction in the United States and elsewhere in response to the supposed failure of 
existing Keynesian economic policy to manage the soaring inflation of the 1970s and 
the fallout of the OPEC oil crisis. Margaret Thatcher’s 1979 election as British prime 
minister and Ronald Reagan’s landslide victory in the 1980 U.S. presidential 
election marked neoliberalism’s political arrival. 
Yet the term had another, highly prominent use in American politics during 
the seventies and eighties as the name for a reformist movement among Democrats. 
Like Hart, many of these young reformers came from Republican families but were 
drawn by John Kennedy to the Democratic Party and his brand of mid-twentieth 
century American liberalism. By 1974, when many of them were first elected, they 
had begun to feel that the New Deal liberalism that dominated Democratic 
policymaking was outdated. Originally a response to the problems of 
industrialization, these reformers argued, liberalism no longer offered an effective 
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response to the challenges of an emerging information age. Rather, it had become a 
vehicle for serving special interests within the Democratic coalition, notably, labor 
unions, blacks, working-class Catholics, and Jews. Instead, Democratic neoliberals 
urged a recommitment to the national interest; they saw themselves as pragmatists, 
applying new solutions to old problems of injustice. As Charles Peters, editor of the 
Washington Monthly, a political magazine that came to be closely associated with 
this neoliberal movement, put it: “Neoliberalism recognizes that there were a lot of 
things wrong with a lot of the Big Government solutions we tried, but there was 
never anything wrong with the ends we were seeking—justice, fair play, and liberal 
ideals."141 In this context, what made neoliberalism new was its divergence from the 
“old” liberalism of the postwar years. 
One corollary of the move away from New Deal interest group politics was 
the neoliberals’ reassertion of economic growth at the top of the Democratic agenda. 
Indeed, a crucial distinction between the new liberalism and the old was the 
neoliberals’ almost exclusive policy focus on economics. “The key,” explained New 
Jersey senator Bill Bradley, “is how to get the economy moving again, not how to get 
new government delivery systems.”142 Or, as neoliberal chronicler Randall 
Rothenberg put it, “John F. Kennedy’s maxim ‘A rising tide lifts all boats’ has been 
modified by the neoliberals: ‘You can’t slice a shrinking pie.’”143 This emphasis on 
economics enabled neoliberals to overlook sometimes significant differences on social 
issues that would once have been divisive. For example, Dick Gephardt, a key 
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neoliberal leader and collaborator with Tim Wirth on budget issues, was a vocal 
opponent of both busing and abortion. By contrast, Wirth supported abortion rights, 
and Lamm, when he was in the Colorado state legislature in 1967, specifically 
touted his credentials as sponsor of the nation’s first liberalized abortion law.144 
Three key themes animated neoliberal policymaking and brought otherwise 
disparate neoliberals together: investment, appropriate technology, and cooperation. 
To promote economic growth, neoliberals emphasized investment in so-called human 
capital as well as in small business and entrepreneurship. Appropriate technology 
was closely linked and encompassed not just the interest in the burgeoning high tech 
sector that in the early 1980s would earn neoliberals the moniker “Atari Democrats,” 
but also a devotion to what they referred to as appropriate political technologies. As 
elaborated by Charles Peters in his 1983 “Neoliberal Manifesto,” these included 
programmatic flexibility, decentralization, microeconomics in place of macro, and 
reliance on market forces rather than government action to effect economic and 
social change. (Indeed, a telling mark of the growing schism between neoliberals and 
New Dealers was neoliberals’ rejection of the aggregate indicators such as Gross 
National Product and Gross Domestic Product that were so central to postwar 
growth liberalism.145) Cooperation was the final theme. Rejecting what they viewed 
as liberalism’s outmoded understanding of competition among antagonistic interest 
groups, neoliberals instead called for concerted action among nations, economic 
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sectors, and even between management and labor within the workplace as the most 
effective means of achieving growth and equity.146 
Observers on both the right and left watched the neoliberals with interest 
and trepidation. Conservatives claimed that neoliberals were unserious. As Michael 
Scully, editor of the American Enterprise Institute’s magazine Public Opinion, 
derisively commented, “If neoconservatives are liberals who got mugged by reality, 
then neoliberals are liberals who got mugged by reality but refused to press 
charges.”147 Old-school Democrats, meanwhile, dismissed the reformers, sniffing, “I 
read the neo-liberal manifesto by [Washington Monthly editor] Charlie Peters and 
there was no there there.”148 In the wake of Reagan’s 1980 presidential victory, 
Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., self-appointed last stalwart of the old liberalism, opined in 
the Wall Street Journal, Playboy, and elsewhere that neoliberals were “fellow 
travelers in the Reagan revolution” who had “joined the clamor against ‘big 
government,’ found great merit in the unregulated market place, [and] opposed 
structural change in the economy.”149 Despite the reservations of the Washington 
establishment, however, by the end of the eighties, neoliberal Democrats had 
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effectively captured the heart of their party and installed their market-oriented 
agenda as the Democratic agenda for the 1990s.150 
Coloradans like Lamm, Hart, and Wirth were central to this transformation. 
This chapter follows several of Colorado’s winning reformers, examining the ways in 
which their political rhetoric and policy priorities shaped the new grassroots 
political ethos of the era. It then turns to the national stage, demonstrating that 
Colorado’s new politics were, in fact, part of a national phenomenon. By examining 
similar reform candidates across the country, internal party strategy documents, 
and scholarly and popular debates as well as the key role of Colorado politicians like 
Tim Wirth and Gary Hart in shaping national political discourse, this chapter 
reveals the pervasiveness of the new politics and its impact across the political 
spectrum. It further demonstrates the significance of neoliberalism among 
Democrats in particular as a historical phenomenon (since Republicans already 
embraced a dominant market orientation before the 1970s, they had less ideological 
and political ground to travel). Moreover, it argues that Democrats were, in fact, 
uniquely well-positioned to sell the neoliberal political agenda to a wary public 
because of their history of skepticism toward business and their greater cultural 
capital as plainspoken and trustworthy in the aftermath of both local controversies 
such as the Olympics and the national trauma of Watergate. Following these 
politicians forward into the 1980s, I show how the politics of quality of life and 
government accountability were, in the hands of ostensibly liberal actors, readily 
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transformed into a pro-market politics that appealed to Colorado’s majority of 
moderate voters while simultaneously undercutting traditional liberal policy 
concerns for economic and racial equality. Placing these Colorado politicians in 
national context, I further show how Colorado’s political realignment was both part 
of and a driver for a broad, national transformation towards neoliberalism. 
* * * 
In 1972, Dick Lamm was a state legislator from a blue-collar neighborhood in 
central Denver. That year, he became the main spokesman for the anti-Olympics 
cause, helping activists establish Citizens for Colorado’s future, the non-profit that 
coordinated the anti-Olympics campaign and draft the successful constitutional 
amendment that banned public funding for the Games. He was also among the 
primary champions of the “sunshine law,” also on the ballot that year, which 
required state officials to disclose all of their business ties and funding sources. 
Lamm’s politics were iconoclastic, combining an array of what would become central 
elements of the new political culture. In particular, his aggressive focus on quality of 
life, his silence about racial inequality, and his approachable personal style marked 
him as a transitional figure between the old politics and the new. 
Originally from Madison, Wisconsin, Lamm came to the Rocky Mountain 
State in 1961. Crossing over the border from Kansas, he remembered stopping by 
the side of the road to watch a flock of geese and thinking, “This is the place.”151 He 
made Denver his home and quickly became active in local politics, where he worked 
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to protect the natural environment that had drawn him to his new home. Lamm’s 
Colorado story was reflective of the times. Between 1960 and 1970, Colorado’s 
population grew by twenty-five percent.152 Like Lamm, many of the newcomers were 
drawn by the state’s natural beauty and, once there, dedicated themselves to 
preserving it. 
Lamm laid the groundwork for his 1974 gubernatorial campaign in the anti-
Olympics fight. He chastised Governor John Vanderhoof, a pro-Olympics booster 
who imagined Colorado as the future “energy capital of the world” and the state 
legislature for ignoring the problems of explosive growth, rising financial burdens, 
and deteriorating quality of life in Colorado.153 “Rather than make ‘Olympic’ efforts 
to come to grips with our problems and our limited tax base,” Lamm chastised, 
“Colorado leaders are attempting to spend limited tax dollars hosting an Olympics 
which promises both to be a large drain on state funds and counterproductive to the 
serious growth problems Colorado is already experiencing.” Colorado, he announced, 
was experiencing a “quiet revolution.” “The people themselves,” he claimed, “are 
changing the goals and policies of a Colorado government, which itself refuses to 
change those goals and policies.” The anti-Olympics movement was thus “a 
recommitment of our people to the principles of democracy upon which our nation 
was founded.” Government—in the pocket of the Chamber of Commerce—was the 
problem, Lamm argued. Instead, he proclaimed, government should work in the 
interest of the people of Colorado to improve their quality of life by listening and 
responding to their needs and desires. 
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Lamm made listening to Coloradans and representing the public interest the 
centerpiece of his gubernatorial campaign. With the slogan, “I’m Dick Lamm, and 
I’m walking for governor,” he undertook several treks across the state, walking eight 
hundred miles in all. It was, ostensibly, a “listening tour” in which the candidate 
sought to hear from citizens—sometimes in planned stops, often simply by the side 
of the road—seeking to find out what they were most concerned about and what 
their policy priorities were. In a radio spot that aired repeatedly across Colorado, 
Lamm explained the reasons for his walk: “A wise politician once said, ‘I thought I 
heard the voice of the people, but it was just three of my friends talking among 
themselves.’” Politicians, he remarked, often became “remote, removed, strangers to 
the very people they represent,” leading to such breaches of public trust as 
Watergate and the Olympics. Because of his walking tour, he promised, “If I’m 
elected governor, I’ll then be ready to lead—in the direction the people want us to 
go.”154 For Lamm, and for the voters with whom he spoke, the breach of public trust 
represented by Watergate and Vietnam and, in a more diffuse sense, the economic 
crises of the early 1970s, was matched by local breaches of public trust by 
government officials and by corporate elites. Together, these generated a sense that 
something had to change. 
Lamm encapsulated that something in a set of policy priorities that he 
shared with other successful reform candidates in 1974. Care for the elderly, lower 
food prices, funding for education, support for agriculture, and property and sales 
tax reform were all part of Lamm’s appeal. These went hand-in-hand with a series of 
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initiatives to move political power in Colorado away from corporations and towards 
individual citizens and to make sure that citizens—not business—were the primary 
beneficiaries of state resources. Dolores Williams, a self-described housewife and 
registered Republican who nonetheless supported Lamm, captured the essence of 
the candidate’s appeal, aptly summarizing the larger New Politics ethos in the 
process: 
Dick Lamm seems to me to be a representative of all people, citizens, not 
necessarily private interests, but a champion of the people who have no other 
lobby, taxpayers, people over 64 who need tax relief, citizens who need to 
have their property protected by adequate land use provisions, citizens who 
would like people to have thought ahead enough to have provided parks for 
their children…He could walk right down the middle line, keeping his sights 
on the people who elected him…avoiding special interests left and right.155 
In practice, this meant lower taxes individuals, higher taxes and more regulation for 
oil companies and oil shale development, campaign finance reform, and better 
controls on growth to direct new development out of the overcrowded, overtaxed 
metropolitan Front Range and into rural areas that needed and wanted it. 
Lamm’s politics retained many elements of a traditional Democratic 
platform, such as advocating government intervention to protect citizens from 
corporate excess and proposing a more progressive system of taxation. But it also 
marked a notable departure from classic, New Deal politics. Labor was entirely 
absent from his rhetoric and policy prescriptions, replaced instead with appeals to 
consumerist and individualist approaches to citizenship and political belonging. This 
was of a piece with the kind of messages emanating from Democratic reformers 
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across the country, who tended to view unions as a special interest that detracted 
from the “national interest” by demanding preferences and privileges for some while 
ignoring the needs of other citizens and the nation as a whole.156 Lamm’s was a 
populist politics, the watchwords of which were “transparency,” “public interest,” 
and “quality of life.” All other issues—from property taxes and parks to inflation and 
the oil crisis, from the Olympics and growth to Watergate and Vietnam—were 
ultimately subsumed within this rubric. 
In keeping with the broader neoliberal interest in entrepreneurship over big 
business and in protecting what they understood as the interests of individual 
citizens over those of organized constituencies, Lamm trumpeted a consumerist and 
anti-corporate message. Thus, for example, when Lamm campaigned on the 
problems of growth and environmental degradation in greater Denver, he explicitly 
linked these issues to the ruling Republicans’ ties to corporate interests: “The traffic, 
the congestion, the noise, the air pollution get worse every day,” he bemoaned in one 
television advertisement, “And while some profit from excessive growth, most of us 
pay for it through increased taxes and more competition for jobs and housing.”157 On 
the subject of Colorado oil shale development, a hotly debated issue in the midst of 
the 1973 oil crisis, Lamm again drew a direct link between the state’s favorable 
corporate tax climate, particularly for energy development, and the myriad ways in 
which citizens suffered under what he argued was an unfair tax burden. To great 
popular approval, he advocated an increase in corporate taxation and a 
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corresponding decrease in property taxes for private homes along with the 
elimination of the sales tax on groceries, insisting that “Colorado citizens pay 
proportionally too much of our tax burden—and corporations pay too little” and that 
“every industry must pay its own way, and that everyone in Colorado has a right to 
benefit from the presence of natural resources in this state.”158 
Far from being “liberal” or “left wing” issues, these concerns about the fate of 
Coloradans in the face of rampant growth, unregulated energy development, 
environmental degradation, corporate lobbying, and government secrecy animated a 
majority of voters. Although there was, of course, a diversity of opinion across the 
ideological spectrum, these were ultimately homeowner issues, parent issues, and 
above all taxpayer issues, emerging repeatedly in statewide polls atop lists of 
pressing concerns for the 1974 election. And they were part of a general critique of 
the reigning corporate-government alliance that Dick Lamm successfully mobilized 
his run for governor. 
This advocacy of the public interest was tied to a concern with what had come 
by the 1970s to be known as “quality of life.” Much as quality of life was a rallying 
cry in the anti-Olympics movement, mobilizing millions of Coloradans against the 
corporate-backed Games, so Lamm argued forcefully that the quality of life in 
Colorado would deteriorate dramatically without a true champion of the people in 
the governor’s mansion. Many voters agreed. One considered that, “the thing that 
attracts me to Dick is concern about the quality of life in Colorado, his concern 
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about…land use issues, consumer protection, some of these kinds of things.”159 Bob 
Andreason, a “life-long Republican” from Cascade and avid Lamm supporter, 
explained, “I’m tired of the philosophy that growth is good, rip-off is right, and 
quarrying is quality environment…I still consider myself a political conservative, 
but…I support Dick Lamm because he is interested in people and in Colorado—in 
that order.”160 
Beyond the substance of his platform, Lamm also had huge stylistic appeal. 
In the aftermath of Watergate and the secrecy surrounding Denver’s Olympic bid, 
appearing to be forthright mattered. The very language Lamm used signaled to 
voters that he was a regular guy. Thus, campaign newsletters about Lamm’s walk 
described his conversations with Colorado citizens but also detailed his meals on the 
trail and his taste in hiking boots.161 Campaign speeches and advertisements were 
conversational and laced with phrases intended to help voters relate to Lamm 
personally, like a trusted friend. In television advertisements and brochures, Lamm 
emphasized his interest in ordinary Coloradans, highlighting, for example, what he 
had learned from residents of the state’s less-populous western and southern regions 
and acknowledging that Denver-based politicians had a reputation for ignoring their 
out-state constituents. He pledged to be a true representative for rural voters, 
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promising that, “As governor…I’m going to keep coming back, and keep listening.”162 
In a characteristic radio spot, Lamm argued, “It’s all right not to have all the 
answers as long as you’re asking the right questions.”163 When discussing the issues 
of the day, Lamm readily acknowledged areas in which his opinions were evolving or 
about which he still had more to learn. 
Coloradans warmed to Lamm’s candor. “Dick,” one voter opined, “is one of 
those rare politicians that is absolutely honest, absolutely forthright.” Paulette 
Kapp, a student from Greeley, explained that she was supporting Lamm because, 
“He accepts us as people not as votes, and it’s a good feeling. Dick Lamm is a friend, 
not just a Gubernatorial candidate.” Another attested that Lamm’s openness helped 
him maintain the respect of all voters—not just those who planned to vote for him. 
Moreover, the campaign’s theme, “If you care for Colorado…,” promoted the idea 
that government was not just the responsibility of elected officials, but of citizens 
too. As Lamm’s campaign strategy documents put it, “caring for Colorado means 
caring for our water resources…our core cities…our elderly…our land; and, finally, 
caring for Colorado means making Dick Lamm its governor.”164 The intent was to 
draw voters into a partnership with the candidate, positioning them as active 
participants in the process of making Colorado a better place to live.165 
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Lamm and other reformers in the New Politics mold argued that the 
electorate, in fact, yearned to be engaged; they rejected conventional wisdom that 
voters were apathetic. The walking tour itself was predicated on the idea that 
Coloradans knew best what their local communities needed. Voters agreed, noting 
that, “He isn’t the typical politician who goes out and meets people and tells them 
what they want to hear. He’s honest in the way he deals with questions, he’s 
interested in what people think, and he listens to them. And uses their 
suggestions.”166 Speaking directly with constituents and then signaling that he took 
their concerns seriously by announcing a policy agenda that specifically addressed 
what he’d heard on the road was a hallmark of Lamm’s winning approach to politics. 
And although he was, perhaps, the most aggressive of all the Colorado reformers in 
perpetuating this self-image, it was a strategy adopted in one form or another by all 
the winning candidates in 1974. 
* * * 
Like Lamm, other Colorado politicians also sought to ally themselves with 
the public interest by adopting a more laid-back, populist style and advocating 
policies that could appeal to a broad swath of voters, regardless of party affiliations. 
Tim Wirth, for example, won election to Congress from Colorado’s second district, 
comprising suburban Jefferson County, Boulder, and West Denver. A vignette from 
his reelection campaign two years later (also successful) is particularly illustrative of 
the new political mode. A campaign brochure, titled “The day Tim Wirth made the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
166 Voter Testimonial Transcripts, 1974, John Parr Papers, Box 1, “Issues—DL,” Denver 
Public Library, Western History and Genealogy Division. 
	  
	  
119	  
lobbyists stand up,” began in a casual, colloquial tone, “Tim tells the story…” and 
went on to describe a particularly packed congressional committee hearing on a bill 
affecting the Bell Telephone System. Noticing that all the people in the crowded 
room looked “suspiciously alike,” Wirth asked the president of Bell to have all those 
connected to the company stand up, and the entire audience stood: they were all 
company lobbyists. For Tim (all his campaign materials referred to him by first 
name), the moral was clear: 
The big boys have plenty of high-priced lobbyists in Washington and 
they make sure that their point of view gets across to the Congress. 
We don’t have to call them. They call us. It’s the other people I worry 
about—the consumer, the senior citizen, the average middle-class 
American. I represent them, and I take that part of my job very 
seriously. 
The brochure went on to detail Wirth’s proposals on campaign finance reform, 
lobbying reform, and enhancing the powers of the Federal Elections Commission. 
“All of this,” Wirth explained, “will help to bring government out in the open…where 
it should have been all along.”167 
A businessman-turned-politician, Wirth made a name for himself in Congress 
on energy policy, environmental and consumer protection, and budget reform. In six 
terms in the House and another in the Senate, he garnered a reputation as an 
exceptionally accessible representative who was responsive to constituents, open to 
alternate viewpoints, concerned about quality of life for people in his district, 
resistant to special interests, and willing to stand up to members of his own party—
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including the president—when he felt it was warranted. Despite having been 
branded by national right-wing political groups as a “dangerous liberal,” the broad 
range of endorsements Wirth garnered in each of his campaigns reveals the 
remarkable extent of his bipartisan support. Both the Rocky Mountain News and 
Denver Post, Colorado’s two ideologically opposed major newspapers, supported 
Wirth’s candidacy time and again. So did the editorial boards of local papers across 
Colorado’s second district, from progressive Boulder to traditionally Republican 
Lakewood, Broomfield, Golden, and Longmont in Denver’s northern and western 
suburbs.168 During his 1986 Senate race, Colorado Business, a local business 
magazine, lauded him as a forward thinker, able to “cut through the gibberish and 
petrified platforms of the political scene” while others hailed his firm grasp of 
economics and his ability to earn the respect of even the most ardent political 
opponent.169 In crafting his political persona, Wirth intentionally cultivated these 
depictions of himself as eminently rational and beyond partisanship, working with 
only the interests of the people in mind. 
Like Lamm and other reformers, Wirth tapped into an inchoate sense of 
dissatisfaction at the grassroots and turned it to electoral advantage. He was 
particularly adept at transposing the new grassroots political orientation that was 
already so visible in contests like those over annexation and the Olympics into 
formal politics, embracing a quality of life message that grounded citizens’ political 
claims in their roles as consumers. In a series of full-page advertisements during his 
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1974 Congressional campaign, Wirth appealed directly to the citizen-consumer, 
encouraging constituents to vote their pocketbooks. Most significantly, he made a 
direct connection between the failure of existing government policies and consumer 
issues like exorbitant prices for basic necessities. Under the headline “We need to do 
something about prices. About taxes. About honesty in government. Now,” a full-
page advertisement from the campaign displayed the image of a gas pump. The 
surrounding text promised that Wirth would “work to make government spend 
within our means” and vowed that he would help to ease the crushing economic 
burden imposed on individuals and families by stagflation by using a common sense 
approach to budgeting and challenging special interests “when they ignore their 
responsibility to keep prices down.” Wirth promised, if elected, to work for tax 
reform to help “people who really need [it]. People like you.” In his view, 
governmental transparency, advocating campaign finance reform, and tighter limits 
on lobbying were essential to protecting citizens in their consumer and taxpayer 
roles.170 
For Wirth and others among the new, young cohort of Democrats in Congress 
and in statehouses across the nation, the ultimate question for the new political era 
was this: “Can our large and diverse country be governed by a broad bipartisan 
consensus in the interest of the general public? Or is it going to be fragmented by 
special interest groups which operate solely on the basis of their own narrow 
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concerns?”171 While Wirth and others aggressively criticized the Republican Party, 
particularly during the Reagan administration, they simultaneously put great stock 
in appearing to rise above the partisan fray. Wirth’s 1976 reelection campaign 
touted his “old-fashioned common-sense approach” to making necessary changes in 
government, particularly with regard to taxes and the budget. Wirth described his 
bipartisan efforts to bring inflation and the deficit under control, triumphantly 
projecting a balanced budget by 1979. Independence, Wirth proclaimed, was also 
central to his common-sense philosophy. “He doesn't believe in the old labels—like 
‘liberal’ and ‘conservative,’” one brochure explained, “because each problem requires 
an individual solution…Tim Wirth takes each issue at [sic] it comes up, looks at all 
sides, and then makes up his mind.” If this moderate, non-partisan approach seemed 
unusual in Washington, that was unsurprising: “Not many Congressmen operate 
that way—but then many Congressmen like the old labels. Tim Wirth just likes to 
be labeled with common sense.”172 
Yet even as Wirth invoked his “common sense approach,” the very definition 
of common sense was changing rapidly. According to Wirth, common sense meant 
engaging in bipartisan efforts to curb inflation and reduce or, better still, eliminate 
the deficit. And although he preferred to target what he viewed as excessive and 
unwise defense spending, Wirth warned constituents that social programs and many 
government agencies would also be forced to make cuts. This agenda was 
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dramatically different from the previous Keynesian common sense that had 
governed Democratic politics and, for the most part, the nation in the early postwar 
decades. By defining deficit reduction and inflation as government’s primary 
responsibilities, Wirth promoted a new understanding of political and economic 
common sense that was on the cusp of becoming hegemonic. 
The neoliberals’ new, market-based approach took center stage in the 
Democrats’ signature 1982 economic policy document. Authored by Tim Wirth and 
fellow Democratic reformer Dick Gephardt, the document, titled “Rebuilding the 
Road to Opportunity (RRO),” laid out House Democrats’ economic and social agenda 
for the decade. RRO was, Wirth explained, an attempt to address a fundamental 
shift from an “industrial economy to one that is increasingly technology- and 
information-based” and from an economy that was largely domestic to one that was 
increasingly international. Although RRO identified growth and fairness as the 
“cornerstones of the Democratic vision,” in fact the document dealt with growth 
almost exclusively. Section headings such as “Increasing Investment in Our 
Economy,” “Investing in Our People,” “Investing in Public Infrastructure,” and “An 
Environment for Investment” signaled the neoliberals’ move away from New Deal 
liberalism’s redistributive politics and towards, in Wirth’s words, “the economics of 
growth and opportunity.” In practice, this meant getting away from what neoliberals 
saw as the Democrats’ pattern of setting policy by appeasing interest groups in order 
to maintain the party’s coalition—what Wirth called “ad-hockery”—in favor of what 
they dubbed a more “realistic” approach centered on entrepreneurship and market 
investment. 
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Traditional liberals lambasted the Wirth-Gephardt roadmap. In an editorial 
titled “Skirting the Fairness Issue,” the Washington Post dryly noted the absence of 
fairness from the “growth and fairness” vision. “What is truly striking about the 
document,” the editors remarked, “is how far the pendulum has apparently swung.” 
Social issues such as health care, welfare, private pensions, and fair access to 
employment that had once been Democratic priorities were now relegated to the 
sidelines, “gathered up in a box and labeled ‘women’s issues.’” No longer matters of 
general concern or questions of civil rights, the Post complained, neoliberal House 
Democrats, now with the power to set their party’s agenda, seemed to believe that 
the major problems of equality had been solved and “need only some fixing up to 
make sure that women get their fair share of the benefits.” Indeed, despite their 
claims to pragmatism over partisanship, this marginalization of social issues was 
part of a political strategy to recapture the votes of so-called Reagan Democrats in 
the upcoming 1984 elections. RRO became the template for the House Democratic 
Caucus’s campaign strategy document that year.173 
In 1984, as he prepared to run for reelection, Wirth wrote to his constituents 
about the future of Colorado and the nation. Three years into the Reagan 
administration, with the country still recovering from the 1981–1982 recession, 
Wirth grimly enumerated the problems of the day, laying them at the feet of 
President Reagan and the Republican Senate, which he called “the most 
conservative Administration and Senate in memory.” As Democrats, he vowed, “We 
must continue to stand up for a very different vision of America.” From there, 
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however, he launched into what, to all appearances, looked very much like a 
Republican policy manifesto, promising to “chop the massive federal deficits,” lower 
interest rates, reform the tax code, and invest in high technology. The crucial 
difference, which continued to be a major dividing line between Democrats and 
Republicans, was the balance Wirth struck between defense and domestic spending. 
Where Senate Republicans and the President proposed massive increases to defense 
spending while slashing domestic programs, Wirth and other New Democrats 
argued that a strong and sensible national defense was possible at much lower cost 
and that, “We must avoid placing the burdens of reduced federal spending on the 
backs of low income persons. We must ensure a dignified and decent quality of life 
for our nation's Senior Citizens.”174 
In conjunction with such austerity measures, Wirth also promoted high 
technology and private enterprise as solutions to America’s economic and social 
problems. Indeed, for Wirth the two were intimately linked. If, as reform Democrats 
claimed, America’s economic crisis was the product of a faltering manufacturing 
sector and the inability of Keynesian government interventions to solve the problem, 
then promoting business investment in new sectors was crucial. Wirth and his 
cohorts argued that America’s “prosperity and competitiveness abroad depends 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
174 Tim Wirth campaign letter to “Fellow Democrats,” May 7, 1984, Colorado Elected 
Representatives—Newsletters & Reports, Wirth, Tim E. Rep 2nd District 1980-1982, 
University of Colorado Libraries Archives Division. 
	  
	  
126	  
increasingly on high technology products and sophisticated services,” and they 
promoted these as the keys to the nation’s future economic strength.175 
Wirth’s career is illustrative of the ways in which the reform spirit in 
American politics, especially within the Democratic Party, persisted and evolved 
throughout the 1970s and into the 1980s. Colorado Democrats liked to say that 
Wirth “began running for president the day he was inaugurated into the House,” 
and this ambition was reflected in his embrace of the free market at a time when 
public faith in New Deal and Great Society programs was waning.176 Wirth was a 
key player in the transformation of the Democratic Party from New Deal liberalism 
to neoliberalism, from government solutions to market-based solutions for a wide 
range of social, economic, and environmental problems. Writing to constituents in 
1980, Wirth declared, “Federal spending must be cut back…Every federal agency 
and program must be thoroughly examined. There can be no sacred cows.” His policy 
prescriptions included means testing of social benefits such as food stamps and 
energy assistance and narrower targeting for entitlements.177 
Ever a deficit hawk, Wirth warned, “We cannot expect the federal 
government to provide a fiscal solution to every problem. The government already 
does too much—and too little well.” He called for cuts in government spending and 
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for efforts to rein in inflation.178 In addition to co-authoring RRO with Dick 
Gephardt and serving as economics subcommittee co-chair for the House Democratic 
Caucus Committee, Wirth was part of the so-called gang of four along with Dick 
Gephardt, Norman Minetta, and Leon Panetta, that drafted the 1981 budget 
compromise between President Reagan and House Democratic leadership. He also 
served, along with Gephardt, on an economic task force for the Democratic National 
Committee, where he was instrumental in incorporating neoliberal economic ideas 
and policy priorities into the party’s platform.179 
During the Reagan years, Wirth embraced the term “Atari Democrat” to 
describe himself and colleagues who advocated a moderate, pro-growth, pro-business 
agenda for the Democratic Party. As the New York Times described them, Atari 
Democrats were committed to “free markets and investment” and saw “investment 
and high technology as the contemporary answer to the New Deal.”180 A founding 
member of the House Democratic Caucus Committee on Party Effectiveness, an 
early institutional manifestation of changes in the Democratic Party widely viewed 
as a forerunner to the New Democrats, Wirth would go on to become a key player in 
the early years of the Democratic Leadership Council, the flagship organization of 
the neoliberal New Democrat movement that, with the election of Bill Clinton in 
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1992, ultimately took control of the Democratic Party as a whole. (Indeed, Wirth was 
national co-chair of the Clinton-Gore campaign.) 
Wirth’s language mirrored similar rhetoric from fellow Coloradans Dick 
Lamm and Gary Hart about fair-mindedness and post-partisanship in the name of 
the public interest. It also became a hallmark of the reform Democrat persona in the 
1980s and, ultimately, of the New Democrats. Wirth’s early rhetoric of 
independence, which he continued to employ throughout his career, was of a piece 
with, for example, the rhetoric of Bill Clinton’s successful 1992 presidential 
campaign. In their book Putting People First: How We Can All Change America, 
Clinton and his running mate Al Gore promised voters, “Our policies are neither 
liberal nor conservative, neither Democratic nor Republican. They are new. They are 
different. We are confident they will work.”181 This language reflected a revised (or 
still revising) American political center, which Clinton and Gore hoped to capture. In 
conjunction with their market- and consumer-oriented policy platforms, their 
approach constituted a clear recognition that the old political consensus had 
collapsed and was rapidly being replaced—both as a result of grassroots pressure 
and through such framing. 
* * * 
 Of all the reform candidates to come to office in 1974, Gary Hart was, 
perhaps, the most self-conscious about the transformation he saw in American 
politics and his sense of himself as its avatar. A native of Kansas, Hart was born 
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into a conservatively religious Republican family. After graduating from small 
Methodist college in Oklahoma in 1958, he enrolled in Yale Divinity School.182 But 
John F. Kennedy’s 1960 presidential campaign was a turning point for Hart. After 
hearing the candidate speak, he was so won over that he registered as a Democrat 
and went to work for the campaign, eventually leaving the divinity school and 
transferring to Yale Law School instead. With the zeal of the convert, Hart set out to 
transform his new party. He believed that Democrats were too beholden to the New 
Deal (what he called the “Eleanor Roosevelt wing of the party”) and should leave it 
behind in favor of a new “pragmatic liberalism.” Kennedy, Hart felt, was poised to 
bring the Democrats into the future and would have succeeded were it not for his 
assassination.183 
 Upon graduating from Yale Law School, Hart returned west, opening a law 
practice in Denver. It was there that he emerged onto the national political scene in 
1970, when McGovern met him on a campaign stop in Denver and invited him to 
become the manager of his 1972 presidential campaign. McGovern lost, but two 
years later Coloradans sent Hart to Washington, ousting long-time Republican 
senator Pete Dominick by a wide margin. In the Senate, Hart made a name for 
himself on the Armed Services Committee as an advocate of military reform and, 
along with Texas congressman Martin Frost, began organizing weekly breakfasts 
where like-minded colleagues gathered to discuss policy and the future of the 
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Democratic Party. By 1980, Washington insiders were beginning to identify Hart as 
the leader of the new, reformist, neoliberal movement among Democrats.184 
 Hart’s 1974 campaign resonated with the rhetoric of other successful 
reformers that year. Like them, Hart saw himself as part of a broad movement in 
American politics that sought to “break the deadlock of old systems and old 
doctrines.”185 He trumpeted his success as evidence of “the restoration of honesty in 
government” and a first step towards beginning Colorado’s long march into the 
future. Hart appealed to the state’s rapidly expanding, increasingly educated and 
affluent electorate with the slogan, “They Had Their Turn. Now It’s Our Turn.”186 
Symbolizing his move away from traditional Democratic constituencies and policies, 
he rejected the term “liberal” to describe the new generation of Democrats, of which 
he saw himself as a leader, preferring instead to be called “progressive,” a label he 
argued should apply equally to moderate Republicans interested in pragmatic 
approaches to policymaking in a rapidly changing world. 
Standing on the steps of the Colorado statehouse in Denver immediately 
after his Senate election in 1974, Hart solemnly intoned, “We now face a stark 
choice, between national renewal or national decline.” Leveling his attack at 
Republicans and Democrats alike, he warned that, “Our problems worsen while 
some retreat to an unfair past and others debate old remedies and contend over 
shopworn policies.” He concluded with a theme that would resurface time and again 
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in his subsequent campaigns: “We must preserve our enduring ideals by replacing 
tired assumptions with new and fresh ideas.”187 Indeed, Hart was among the first 
politicians to understand that the nation was, in 1974, in the early stages of a 
profound economic and political change. Hart later identified the 1970s and 1980s as 
a moment of rupture in American politics, one marked by shrinking voter turnout 
and party identification, increasing factionalism, and one term presidencies. The 
rupture, he argued, was “the product of the fundamental failure of our system to 
deal with change.”188 In this case, that change was the failure of Keynesian-style 
economic management to provide effective solutions in the face of a rapidly changing 
economy that was increasingly post-industrial, service- and financial-sector oriented, 
and global in scope.189 
Throughout his political career, Hart, more than almost any other Democrat, 
went out of his way to reject the New Deal and the old political coalition that had 
been the bedrock of Democratic politics since the 1930s. He first sounded this theme 
in his 1974 race for Senate, but it surfaced again in his 1980 reelection campaign 
and in his 1984 run for president, making him one of the first, even among a group 
of young, like-minded Democrats, to so explicitly and forcefully renounce the old 
liberalism. Addressing an audience at the University of Denver in 1974, Hart 
explained that, “This country is in trouble” because of the New Deal habit of creating 
a new government agency every time a problem emerged. He denounced “the 
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proliferation of agencies,” which he argued often created more problems than they 
solved, concluding, “It is time to replace the New Deal, or at least the conventional 
thinking which is its grandchild.”190 Hart identified inflation, energy, the 
environment, and congressional reform—the very issues that had animated 
Colorado voters—as the issues of the day and proclaimed that, “they are not left-
right issues…and they will not yield to ‘New Deal thinking.’”191 
Like other reform Democrats, Hart’s policy prescriptions were an eclectic 
hodgepodge of more clearly market-oriented ideas and ones that harkened back to 
an older Keynesian liberalism. In one of his first speeches on the Senate floor, Hart 
denounced government bureaucracy, admonishing: “The pragmatism of the New 
Deal has become doctrine—if there is a problem, create an agency and throw money 
at the problem. We have lost that sense of pragmatism over the years, and what 
were once viewed only as experiments have now become articles of faith.”192 Such 
pronouncements earned Hart comparisons to a young Barry Goldwater and won him 
accolades from leading conservatives including National Review’s William F. 
Buckley and Paul Weyrich, director of the influential conservative think tank 
Committee for the Survival of a Free Congress. 
Despite these small government pronouncements, however, Hart was no 
friend to big business. Indeed, he attacked corporations with equal fervor, 
championing instead the small businesses and entrepreneurs that were the favorites 
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of neoliberals. The result was a typically neoliberal policy agenda. Hart demanded 
an end to what he saw as failing public housing programs and promoted instead a 
system of government incentives to stimulate a market for privately built and owned 
affordable housing for low-income families. He attacked wasteful military spending 
that, he argued, produced massive federal budget deficits while failing to actually 
increase national security, proposing rather that the Pentagon behave like a 
business, relying on competitive bidding to improve costs and efficacy. Throughout, 
his proposals had a distinctly market-oriented bent that, while clearly not 
Republican, nevertheless set them apart from conventional Democratic 
prescriptions.193 
This program of pragmatic, market-based approaches to the problems of 
ordinary Coloradans and the nation, along with Hart’s rhetoric of transparency and 
innovation, had clear bipartisan appeal. Hart won his first election in a landslide, 
outpolling Republican incumbent Pete Dominick across the state. Even in heavily 
Republican precincts, CBS and NBC exit polls indicated that Hart received an 
impressive forty-eight percent of the vote. Moderate voters of both parties and the 
middle class were Hart’s strongest supporters, with fifty-six percent of self-described 
moderate Republicans, sixty-five percent of moderate Democrats, and sixty-one 
percent of middle-income voters choosing Hart.194 
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Hart’s victory among a broad swath of the electorate came as no surprise to 
many influential Washington observers. While Watergate was, of course, a crucial 
factor in the election, his appeal, like that of other reformers, reached far beyond 
simple anti-incumbent sentiment. The distinctly moderate or, as Tim Wirth put it, 
“common sense” solutions proposed by reform Democrats in 1974 were crucial to 
their success. Observers such as the political statistician Richard Scammon, co-
author with Ben Wattenberg of the influential 1970 book about the changing 
American electorate, The Real Majority, argued earlier in 1974 that, as the New 
York Times put it, Hart “made himself a front-runner partly by trimming his liberal 
sails–plumping for free enterprise and damning gun controls.”195 Hart himself 
sounded a similar theme. When pressed to explain how the election of so many 
ostensible “liberals” could be reconciled with new Gallup Polls showing that public 
opinion was growing increasingly conservative, he explained that liberalism and 
conservatism were old terms unsuited to a new political era. “We’re locked into these 
‘60s definitions of liberal-conservative which don’t work anymore,” he explained. 
“The issues of the ‘70s are not liberal or conservative.” The movements that 
polarized the nation along liberal conservative lines in the 1960s, civil rights and the 
Vietnam War, were no longer relevant.196 
Hart’s insistence that the old, ideological terms no longer applied points to a 
crucial and little-understood aspect of the 1974 “Watergate Babies” election, which 
brought scores of young Democrats into office. While the Democratic victories that 
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year are often explained away as merely a strong tide of anti-incumbent sentiment 
in the wake of the Watergate revelations, in fact they were the product of a far-
reaching political shift within the electorate. By distancing himself from McGovern’s 
more leftwing stances while continuing to court his constituency of young people and 
suburbanites by extending the quality of life and transparency themes, Hart won 
election without having to appeal to the Democrats’ traditional coalition of 
minorities, ethnic voters, and organized labor. 
Although often dismissed as hopelessly liberal, McGovern’s own candidacy 
pointed the way towards what would emerge as the neoliberal orientation among 
Democrats. In fact, McGovern’s New Politics coalition provided the kernel for a new, 
core Democratic constituency and a new generation of leaders. Young and affluent, 
this new generation was moderate, pragmatic, and hostile to the old coalitions and 
alliances that had long governed the Democratic Party.197 When McGovern wrote in 
a 1970 letter announcing his candidacy, “I seek the presidency because I believe 
deeply in the American promise and can no longer accept the diminishing of that 
promise…Thoughtful Americans understand that the highest patriotism is not a 
blind acceptance of official policy, but a love of one’s country deep enough to call her 
to a higher standard,” these young voters responded enthusiastically. 
Pronouncements like this, along with promises to run a campaign built on “candor 
and reason,” free from manipulation and fear and rooted in a “national dialogue on 
mutual respect and common hope” resonated with disillusioned young voters and 
pointed the way towards a politics that eschewed special interests in favor of an 
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imagined national interest.198 These, in turn, became hallmarks of the neoliberal 
political philosophy. 
Indeed, the characterization of the New Politics of 1968–74 as a far-left 
movement from which the New Democrats of the 1980s and ‘90s offered a dramatic 
departure is false. Rather, the very same people were involved at each stage of the 
Democratic Party’s post-sixties reform. Along with campaign manager Hart, Bill and 
Hillary Clinton were devoted McGovernites and campaign workers, as were many 
who would become active in neoliberal and New Democrat circles. While Eugene 
McCarthy and George McGovern certainly offered a leftwing political vision, the 
seeds of the reform movement that their acolytes would eventually popularize were 
already present in their emphases on consumerist and quality-of-life issues like the 
environment, growth, and consumer prices. By the same token, the young, educated, 
frequently suburban voters that both McCarthy and McGovern courted would prove 
crucial to Democratic successes under Bill Clinton, shifting the focus away from the 
party’s historical coalition of minorities, labor, and the poor toward the swing voters 
and “soccer moms” who dominated 1990s debate. It was not only their vehement 
opposition to the Vietnam War but also this move towards a new Democratic 
constituency that set them apart from establishment candidates, and it was this 
strategic innovation that subsequent Democratic reformers would embrace to great 
effect. Contemporary observers, who characterized so-called Atari Democrats like 
Hart and Wirth as a departure from the “ultra-liberal” New Politics, failed to 
recognize these important continuities. New Politics, Atari, neoliberal, and New 
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Democrat were simply different stages in the evolution and refinement of a new 
Democratic political form. By the time he first ran for president in 1984, Hart had 
become thoroughly associated with the reform movement of market-oriented, high 
tech Democrats who appealed to the new constituency of issues voters under these 
various guises. 
But how did a political culture of public interest that was anti-bigness and 
anti-corporate contribute to the emergence of a pro-business, market-oriented 
politics, all the while maintaining a populist appeal? The grassroots “quality-of-life 
politics” espoused by a growing number of Americans reveals the kernel of what 
would, in the hands of politicians like Hart, Wirth, and Lamm, become the core of a 
new neoliberal political consensus in America. Fundamentally, quality-of-life politics 
were about property ownership and the right to control where and how one lived, 
whether that meant clean air and access to beautiful mountain parks; being 
empowered to keep mental institutions, affordable housing, landfills, and other 
“undesirable” land uses out of one’s neighborhood; or sending one’s children to a 
neighborhood school. The ways in which reform Democrats framed the problems 
facing Americans—and their proposed solutions—are revealing of their underlying 
ideology. Consumer citizenship has a long history in the United States, but what 
distinguished the neoliberals’ brand of consumer-oriented politics was its fiscal 
conservatism. Earlier generations of consumer-citizens had marched and boycotted 
to achieve greater regulation of food industries, price controls, and other government 
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interventions.199 By contrast, seventies-era consumer politics, as re-articulated by 
politicians like Hart and Wirth, advocated stricter targeting of entitlement 
programs, cuts in federal spending, a slow down in federal construction projects, 
revenue sharing, and the devolution of power from the federal government to the 
states and localities.200 
Quality of life was a consumerist ethos that simultaneously offered a political 
rallying cry for citizens, while also effectively stripping issues of their racial and 
class elements. So, for example, the “quality of life” environmental argument 
emphasized the unpleasantness of smog and the despoiling of the pristine mountain 
landscapes, for which, reform politicians like Lamm, Wirth, and Hart suggested, 
most residents had moved to Colorado in the first place. At the same time, such 
politics typically downplayed or ignored the racial and class elements inherent in 
environmental concerns. Even as the environmental justice movement made 
impressive strides nationally to increase awareness of the environment as a matter 
of serious, structural inequality, both in terms of access to green space and exposure 
to pollution and its effects, mainstream politicians addressed it almost exclusively 
on the terrain of consumer choice and protection. Lamm and Wirth, both recognized 
as leaders on the environment and conservation, rarely if ever acknowledged the 
negative health impacts of smog or the disproportionate impact of pollution on lower 
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income and minority communities. Instead, they framed environmentalism in terms 
of helping Coloradans to “protect their own homes and yards” or “protecting our 
neighborhoods from accidents involving the transportation of hazardous materials.” 
Wirth was also adept at framing other issues in consumerist, quality-of-life terms. 
Deficit reduction, for example, was vital because, “Unless the deficits are reduced 
now, young families will have to continue to wait to buy their first home.” This kind 
of politics, which elevated citizens’ identities as taxpayers and consumers as central 
to political identity and participation, lent itself to the neoliberal message of 
autonomy, individualism, and markets.201 
On other issues too, quality-of-life politics ignored the structural inequalities 
under which communities of color were forced to operate. Education was a crucial 
arena in which reformers proposed solutions focused on developing the capacity of 
individual students without addressing systemic obstacles to minority access and 
success. In the 1974 election that brought so many neoliberals to office, for example, 
education was a central issue, with school desegregation and busing at the center of 
the debate. Yet race was conspicuously absent from campaign rhetoric and policy 
prescriptions offered by candidates like Wirth, Lamm, and Hart. Wirth, for example, 
campaigned hard on education, but although his early education proposals contained 
many traditionally liberal elements such as support for teacher collective 
bargaining, his overall framing of the challenges that education policy must address 
was distinctly neoliberal. Diversity, Wirth argued, should be encouraged, but not on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
201 “Cutting the Federal Deficit,” Rep. Tim Wirth Reports, (Jan, 1983), in Folder “Wirth, Tim 
E., Rep 2nd District” and “A Fighter for Colorado: Tim Wirth,” in Folder “Sen. Tim Wirth—
Sen 2nd District,” Colorado Elected Representatives—Newsletters & Reports, University of 
Colorado Libraries, Archives Division. 
	  
	  
140	  
the basis of race or class. Rather, diversity in educational style and goals was to be 
the goal. “[O]ur philosophy,” he explained, “should be aimed at allowing every child 
and adult the opportunity for the best education he or she can handle. Diversity 
must be encouraged, because different individuals learn in different ways, and a 
single, lockstep system is not best for all.”202 Dick Lamm’s education platform in his 
1974 gubernatorial race was similar, also avoiding any explicit mention of race. 
Lamm’s running mate George Brown, who became the first African American to win 
statewide office in Colorado when he was elected lieutenant governor that year, also 
called for improvements in educational equality but was careful to list universal 
goals such as special education and improved literacy—not school desegregation or 
equalized funding for minority schools—as specific policy objectives.203  
While, at least in Brown’s case, the choice to distance himself from the issue 
of race may have been strategic, by and large the reformers’ characterization of 
education as an economic question of investment in the nation’s human capital, not 
as a matter of social justice, was a deeply held neoliberal tenet that distinguished it 
from traditional liberalism. “What is striking about the reemergence of education 
and training [in Democratic policy making and thinking],” noted one contemporary 
observer, “is that their new economic context represents a departure from 
contemporary liberal theory, which has stressed not the market advantages, but the 
non-market benefits of education and training.204” In language that would soon 
become familiar in school reform debates from the 1990s onwards, neoliberals in the 
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late 1970s and 1980s argued that, far from being instruments of social progress, 
urban public schools “have in fact become the principal instrument of class 
oppression in America” and that incompetent teachers were largely to blame.205 
They therefore attacked teachers unions and tenure. Where liberals advocated 
programs like busing as tools for increasing social and political equality, neoliberals 
called instead for job training programs, merit pay for teachers, and magnet schools. 
In keeping with their general emphasis on cooperation, public-private partnership 
was one of the most consistent themes in neoliberal education policy. Vouchers, 
which would replace investment in public schools with subsidies to allow lower 
income students to attend private school, were a centerpiece of their education 
proposals. 
In nearly every instance, neoliberals put forward these ideas in language that 
did not reference race.206 By contrast, the candidates who lost to neoliberals, both 
Democrats and Republicans, addressed questions of race head on. In his first 
election to Congress, Tim Wirth defeated incumbent Don Brotzman, a conservative 
Republican, and a left-liberal Democratic challenger backed by the Colorado 
Federation of Labor, both of whom discussed busing openly throughout the 
campaign. Similarly, Gary Hart’s Republican opponent, Pete Dominick, was a vocal 
opponent of busing, as was Governor John Vanderhoof, whom Dick Lamm unseated. 
The absence of race from neoliberal rhetoric and policy programs in the 1970s and 
‘80s was one manifestation of an influential “color-blind” politics in this period that 
systematically obscured the structural and racialized underpinnings of inequality in 
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America, particularly with regard to residential geography and schools.207 Color-
blind politics had the effect of absolving white citizens of any perceived racial bias 
while, simultaneously, producing racial- and class-differentiated outcomes. Such 
politics operated by focusing exclusively on individual choices in supposedly free 
markets (e.g., for suburban housing) while ignoring the vastly unequal resources 
and power that white and non-white, poor and non-poor actors brought to the field 
and the structural forces that both created and perpetuated these differences. This 
color-blind politics lent itself readily to the neoliberal project. Indeed, it was integral 
to it, elevating market principles and market-based solutions as the only either 
legitimate or effective means for addressing racial inequality. It thereby bolstered 
the notion of the market as a sort of super institution, beyond politics, that was 
inherently neutral and fair.208 
* * * 
In 1984, eight candidates ran in the Democratic primaries for the chance to 
challenge Ronald Reagan. That contest, which ultimately came down to a two-man 
race between Gary Hart and the eventual nominee Walter Mondale, dramatized the 
divide between the old liberalism of the New Deal and the new style of pragmatic, 
market-oriented politics espoused by young, centrist Democrats. In Mondale’s words, 
the election was for “the soul of the Democratic Party,” offering voters a choice 
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between New Deal liberalism and what he called the “uncaring attitudes of a whole 
generation of younger Democrats.” Running as a self consciously old-style liberal, 
Mondale derided Hart for abandoning what he saw as the party’s longstanding 
concerns for equality and justice. On civil rights, Mondale recounted his movement 
credentials, while noting, “My opponent wrote a book about America’s future. Never 
mentioned civil rights in 180 pages.”209 As the election drew nearer, Mondale 
continued to court the party’s traditional constituencies aggressively: organized 
labor, Jews, and blacks. By contrast, Hart trumpeted the need for “new ideas” in 
American politics and the need for a new generation of leaders to move beyond what 
he called “a government bound by old alliances, old promises, and failed 
institutions.”210 He talked passionately about American economic influence 
throughout the globe, lauding the United States as a catalyst for increasing 
democracy and opening markets, two things he saw going hand-in-hand.211 And, 
while he continued to seek the support of organized labor, he simultaneously 
rejected their legislative agenda as a threat to free trade, which he deemed to be of 
paramount importance.212 While talking in general terms about equality, he focused 
his attention on young voters, suburbanites, and women. Although Mondale won the 
Democratic nomination, he did so by the smallest of margins. Hart won almost as 
much of the popular vote and only one fewer states—twenty-four to Mondale’s 
twenty-five. In addition to Ohio, Indiana, and all of New England, which he carried 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
209 “Mondale Champions Party’s Old Values,” Washington Post, March 8, 1984. 
210 Gary Hart television campaign advertisements, 1984, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_detailpage&v=1EX9k7OC0w4. 
211 Gary Hart presidential campaign brochure, 1988, University of Colorado Archives. 
212 Howard Raines, “Hart Enters Presidential Race, Stressing New Ideas,” New York Times, 
February 18, 1983. 
	  
	  
144	  
handily, Hart also swept every state in the West with the exceptions of Kansas and 
Texas. 
Hart’s narrow defeat in the primaries and Mondale’s crushing loss to Reagan 
in the general election point to the sea change underway both within the Democratic 
Party and the electorate at large during the 1970s and ‘80s. Traditional liberalism 
was losing traction and neoliberal ideas had growing appeal. As the 1988 election 
came into view, pundits noted that virtually all the Democratic candidates had 
adopted what were, four years earlier, some of Hart’s most surprising new ideas on 
issues like military reform, education, free trade and, as the New York Times put it, 
“above all, a sense that it is possible for Government to attend to social needs 
without producing copies of New Deal and Great Society programs.”213 Hart was 
widely viewed as the front-runner and someone uniquely positioned to craft a new 
identity for the party going forward. Even professional Republicans such as 
Republican National Committee chair Frank Fahrenkopf, Jr. opined, “at least he has 
tried to distance himself from the old New Deal liberalism” and predicted that Hart 
would have an edge among voters.214 
Neoliberal ideas gained traction among party leaders too. In 1985, a group of 
Sunbelt Democrats founded the Democratic Leadership Council (DLC) to promote 
neoliberal ideas within the party. The next year, when the Democratic National 
Committee met in Atlanta to develop the party’s platform for the upcoming election, 
DLC members took leading roles, even earning the grudging endorsement of party 
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chairman Paul Kirk, Jr., a long-time reform skeptic and confidant of Ted Kennedy. 
In language that echoed familiar neoliberal tropes, Kirk proclaimed that, “The 
larger interests and broader agenda of the Democratic Party and the nation have 
superseded the singular agenda of elite groups.”215 The neoliberal call to elevate 
issues over constituencies, the national interest over special interests, now had 
institutional support. 
Whereas in the 1970s, reform candidates like Hart often seemed to be 
awkwardly straddling the old and new politics, by 1988, after eight years of the 
Reagan administration, Democrats had come into a fuller embrace of the neoliberal 
policy agenda. Indeed Hart, once considered something of a party heretic, now found 
himself running to the left of DLC stalwarts like Dick Gephardt and Bruce Babbitt, 
whom he described as “Reagan in Franklin Roosevelt’s clothing.” Going forward, it 
would be Hart’s and his peers’ young, female, and suburban constituencies who 
would be not just the centerpiece of future Democratic victories but the most hotly 
contested and aggressively targeted voting groups for both parties. Although Hart’s 
early front-runner candidacy eventually collapsed amidst scandal, leaving the 
Democrats scrambling for a viable nominee, his themes would resurface 
triumphantly in 1992 in the hands of fellow ex-McGovernites-turned-New 
Democrats, Bill Clinton and Al Gore. 
* * * 
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Indeed, Bill Clinton was himself a product of this neoliberal transformation. 
Journalistic accounts often portray Clinton as the savior of the Democratic Party, a 
reformer who emerged out of whole cloth after decades of Democratic foundering and 
gave the party new life and political relevance as centrist New Democrats. Yet 
Clinton’s 1992 presidential victory is best understood as the apotheosis of a broad 
realignment of American and Democratic Party politics since 1968. As with so many 
other neoliberal reformers, Clinton’s story in fact begins in the upheavals of the 
early 1970s. In 1972, he and future wife Hillary Rodham went to Texas to work for 
the McGovern campaign. Two years later, Clinton ran for Congress in his home 
district, Arkansas’s third. At just twenty-eight years old, Clinton, like Lamm, 
traveled his state to learn first-hand what mattered to citizens (although, unlike 
Lamm, he preferred a beat up AMC Chevy Gremlin to hiking boots). His campaign 
ads sought to make him relatable, showing him meeting with constituents across the 
state while the voiceover intoned in a folksy, banjo-accompanied singsong, “Bill 
Clinton’s ready, he’s fed up too! He’s a lot like me, he’s a lot like you. Bill Clinton 
wants to get things done, so we’re gonna send him to Washington.” The theme, as 
with so many that candidates year, was change.216 
In his early days, Clinton's politics were mixed with a heavy dose of old-style 
Arkansas populism: excess profits tax on the oil industry, trust busting, national 
health insurance, a fairer tax system, better funding for education, public funding of 
presidential elections, and a general skepticism towards the government in 
Washington. “The American people,” he sympathized, “have a general feeling of 
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helplessness about the federal bureaucracy, which is unyielding, distant, and not 
responsible.” He promised that, as congressman, he would work to reduce inflation, 
lower food prices, make the tax code more fair to middle class families, and curb 
government spending.217 Clinton also advocated austerity, proclaiming himself a 
candidate “who’s not afraid to say no to the unnecessary government spending that 
has hurt the economy of the country.”218 Although he lost the election, Clinton came 
closer than any Democrat in several generations and made a name for himself as a 
rising star in Arkansas politics. Two years later, he was elected attorney general 
and, in 1978, governor.219 
As governor, Clinton’s Democratically inflected brand of neoliberalism 
developed further. Education was his passion, and he focused tremendous energy 
and resources on improving his state’s public schools, which were among the worst 
in the nation. While public education has long been a Democratic priority, Clinton’s 
approach to improving the schools was a departure from liberal expectations. Like 
Wirth and Hart, he coupled increased funding with new requirements for teacher 
and student accountability. In 1980, Clinton implemented Arkansas’s first statewide 
standardized-testing program. Reducing welfare dependency was another 
preoccupation and, in Clinton’s proposals for Arkansas in the 1980s, the seeds of 
what would eventually become his national welfare reform program were already 
evident. Indeed, the signature formulation of Clinton’s 1996 welfare reform drive—
that Americans “want a hand up, not a hand out”—first surfaced in a speech he 
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made to the Arkansas state Democratic convention in 1974, and a variety of policies 
requiring work and education for all welfare recipients became hallmarks of his 
policy as governor.220 
If in the popular imagination Clinton’s success has come to symbolize the 
transformation and revitalization of the Democratic Party, Jimmy Carter’s 
beleaguered presidency is often posed as the nadir of the party’s post-1968 slump. In 
this view, Carter was the last liberal president, his failures proof of liberalism’s 
dysfunction and waning relevance after its postwar golden era. But this misses the 
tectonic shifts within the party during this period. Carter was hardly a liberal. 
Rather, like other successful Democrats of the 1970s, he presented himself as a 
reformer. As a candidate, he adopted themes consonant with the new style in 
Democratic politics. As president, he promoted cuts to federal spending, 
deregulation of major industries, and a slew of other policies more in keeping with 
the emerging neoliberal sensibility within his party than with the receding liberal 
tide. 
Carter is best understood as a transitional figure bridging the divide between 
the New Deal and the New Democrats. In accepting the Democratic nomination at 
New York’s Madison Square Garden in 1976, Carter explicitly invoked the 
Democratic legacy of Roosevelt, Truman, Kennedy, and Johnson and hailed the 
party as the proud champion of America’s diverse people: immigrants, workers, and 
religious and racial minorities. At the same time, he embraced many of the stylistic 
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and thematic elements of the emerging neoliberal politics, proclaiming, “There is a 
new mood in America. We have been shaken by a tragic war abroad and by scandals 
and broken promises at home. Our people are searching for new voices and new 
ideas and new leaders.”221 Responding to voters’ demands for transparent and 
responsive government, Carter promised “a government as good as its people.” He 
seemed to offer national unification after a period of intense generational, class, and 
ideological schisms.222 
Carter adopted a folksy, approachable style. Both as governor and 
presidential candidate, he quoted theologian Reinhold Niebuhr and folksinger Bob 
Dylan and called for political power to be returned to the hands of the people.223 Like 
Colorado’s Lamm during his bid for governor, Carter opened his presidential 
campaign with a “learning posture”: an admission that he did not have all the 
answers and a pledge to travel the country listening to and learning from citizens.224 
In television advertisements, Carter addressed voters directly, a departure from the 
more formal campaign ad conventions of the time, telling them that he would work 
for a federal “sunshine law” to expose legislators’ ties to industry and vowing to 
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make government work for the people. While images of the candidate glad-handing 
eager crowds filled the screen, a voiceover proclaimed that voters were beginning to 
recognize him as “a man who will change the way this country is run, a competent 
man who can make our government open and efficient.” In the aftermath of 
Watergate and President Ford’s subsequent pardoning of Nixon, Carter’s winning 
slogan was “A leader, for a change.”225 
From the vantage point of the mid-1980s, neoliberals still claimed Carter as 
one of their own. Rather than a last gasp of liberalism, Randall Rothenberg 
proposed, “it can be argued that the Jimmy Carter elected in 1976 represented the 
first halting steps towards a post-New Deal liberalism, and that his defeat of Gerald 
Ford that year was occasioned by the electorate’s innate awareness and approval of 
this shift.”226 James Fallows, a Carter speech writer and journalist closely associated 
with neoliberalism and Charles Peters’ Washington Monthly, concurred. Looking 
back on Carter’s presidency and his legacy in 1979, Fallows reflected on the 1976 
campaign. Using language strikingly reminiscent of the way Tim Wirth or Gary 
Hart might have described themselves at the time, Fallows recalled:  
I felt that [Carter], alone among the candidates, might look past the tired 
formulas of left and right and offer something new….I was led on myself by 
the hope that Carter might make sense of the swirl of liberal and 
conservative sentiment then muddying the political orthodoxy….I told my 
friends that summer that Carter had at least the same potential as Franklin 
Roosevelt to leave the government forever changed by his presence.227 
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Carter’s failure, then, was not that he embraced liberalism too strongly but rather 
that he failed to live up to his promise of unity, progress, and transparency. 
 Many neoliberals attributed Carter’s political demise to the unwillingness of 
the Democratic Party to embrace the new, reformist direction that they believed 
Carter espoused. Reflecting back on Carter’s presidency in 1982, Bruce Babbitt, 
Arizona’s neoliberal Democratic governor, hailed Carter as a man ahead of his times 
who “recognized, as a candidate, out on the horizon, many of the issues we’re talking 
about.” Carter’s problem, Babbitt suggested, was being “a little too early” and 
finding himself at the mercy of a party leadership unprepared to hear his message of 
reform. This, then, a cautionary tale to Democrats about the perils of ignoring the 
popular mood and neoliberalism’s growing appeal.228 
By the mid-1980s, Democrats had adopted a fuller embrace of the kind of 
neoliberal politics that the party had once resisted. To see the rhetorical and 
ideological distance that the Democratic Party had traveled, one need only look at 
Jesse Jackson’s 1984 and 1988 presidential campaigns. Often dubbed the New 
Democrats’ “main nemesis,” he was branded by reporters as a “classic liberal in the 
tradition of the New Deal and Great Society” and “a repository for the philosophies 
of America’s old-fashioned liberal-left.” Jackson’s rhetoric and platform stood in 
stark contrast to the new mainstream of Democratic politics.229 Whereas politicians 
in the new style talked in soaring terms of “equality” and “justice” even as they 
avoided any mention of race, Jackson was more direct. Others focused their foreign 
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policy discussion on military spending, developments in Central America, and 
nuclear disarmament. While Jackson’s platform included policy prescriptions for 
these issues and more, his overall assessment was a more fundamental critique. 
Campaigning for president in Philadelphia in January 1984, he exhorted the crowd: 
“When you buy Honda and Toyota, that’s foreign policy. Russian Vodka, that’s 
foreign policy. Mercedes Benz, that’s foreign policy,” and, to his largely black 
audience, he concluded, “Matter of fact, we came here on a foreign policy!”230 
Capitalism, Jackson argued, was America’s foreign policy, perhaps especially so in 
the emerging new age of market orthodoxy. Juxtaposed with Hart’s and other 
neoliberals’ lofty pronouncements about equality of opportunity for all, Jackson’s 
old-style civil rights rhetoric and tone, his explicit evocations of blacks’ historical 
exclusion from economic and political participation, and his matter-of-fact focus on 
discrimination and equality of outcomes rather than of opportunity, were jarring. 
Jackson also offered a trenchant diagnosis of the demographic, economic, and 
political transitions transforming the United States that differed markedly from the 
increasingly neoliberal perspectives of his Democratic contemporaries. “You must 
never forget,” he warned, “that about the time we [African Americans] began to take 
over the cities, Nixon shifted the power to the suburbs. Now Reagan has shifted it to 
the states. So you have mayors who have more and more responsibility and less and 
less power. We got more and more votes and fewer and fewer services.”231 Jackson 
focused attention squarely on the structural and institutional underpinnings of 
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racial and class disfranchisement in the United States, emphasizing the cruel irony 
of rising black political power within cities at precisely the moment when cities 
began losing power to rapidly growing, often heavily segregated suburbs. This 
emphasis on structural forces, which then demanded structural (i.e. political and 
governmental) solutions, ran counter to the mainstream individualist, race-neutral 
political discourse of the era. Indeed, Jackson was alone among the candidates in his 
framing of the issues. Jackson’s campaigns, with their unabashed embrace of 
traditional liberal programs and direct appeals to minorities and the poor offered a 
stark counterpoint to the new neoliberal commonsense that had taken hold within 
the Democratic Party. 
Jackson’s emphasis on structural inequalities, while increasingly alienated 
from Democratic rhetoric and policymaking, resonated with other critiques of 
neoliberalism on the left. Speaking at a conference on neoliberalism convened in 
1983 by Charles Peters, Victor Navasky, editor of The Nation, observed that unions 
always topped neoliberals’ list of special interests and that their much-vaunted 
“realism” seemed to rely on the erosion of labor strength. Rather than achieve the 
neoliberals’ lofty goal of rising above special interests in the name of pragmatic 
public policy, Navasky argued that the effect of neoliberalism in practice was simply 
to elevate the interests of the non-minority and non-poor by coding these citizens 
(essentially, wealthy and middle-class whites) as part of the national interest while 
dismissing all others in their claims for political representation.232 
* * * 
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The early 1970s was a moment of rupture in America, providing an entry 
point for a new political-economic and cultural common sense to take hold. The 1973 
OPEC embargo, which quintupled the price of oil in the United States, leading to 
dramatic increases in the price of consumer goods, and the emergence of a new, 
service- and finance-oriented global economic regime confounded conventional 
Keynesian theories of economic management, demanding a systematic reevaluation 
of old assumptions about the role and responsibilities of government. At the same 
time, significant breaches of the public’s faith in governing institutions and officials 
created an opening for a reevaluation of the relationship between government and 
citizens, leading to the emergence of a new popular political culture. In this, the 
Watergate scandal was the most far-reaching—but hardly the only—precipitating 
event.233 
Yet the evidence from Colorado and metropolitan Denver makes clear that a 
more thoroughgoing rupture was underway and that the seeds of discontent came 
not just from major national upheavals but from the experience of politics at the 
state and local levels too. Local battles were the breeding ground for this cultural 
and political transformation. The standard narrative of late twentieth-century 
liberal decline showcases George McGovern’s 1972 defeat in the presidential election 
as a watershed moment for the breakdown of the Democratic Party, presenting it as 
part of a binary in which liberalism and its institutional embodiment in the 
Democrats must give way entirely in order for the New Right to rise. At the same 
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time, discussions of public alienation and their growing distrust of government tend 
to focus on the national level, emphasizing Watergate and the Vietnam War. 
Moreover, the politicians who proposed solutions to those challenges—who 
sought to overcome the rupture in the American political system and to rebuild the 
public’s faith in politics as an enterprise that could represent their interests—drew 
many of their ideas, their tactics, and their rhetoric from local struggles. In Denver, 
as the preceding chapters have shown, contests within the rapidly expanding 
metropolis over the allocation of scarce resources like water, parks, roads, and 
schools and over who should be empowered to make those decisions dominated the 
political landscape. Leaders like Lamm and Wirth especially, but also Hart, were 
themselves shaped by these conflicts as much as were their constituents. They were 
then able to capitalize upon them to win elective office and begin the process of 
reforming existing political and bureaucratic institutions along new lines. It was in 
this crucible that the newly neoliberal quality-of-life political culture was formed. 
Indeed, it was this cultural transformation that enabled the neoliberal 
political project to take hold across the political spectrum. Popular demands for 
government transparency and accountability, the populist insistence on 
approachable and responsive elected representatives (and the elevation of this 
characteristic above almost all programmatic considerations in making electoral 
choices), a growing evocation of consumerist and individualized quality of life as a 
primary right all constituted a new cultural orientation towards society, 
government, and citizenship that provided fertile soil for the new politics, 
particularly (and, perhaps, ironically) within the Democratic Party. Where their 
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Republican opponents often sounded condescending or elitist, tone deaf to the public 
demand for populist rhetoric, reform Democrats like Dick Lamm, Tim Wirth, and 
Gary Hart eagerly embraced the new ethos. Indeed, they owed their electoral 
success largely to their ability to frame the new market-oriented politics as being in 
the interest of ordinary Americans—Tim Wirth’s “people like you.” By contrast, the 
Republicans, despite Richard Nixon’s winning “silent majority” formulation of 
several years earlier, struggled in the 1970s to overcome their longstanding 
reputation as the party of business and elites. 
Neoliberalism took various forms and was constantly contested, even or 
perhaps especially by those who were among its chief promulgators. Political 
neoliberalism could have many expressions. Certainly, the rhetoric and programs of 
Democrats like Lamm, Wirth, and Hart differed markedly from those of Ronald 
Reagan, who is often viewed as the quintessential American neoliberal. Yet what 
anchored these various articulations across the political spectrum was a shared 
belief in the market as an autonomous, pre-political force that was both efficient and 
fair in the task of allocating resources across society. Effectively, the fundamental 
question for governance in this period shifted from a Keynesian “how much state?” 
to the new “how much market?,” and it became increasingly difficult to articulate 
alternatives to the rising market logic while still maintaining mainstream political 
legitimacy.234 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
234 Mudge, “What is Neo-Liberalism?” 
	  
	  
157	  
 
Chapter 4: “How Do You Spell Relief?”: The Tax Revolt in Colorado, 
1966–1992 
 The rising influence of neoliberal reform Democrats and their success with 
the electorate was one marker of the shift in public attitudes towards government 
from the 1970s onwards. Another was the emergence of a widespread anti-tax 
politics across the country. Taking root in places as disparate as California, 
Michigan, Florida, Massachusetts, and Colorado, it was another potent 
manifestation of the public’s growing frustration with how government operated and 
their ability, as citizens, to influence it. In the fall of 1978, Coloradans joined 
millions of Americans across ten states who went to the polls to consider adding tax 
and spending limitations to their state constitutions. Earlier that year, Californians 
had garnered dramatic attention with their passage of Proposition 13, a 
constitutional amendment that rolled back property tax rates to just one percent of 
the assessed property value and severely curtailed the ability of local governments 
to raise them. Throughout the country, people, pundits, and politicians alike spoke 
of a tax revolt. The amendment on Colorado’s ballot that year, known colloquially as 
Burch-Orr after State Treasurer Palmer Burch and co-author Jack Orr, a local 
rancher, took a somewhat different approach, demanding a hard limit on 
government spending rather than a tax cap. But unlike voters in California, the 
Coloradans who voted on November 7 defeated Burch-Orr by a resounding 59% to 
41%.235 
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 This was not the start of Coloradans’ uneasy relationship with the tax revolt, 
nor would it be the end. Over a twenty-five year period, beginning in 1966, a variety 
of anti-tax groups succeeded in putting on the state ballot a total of eight proposed 
constitutional amendments designed to limit taxing, spending, or both. Each went 
down in defeat, until the final attempt in 1992, when the Tax Payer Bill of Rights 
(TABOR) passed with just over fifty percent of the vote. 
 The nation-wide tax revolt that began in the late 1970s is generally 
understood as a rightwing popular movement, proof of the nation’s rightward shift, 
and of the triumph of conservative ideology. In this mode, the 1992 passage of 
TABOR, then the most restrictive state limit on taxation and spending anywhere in 
the United States, is often presented as evidence of Colorado’s abiding conservatism. 
And indeed, conservative activists were instrumental to its passage. Douglas Bruce, 
the Colorado Springs real estate investor who devised the amendment and was its 
chief advocate, was active in the Colorado Republican Party and national 
conservative politics. Before coming to Colorado in 1986, Bruce worked as a 
prosecutor and real estate investor in Los Angeles, where he became interested in 
anti-tax initiatives through Proposition 13. The Colorado Union of Taxpayers (CUT), 
sponsor of the earlier Colorado amendments and vocal supporter of TABOR, was the 
local subsidiary of the National Union of Taxpayers, where now-legendary anti-tax 
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crusader and conservative political activist Grover Norquist got his start as 
executive director.236 
 Yet it would be a mistake to characterize TABOR, and anti-tax politics more 
broadly, as evidence of a rising popular conservatism or the increasing dominance of 
small government ideology. Indeed, throughout the 1970s and ‘80s and into the 
1990s, Americans consistently supported a wide array of tax-supported government 
programs and services, even calling for the expansion of some. Rather, the history of 
tax- and spending-limiting constitutional amendments in places like Colorado 
reveals that this was yet another manifestation of the emerging politics of quality of 
life and government transparency at work. What changed over the quarter century 
between the first attempt to pass an anti-tax initiative in Colorado in 1966 and the 
eventual passage of TABOR in 1992 was not Coloradans’ fundamental political 
outlook or their beliefs about government’s proper role but rather their feelings of 
frustration and sense that government had become both unfair and unaccountable. 
The “tax revolt” of 1978 was not a conservative groundswell but rather an 
outpouring of frustration with how government was operating in particular local 
places at the time, which conservatives and Republicans turned to their advantage. 
Where anti-tax measures passed, it was because citizens felt that the tax system 
was unfair and that government had become unresponsive to their needs. Where the 
measures failed, as in Colorado, voters either did not share that sense or were 
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unpersuaded that the anti-tax amendments on their ballots would provide 
meaningful improvement. 
The situations in Colorado and California in 1978 were markedly different, 
which accounts for the differing outcomes of their anti-tax measures that year. The 
slogan “Don’t Californicate Colorado,” coined during the Denver Olympics 
controversy to connote the Los Angeles pollution, sprawl, and gridlock that 
Coloradans hoped to avoid, might equally have applied to taxation and state finance. 
In the late 1970s, California was notorious for its soaring property tax rates, spurred 
by inflation, which rose by as much as four or five percent annually, often resulting 
in as much as a tripling of an individual homeowner’s bill from year to year. On the 
eve of Proposition 13’s passage, Californians paid property taxes fifty-one percent 
above the national average. At the same time, the state came to rely increasingly on 
income taxes as a source of revenue. A combination of rising tax rates and inflation 
produced nearly twenty percent annual increases in per capita state income tax 
collections, even as Californians experienced a decline in their real wages, as 
measured in constant dollars adjusted for inflation. As citizens struggled to meet the 
demands of this heavily unbalanced tax system, the California state government 
amassed a five billion dollar surplus, none of which the legislature chose to return to 
the people or otherwise use for tax relief. For all of these reasons, Californians were 
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understandably distraught and, by 1978, increasingly pessimistic about the 
willingness of their elected representatives to offer any sort of relief.237 
Although Colorado’s property tax rates were quite high during much of the 
1960s and ‘70s, accounting for nearly a third of total state revenue, Coloradans’ 
overall tax burden remained at or below the national average. Both the state and 
local governments’ heavy reliance on property taxes led many to argue that 
Colorado’s tax structure was regressive and that it tended to replicate socioeconomic 
inequality across the metropolitan landscape, as lower-income communities 
generated lower tax revenue and, consequently, had substantially less money to 
direct towards public services like education. This situation was exacerbated during 
the 1960s and early 1970s by inflation in property assessments, which both 
increased annual local property tax revenues and triggered a provision in state law 
to lower state aid for education correspondingly. Decreasing reliance on state funds 
for education resulted in a substantial budget surplus, but rather than keep the 
excess, as California lawmakers at done, Colorado’s legislature took steps to correct 
the imbalance, passing bills in 1973 and again in 1978 that drastically reduced 
property taxes. As a result, by the time the Burch-Orr tax limiting amendment came 
to a vote in November 1978, Colorado ranked twenty-third nationally in property 
taxes (California, by contrast, ranked fourth). 
These were not the only ways in which Colorado lawmakers took action to 
address what state residents considered to be significant inequities in the tax 
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structure. In addition to these property tax reforms, in 1977 the Colorado legislature 
imposed a five-year, across-the-board cap, limiting the annual increase on all state 
spending to seven percent. This was an extension of an earlier spending cap, which 
itself had been an expansion of a previous, more narrowly focused spending limit. 
Moreover, in the face of rapid inflation that artificially catapulted taxpayers 
nationwide into higher tax brackets, Colorado lawmakers were national pioneers in 
indexing the state income tax to inflation, thereby stabilizing rates for most state 
residents. As a result, Coloradans were not plagued by the threat of losing their 
homes or being forced into higher tax brackets when inflation artificially made their 
incomes appear larger. In short, Coloradans did not share the experience of 
Californians and voters in the other twelve states that adopted tax or spending 
limitations in 1978, who faced rising taxes and unresponsive state legislatures. 
Rather, they could point to effective and well-publicized efforts on the part of state 
government to take citizen concerns about inflation and taxation seriously and to 
implement appropriately corrective policy.238 
Colorado’s 1978 tax-limitation measure, Burch-Orr, failed despite a decade of 
very active debate about taxation and attempts to pass tax-limiting constitutional 
amendments in the state. A closer look at this history helps to illuminate the danger 
of classifying anti-tax politics as necessarily conservative. From the mid-1960s 
through the late-1970s, the Colorado conversation about taxes spanned the political 
spectrum. For their part, miners and ranchers in Western Colorado wanted lower 
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taxes on business property. This was reflected in a 1966 ballot initiative written by 
the Colorado Association of Commerce & Industry—formerly the Colorado Chamber 
of Commerce—in conjunction with the Cattlemen’s Association of Colorado, the 
Cattle Feeder’s Association, and the Colorado Woolgrowers. This first attempt at 
constitutional tax limitation would have severely restricted tax rates on both 
personal and business property and would have exempted all personal property and 
business from taxation. The measure failed at the polls by a wide margin, 68% to 
32%, losing decisively in the metropolitan Front Range, where a majority of 
Coloradans lived.239 
Also in 1966, the non-partisan, but generally progressive, League of Women 
Voters of Colorado embarked on a study titled “Are Property Taxes Obsolete?” 
Recognizing that property taxes had become crucial to the provision of public 
services at the local level, the League planned to focus on them as a mechanism for 
funding schools.240 Over the next five years, the League’s volunteer researchers came 
to see Colorado’s existing tax structure as severely regressive, relying too heavily on 
local sales and property taxes for the majority of school funding. At a time when the 
League was deeply involved in efforts to combat municipal fragmentation across 
metropolitan Denver, this growing reliance of local school districts on property taxes 
only served to compound the deleterious effects of residential segregation and class 
stratification throughout the region. The League’s 1971 platform addressed both the 
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problems of excessive property tax and school inequality, demanding “a state finance 
system that would provide sufficient funds for public schools to equalize educational 
opportunity and to relieve property taxes…[and] measures to make taxes and 
services throughout the state more nearly equal.”241 Responding to these same 
concerns, the progressive citizen advocacy group Common Cause proposed an 
initiative for the 1972 ballot that would have written severe limits on local property 
tax rates into the state constitution, with the intent of forcing Colorado to shift 
public school funding back to the state in an effort to equalize per-pupil funding 
across all school districts.  
Despite their shared concerns about the way that reliance on property taxes 
to fund schools exacerbated the effects of residential segregation and perpetuated 
inequality, the League nevertheless came out against both the Common Cause 
amendment and another tax-limiting amendment would have capped property taxes 
at 1.5 percent of assessed value. This, too, was in keeping with the League’s action 
program for the seventies, which rejected efforts to correct inequities in the tax code 
by imposing constitutional restrictions. In a policy statement issued shortly before 
election day in 1972, the League advised, “We support a state finance system that 
would provide sufficient funds for public schools, to equalize educational opportunity 
and relieve the property tax, but we are convinced that neither of these two 
amendments provide the appropriate vehicle for change.” Instead, they argued, the 
constitution should be left flexible and unburdened by “unnecessarily restrictive 
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language” to allow state lawmakers to respond quickly to changing circumstances 
and emergences.242 
Coloradans rejected the Common Cause proposition by a margin of 79% to 
21%, and the proposed 1.5% cap by a margin of 76% to 24%.243 Most Coloradans 
apparently either were satisfied with their elected representatives’ ongoing efforts to 
limit the tax burden or were persuaded that, whatever inequities and inefficiencies 
persisted in the tax code, these amendments did not offer effective solutions. For 
residents of metropolitan Denver, the ongoing and increasingly tense controversies 
over municipal annexation and school desegregation also may have played a role, 
making suburbanites, in particular, less receptive to calls for equity as they sought 
to police the boundaries of their communities and regional responsibilities. In 1976, 
yet another tax-limiting amendment, which would have required voter approval of 
all new or increased taxes, met a similar fate, rejected by voters 75% to 25%.244 
Even as Coloradans repeatedly rejected the imposition of tax limits in their 
state constitution, the issue of taxation remained politically potent. In addition to 
the property tax reform passed by state lawmakers in 1973, successful candidates 
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for office made promises for tax reform central to their campaigns. Republicans and 
conservatives were not the only ones focusing on taxes. As shown in chapter three, 
this included the array of reform Democrats who won election in 1974. Dick Lamm 
and Tim Wirth, in particular, were masters at capturing the public mood with their 
denunciation of current tax policy and promises of reform. Unlike their conservative 
counterparts, however, Democrats like Lamm and Wirth couched their promises in 
the language of populism rather than that of liberty and freedom from government 
tyranny. One full-page Wirth campaign advertisement that appeared in local 
newspapers during the 1974 campaign asked voters, “Do you think your taxes are 
fair? Tim Wirth doesn’t. And he’s ready to start doing something about them.” 
Aiming squarely for the middle class, the ad continued, “He proposes real tax 
reform…The kind that won’t allow millionaires to pay no tax at all, while the rest of 
us pay more than our share. It’s time for tax breaks—for the people who really need 
them. People like you.”245 
In these Colorado Democrats’ populist framing, three issues received 
particular attention: taxes on natural resources, corporate taxes, and the sales tax 
on food. Lamm hammered these themes throughout his 1974 campaign for governor, 
arguing that Colorado’s existing tax structure unfairly favored business at the 
expense of citizens. In position papers, radio ads, and on the stump, Lamm fumed, 
“Colorado citizens pay proportionally too much of our tax burden—and corporations 
pay too little. While retired people in my district are selling their homes because 
they can’t afford to pay their taxes, the chamber of commerce is bragging about our 
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favorable tax climate.” If elected, he promised to work for legislation to correct what 
he dubbed an unjust tax structure. He further called for closing loopholes that 
protected extractive industries, such as mining, timber, and oil shale, from taxation, 
even as these businesses placed increasingly heavy demands on state resources and 
taxpayer-funded services. Along with Wirth and other Democratic candidates, 
Lamm vowed to end the three percent sales tax on food, a regressive tax seen by 
many as particularly egregious.246 
Yet even with the popularity of these calls for tax fairness and reform—and 
the success of candidates who championed them—Coloradans themselves proved the 
ultimate obstacle to reform. Just as he had promised during the 1974 campaign, two 
years later Lamm pushed for a voter referendum on legislation to eliminate the sales 
tax on food, raise corporate income taxes, and impose severance taxes on natural 
resource extraction just as he had promised during the campaign. Voters rejected it 
by a twenty-two point margin, 61% to 39%.247 
In addition to reform Democrats and Colorado’s traditional mining and 
ranching interests, conservative movement activists joined the tax-limiting fray. The 
Colorado Union of Taxpayers (they cleverly inverted the name of the national 
organization to produce the acronym CUT) was founded in 1976. Although affiliated 
with the National Taxpayers Union, based in Washington, D.C., and taking many of 
its cues from the parent organization, the Colorado affiliate was also, in important 
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respects, a genuinely grassroots organization. Headquartered in the conservative 
Denver suburb of Lakewood, CUT was fueled by the work of a small band of 
dedicated members throughout the Front Range.248 
By 1978, the spirit of the tax revolt was in the air across the nation. Wary 
elected officials scrambled to respond. At the National Governor’s Association 
meeting that year in Boston, the main topic of conversation was the ten state ballots 
sporting “tax relief” measures and twenty-four additional states where activists or 
officials were working to introduce legislation or circulate petitions. Colorado’s 
Governor Lamm, who had campaigned on a platform of government transparency 
and a promise to reform the state’s tax code, attributed the tax-limiting atmosphere 
to citizens’ desire to gain more direct control over government. When asked about 
the proposed Burch-Orr amendment on Colorado’s ballot, he predicted, “If the 
constitutional amendment passes, it will not be because of a well-organized 
campaign supporting the amendment, but rather because of the mood of the public.” 
Maine’s Independent Governor James Longley concurred, opining that, “The tax 
revolt is very serious and is going to continue until government is responsive to the 
will of the people to limit spending and taxation.”249 
Yet for all the talk of tax revolt, the movement (if it could truly be called that) 
enjoyed surprisingly limited popular support. Despite this pervasive sense that 
voters were anti-tax and, increasingly, anti-government, voters in general weren’t 
conservative ideologues and, indeed, conservative ideological affiliation was not on 
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the rise during this period. Polling indicates that citizens continued to support a 
wide array of government services and programs. They also supported taxes in 
general to pay for these services but chafed when they believed that they were being 
asked to pay more than their fair share, that others were getting off too easy, or that 
government was being profligate with tax money.250 
Those, like Palmer Burch and CUT, who were conservative anti-tax 
ideologues, understood the fine line they would have to walk to garner public 
support for their amendment. Throughout the 1978 campaign, co-sponsor Jack Orr 
insisted that the amendment was a moderate one, designed simply “to bring growth 
in spending within an acceptable range without disrupting the necessary functions 
of government.” 251Appealing to the same themes that worked for winning reform 
Democrats in the 1974 elections, CUT secretary Lillian Bickel argued that existing 
statutory limits on government spending were not working and that, if passed, 
Amendment 2 would free Colorado government from the excessive power of special 
interests.252 Burch, meanwhile, took pains to distance himself and the amendment 
from the comparison to California’s Proposition 13. “The sponsors of Amendment No. 
2 are not anti-education, or anti-government,” he hurried to reassure voters, “We are 
not like Jarvis who said ‘them dirty bureaucrats,’ you haven’t heard us say a thing 
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like that. I believe in representative government, I spent 28 years of my life [in state 
government]. I am not anti-government.”253  
Throughout the campaign, appeals to ideological conservatism including 
references to the threat to liberty or the importance of small government were 
conspicuously absent. Indeed, during this period, even clearly conservative anti-tax 
organizations like CUT sought to portray themselves in a more neutral light, 
downplaying their ideological allegiances and their connection to national 
conservative activists and, instead, presented themselves as middle-of-the-road 
protectors of the public against the encroachment of special interests. “It is 
emphasized that we are neither an extremist nor a right wing group,” CUT assured 
voters in a membership recruitment letter widely distributed in advance of the 
election. “Instead we are individuals who believe that government can be made more 
efficient and more effective if given a proper push by concerned citizens.”254 This 
rhetorical gambit, while sharply at odds with the group’s privately expressed anti-
government attitudes, had obvious appeal in a state that had just elected an array of 
reform Democrats precisely on their anti-special interest merits. 
The failure of the Burch-Orr amendment in Colorado and the simultaneous 
success of similar tax and spending limits in other states in 1978 was, then, not 
ideological but rather circumstantial. Over the ensuing decade, Americans generally, 
Coloradans among them, continued to espouse broadly liberal attitudes towards 
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government programs and services. Even at the height of Ronald Reagan’s 
popularity, when he won reelection in 1984 by a landslide over former Democratic 
Vice President Walter Mondale, the majority of Americans continued to profess 
economic views that were explicitly at odds with the conservative Republicans’ 
political economic philosophy and policy prescriptions.255 
If, in fact, the story of anti-tax politics were one of steadily increasing 
conservatism among the electorate, we would expect to see the issue persist on the 
public’s political agenda and for anti-tax measures to receive increasing levels of 
support over time. In Colorado, this is not what happened. For almost a decade after 
the Burch-Orr amendment’s failure in 1978, tax limitation remained off the agenda 
in the Rocky Mountain State. The next attempted ballot initiative—Amendment 4—
came in 1986. The brainchild of John and Diane Cox, western slope farmers 
concerned with rising property taxes and the falling property value of their farm, 
Amendment 4 was largely supported by other western Colorado farmers in similar 
circumstances. To promote the initiative, the Coxes formed an organization called 
the Association of Colorado Taxpayers, which worked throughout the state to garner 
support.  
It comes as no great surprise that Western Slope farmers led the anti-tax 
charge in the mid-1980s. Once the dominant economic and political interest in the 
state, by 1986 farmers, ranchers, miners, and others who made their living from the 
land were no longer Colorado’s primary economic engine and had become 
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marginalized in state politics, supplanted by metro Denver, with its concentration of 
corporate headquarters, finance, and tourism. Although Colorado did experience an 
economic downturn during the 1980s, it still performed well ahead of the national 
average, with most of the economic deceleration concentrated in oil and 
agriculture.256 Front Range voters, less hard hit than their counterparts across the 
Continental Divide, were disinclined to alter their constitution, persuaded by 
opponents of the amendment who argued that it would make it more difficult for 
government to respond quickly to emergencies or changing circumstances. Despite 
its grassroots origins, therefore, popular interest in Amendment 4 was extremely 
limited and the measure was defeated 62% to 38%.257 
For the next six years, anti-tax efforts in Colorado limped along, bolstered by 
the single-minded determination of activist Douglas Bruce. While the 1986 
campaign, albeit limited, had been a genuine grassroots effort, Bruce’s campaign for 
tax- and government-limiting amendments had more the quality of a personal 
crusade. Freshly arrived from California, Bruce threw himself into the Amendment 
4 campaign, becoming the measure’s Colorado Springs spokesman. As he tells it, 
when activists met after the election to discuss next steps, a schism emerged 
between those who wanted a stiff property tax cap similar to California’s Proposition 
13 and those, like Bruce, who preferred a broader tax relief measure. Ultimately, 
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Bruce decided to forge ahead with his own tax- and spending-limit initiative in the 
1988 election cycle.258 
Bruce’s 1988 measure, supported by his newly formed Taxpayers Bill of 
Rights (TABOR) Committee, was one of four anti-tax initiatives proposed for the 
Colorado ballot that year. All came from people who had been active in the 1986 
campaign but who disagreed about the best path forward. One competing initiative 
came from the Coxes and their Association for Colorado Taxpayers. Another was 
proposed by a group of Freemont County residents on the western slope who 
championed a property tax cap similar to California’s Proposition 13. Along similar 
lines, mine operator and oilman Joseph Dodge formed Citizens that Love Colorado 
and proposed another Proposition 13-like amendment. Although the existence of 
four initiatives in 1988 may seem to be an indication of the growing importance of 
anti-tax politics in Colorado, in fact, they were more a product of in-fighting among 
the small but dedicated group of activists who had been involved with the Coxes’ 
1986 Amendment 4 campaign. 
Ultimately, only Bruce’s TABOR initiative gathered enough signatures to 
appear on the November 1988 ballot, as Amendment 6. TABOR differed significantly 
from previous tax-limiting efforts in Colorado. Although TABOR included both a 
spending limit and tax cap, it went considerably further. Under TABOR, all new or 
increased taxes would require direct voter approval, except in narrowly defined 
cases of emergency; state income and property taxes would be significantly reduced; 
and total government spending would be tied to a ratio of inflation and population 
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change. Although Bruce tried to present himself as moderate and TABOR as a 
modest change to current state policy, he frequently slipped into more radical 
rhetoric, denouncing Colorado taxes as “out of control” and proclaiming that TABOR 
was “leading a crusade for traditional American values—home ownership and the 
authority to decide how much government we are willing to pay for.”259 
Opposition to Bruce’s initiative came from many quarters. Citizens for 
Representative Government, the political action committee formed by a combination 
of business associations, education groups, and government interests to oppose the 
Cox’s 1986 measure, redoubled their efforts in the fight against TABOR, challenging 
the validity of many of the signatures Bruce had gathered to get TABOR on the 
ballot. Unsurprisingly, Roy Romer, the Rocky Mountain State’s Democratic 
governor, also came out against the amendment, campaigning across the state for its 
defeat. Labor groups donated heavily to the anti-Amendment 6 campaign as did the 
Colorado Municipal Bond Dealers’ Association. Meanwhile, the non-partisan 
Colorado Public Expenditure Council, a publicly funded entity charged with 
studying various economic issues in Colorado and the potential economic impact of 
prospective legislation, opined that, “adoption of a far-reaching constitutional 
amendment, whose effects are unknown and subject to years of litigation, will not 
serve the best interests of Colorado as it works toward economic recovery.”260 
Among the measure’s more surprising opponents were the Colorado 
Association of Commerce and Industry, the state’s leading business association, 
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which dubbed TABOR “a draconian disaster”; Republican state senate president and 
long-time anti-tax advocate Ted Strickland; Bill Armstrong, Colorado’s famously 
conservative U.S. senator; and three former Colorado governors. Even Joseph 
Dodge, author of one of the other 1988 tax limitation initiatives, came out against 
TABOR. Despite Bruce’s confident assurances that his measure would sail easily to 
victory, sending a clear message to Colorado’s governor and state legislature that 
“the voice of the people…cannot be ignored,” voters rejected it by a margin of : 58% 
to 42%.261 
Declaring that special interests had “stolen” the 1988 election, Bruce 
immediately began work on a new version of TABOR for the 1990 ballot. This 
version, known as Amendment 1, was even more convoluted. Once again, a laundry 
list of Colorado lawmakers, Democrats and Republicans alike, lined up to oppose the 
amendment, even going to far as to discuss putting forward their own alternative 
amendment in order to draw attention away from Bruce. Governor Romer, now in a 
battle for reelection, again toured the state urging voters to reject TABOR once and 
for all. Described by one political observer as a “toned-down and polished-up 
successor to Amendment 6,” at 1,875 words, Amendment 1 was still remarkably 
lengthy and complex, prompting Denver Post columnist Fred Brown to lament, “For 
sheer complexity, [TABOR] deserves a prize.” For his part, Bruce insisted publicly 
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that TABOR was merely a “moderate, responsible curb on the tax-and-spend politics 
of the recent past.”262 
Once again, the amendment failed, although this time by a much narrower 
margin. Indeed, as election night came to a close, Amendment 1 was still too close to 
call. Ultimately, it lost by just 20,000 votes, 51% to 49%.263 Growing popular 
frustration with lawmakers, both locally and nationally, while helping to close the 
gap, was still insufficient to get the measure passed. 
In both 1988 and 1990, proponents of TABOR accused their foes of using 
political chicanery to keep the amendment from passing. In 1988 Citizens for 
Representative Government petitioned to have many of the signatures gathered in 
support of the initiative invalidated, prompting Colorado Secretary of State Natalie 
Meyer, a Republican, to throw out nearly a third of them. TABOR’s proponents cried 
foul, insisting that the signatures were all legitimate and that this had been an 
illegal political maneuver on the part of Democrats and others to block the 
amendment. In 1990, Meyer again was in the public eye for attempting to keep that 
year’s incarnation of TABOR off the ballot. Her effort, while unsuccessful, publicized 
Bruce’s cause, casting him and his amendment in a sympathetic light as victims of 
government run amok. Rather than fighting Meyer by gathering new signatures, as 
they had done previously, supporters of the amendment took her to court and won.264 
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Although Bruce tried again in 1990 to present himself as moderate and his 
amendment as a reasonable, middle of the road solution to high taxes, he continually 
returned to an amped-up, ideological rightwing language of small government and 
freedom that did not sit well with voters. “Every year, government gets bigger,” 
Bruce told the Denver Post after TABOR qualified for the ballot, “It frankly corrodes 
the human spirit to have people think government will take care of everything. I’m 
opposed to the trend toward state socialism.”265 TABOR also suffered from the 
support of the Republican candidate for governor against incumbent Roy Romer, 
John Andrews.. While Romer successfully presented himself as a moderate, centrist 
Democrat working to bring economic prosperity to Colorado, the Republican 
challenger campaigned as a staunch conservative. Andrews made support for 
TABOR a centerpiece of his campaign, warning that, if the measure failed, Colorado 
would become “Taxarado,” and women would be forced out of the home and into jobs 
because of high taxes, derisively dubbing Romer “Governor Tax.”266 He also accused 
Romer of being beholden to “radical feminists” and “militant homosexuals.”267 Such 
views were far to the right of most Coloradans and did nothing to help TABOR at 
the polls. Indeed, Andrews’ conservatism was sufficiently controversial that many 
Colorado Republicans gave money to Romer in an effort to keep the GOP candidate 
out of the governor’s mansion. Many of these Republican donors, both individuals 
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and businesses, specifically cited Anderson's support for TABOR as the primary 
reason for their displeasure.268 
By 1992, things had changed. While in 1978 and again in 1986 and 1988, 
Coloradans paid relatively low taxes and could be fairly confident in their elected 
officials’ willingness and ability to correct inequities in the tax structure, by 1992, 
that was no longer the case. Even so, it would be a mistake to view TABOR as proof 
of either a tax revolt or some groundswell of popular conservatism. Rather, a 
combination of factors conspired to facilitate TABOR’s passage. A series of high-
profile incidents led to widespread popular frustration with elected officials around 
the question of taxes, while several years of economic slowdown led many 
Coloradans to worry about their financial futures (although, ironically, at the time of 
the election the economy was on the cusp of a major boom). But these were far from 
the deciding factors. In fact, in the years preceding TABOR’s passage, Coloradans 
approved tax increases to fund an array of major public projects, indicating not a 
rise in anti-tax sentiment but, rather, their continued willingness to use taxation as 
a tool for achieving specific public goods. Where TABOR and taxes had dominated 
the 1988 and 1990 elections, ensuring that voters were generally well-informed 
about the substance of the proposed amendments, in 1992 other issues, namely a 
proposed sales tax increase to fund public schools, the anti-gay constitutional 
amendment also on the ballot that year, and the presidential election, took center 
stage, distracting the attention of both traditional opponents of anti-tax measures 
and the public at large. Amidst this state of popular frustration and general 
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preoccupation with other issues, TABOR’s dogged author and chief advocate Douglas 
Bruce was able to dominate that year’s conversation about taxes and government 
limitation in ways that had not previously been possible. On election night, TABOR 
passed with nearly 54% of the vote.269 
What accounted for TABOR’s eventual success? In the years leading up to 
TABOR’s passage in 1992, Colorado politics was dominated, particularly in the 
Front Range, by a series of tax proposals. The success of measures to raise funds for 
local schools and libraries, a new convention center, airport, and baseball stadium 
all demonstrate the continued willingness of voters to support taxation when they 
deemed it beneficial. As Floyd Ciruli, Colorado’s leading public opinion pollster, put 
it, voters “still pick and choose” among individual tax proposals, “They haven’t 
reached a point where they say no to everything yet.”270 Rather than an outright 
rebellion against rising taxes or an embrace of small government conservatism, 
Coloradans, particularly in the populous metropolitan Front Range, evinced a strong 
embrace of taxation as a valuable tool for accomplishing desired public ends. 
Plans to build a new airport and to attract a new major league baseball team 
to Denver developed more or less simultaneously. Both projects required popular 
approval of new taxes across the six-county Denver metropolitan area to fund 
construction. The challenge, then, was not simply to persuade Coloradans that these 
initiatives were worthy of their tax dollars but also to achieve a high level of inter-
county cooperation across a fragmented and often contentious metropolitan region. 
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In 1990 and 1991, voters approved both projects, and the attendant new taxes. 
Support for the projects was widespread, cutting across partisan lines. Indeed, 
Douglas and Arapahoe counties, generally regarded as conservative, passed the 
ballpark initiative with over 60% approval. It also passed decisively in Jefferson 
County. 
The airport measure, meanwhile, won approval 63% to 37% across 
metropolitan Denver, with Front Range residents eager to take advantage of the 
influx of new jobs, business, and tourism that the project promised. Upon receiving 
the election results from across the six-county stadium district, Denver Mayor 
Federico Peña proclaimed, “We are in a time that is unparalleled in the history of 
our city.” Pointing not only to the stadium vote but also to recent voter approval of 
the airport and a new convention center, along with bond initiatives to improve city 
schools, streets, and libraries, Peña asserted, “People realize we need to make 
investments in our city, even in difficult economic times.”271 
Although the airport and stadium initiatives passed overwhelmingly across 
the metro area, the stadium tax actually was rejected in both Denver and Adams 
Counties. Just as the success of these initiatives evidences the pragmatic approach 
that most residents of metro Denver took to taxation, the stadium issue’s failure in 
these two of the six metropolitan counties demonstrates the importance of 
particularist local concerns, not ideology, in determining voters attitudes towards 
particular tax proposals. Adams County’s rejection of the stadium tax was, above all, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
271 Paul Hutchinson, “Vote on baseball stadium: ‘Safe!’—Conditional sales tax wins narrow 
approval,” Denver Post, August 15, 1990. 
	  
	  
181	  
the product of years of animosity between the suburban county and the core city. 
Simmering resentments towards Denver fueled the opposition, much of it rooted in 
old tensions stemming from what many Adams County residents saw as a land grab 
by Denver of land needed to connect the city to the airport. Many in Adams County 
feared Denver’s annexation of a narrow connecting corridor would open the county to 
the threat of possible future Denver annexations. Adams County voters ultimately 
came around and supported the annexation by a significant margin, but only after 
extensive campaigning on the part of Governor Romer and numerous Front Range 
business leaders. 
Despite the county’s eventual support for the airport initiative, tensions 
remained. In an article published immediately following the stadium vote, tellingly 
titled “Adams Co. still touchy about Denver,” the Denver Post sighed, “Tuesday’s 
vote shows they managed to fuel the lingering resentment toward Denver that exists 
among a fair number of Adams County folks who still think the big city gets all the 
goodies at their expense. Like the new airport that may bring jobs to Adams County, 
but still is located in Denver.” Denver naysayers in Adams, the Post suggested, 
never passed up an opportunity to “drive a new wedge between Denver and its 
suburban neighbor,” a view that seemed born out by former Adams County 
Chairman Hal Shroyer. Upon learning that Adams residents had voted down the 
stadium initiative, he crowed that the negative stadium vote proved that, were the 
airport election held again, it would fail. Far from a rejection of taxes at large or an 
	  
	  
182	  
ideological commitment to limited government, Adams residents’ rejection of the 
stadium appears to have been driven primarily by inter-county rivalry.272 
Within Denver itself, opposition to the stadium was also widespread—almost 
two-to-one—even as Denverites supported a host of other spending proposals, 
including three billion dollars for transportation and ninety million dollars for 
library improvements. Political observers agreed that the key to passing new taxes 
was persuading voters that the funds were directly linked to a tangible benefit. 
Moreover, frustrations with local government did not necessarily translate into anti-
tax attitudes. As pollster Paul Talmey, who conducted pre-election surveys for the 
Denver Post and News 4 just ahead of the city bond election, explained it, the 
thinking among Denverites went something like this: “I may not trust city council, 
but if I earmark the money for an improvement on my street, I don’t have to worry 
about city council messing it up. I may not think much of the school board, but I still 
believe in education, and I want the school in my neighborhood to be fixed up.” 
Pollster Floyd Ceruli concurred: “There is no taxpayers’ revolt at this point…While it 
may be tightening up, you can still see people willing to make these investments.”273 
Two referenda on school bonds, one in ostensibly conservative Jefferson 
County and the other in heavily Democratic Denver, further indicated Coloradans’ 
willingness to selectively embrace taxes when they saw a clear benefit. Jefferson, 
located to the west of Denver and home to the state’s largest school district, had long 
been known as one of the more conservative suburban counties within the metro 
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area. Indeed, it was home to many of CUT’s executive board members and the 
organization itself was headquartered there. What is more, the preceding decades 
had provided residents with numerous reasons to resist taxation: fear of annexation 
into Denver, opposition to school desegregation and “forced busing,” resentment over 
the proposed use of local land and tax dollars for Olympic events, and more. For both 
ideological and circumstantial reasons, then, Jefferson County seemed fertile soil for 
anti-tax sentiment. Yet, following extensive public debate, residents rejected the 
ideological anti-tax argument decisively in a special election with heavy turn out in 
October 1992, passing a bond initiative to give $325 million to the county's public 
school system in the upcoming fiscal year for use in building maintenance, new 
school construction, and other infrastructure needs.274 
Rather than embrace arguments about the importance of small government 
or taxes as a threat to liberty, instead, the majority of Jefferson County residents 
expressed views in keeping with the pragmatic quality-of-life politics that had long-
since become the norm. As parents, their children's education was of paramount 
importance, and many expressed the view that higher taxes were acceptable—even 
desirable—in the name of better schools. One parent who voted for the bond 
initiative explained, “We have school-age children who deserve a good education.” 
Echoing this sentiment, another told reporters outside a polling place in southern 
Jefferson County, where school enrollments were rising particularly fast, “It’s just 
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really important for kids.”275 When Ray Walton, Jefferson County resident and CUT 
leader addressed a public meeting, suggesting that cutting taxes would actually 
increase the funds available for public education—essentially a “trickle down” 
argument—he drew hisses from the crowd of over 200 assembled parents. Voters 
were equally unpersuaded by the arguments of Colorado Christian Coalition 
president and CUT activist Katherine Anderson’s argument that taxes are a “moral 
issue” because higher taxes force mothers into the workforce and cause families to 
reduce their donations to churches. Denverites themselves displayed similarly 
selective attitudes towards taxation, approving a substantial school bond initiative 
even as they resisted the stadium tax. 
These attitudes were very much in keeping with prevailing popular political 
sentiments. In the 1992 presidential election, a decisive majority of Coloradans 
supported either Perot or Clinton over George Bush, drawn to the candidates’ 
centrist social values and seemingly pragmatic, rather than ideological, approach to 
taxes. Residents of heavily Republican Jefferson County were representative, 
supporting Bush and Clinton in almost equal measure, with the combined Clinton 
and Perot vote outpacing Bush almost two to one.276 In short, voter responses to the 
array of proposed tax increases across metropolitan Denver indicate that quality of 
life politics, not rising anti-tax, small-government conservatism, dominated local 
politics and voter attitudes at the time of TABOR’s passage. 
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In addition to the major tax initiatives in 1990 and 1991 for the airport and 
the stadium, what ultimately tipped the scales in TABOR’s favor in 1992 may 
simply have been distraction. In previous election years, TABOR dominated the 
campaign and was the subject of intense debate among candidates, substantial 
activity among Colorado political organizations, and news coverage in both of the 
state’s major daily papers. Consequently, voters arrived at the polls comparatively 
well versed in the details of the initiative. Bruce, as the measure’s sponsor and chief 
advocate, also drew considerable attention, much of it negative. By contrast, in 1992, 
TABOR received little attention and this, ironically, seems to have contributed to its 
success. 
Several factors contributed to TABOR’s comparatively low profile. Most 
obviously, the 1992 presidential election dominated the public’s attention. The three-
way contest between Republican incumbent George H. W. Bush, Democratic 
newcomer Bill Clinton, and independent Ross Perot was among the most dramatic 
races in recent memory, and Colorado was a key battleground state. Additionally, 
while in past years TABOR and other tax-limiting initiatives had occupied spots on 
relatively uncrowded ballots, where they were often the most high profile items and, 
thus, the most intensively discussed and dissected, in 1992, TABOR was one of 
thirteen ballot initiatives. And two of the others took the limelight. Most significant 
was Amendment 2, a proposed constitutional amendment, discussed at length in 
Chapter 5, which was a first-in-the-nation attempt to add provisions regarding 
sexual orientation to a state constitution. Amendment 2 dominated the campaign, 
bringing intense national scrutiny to the Rocky Mountain State and drawing the 
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lion’s share of local news coverage as well as the political attention, energy, and 
financial resources of citizen groups, activists, and politicians who, in previous 
years, had dedicated themselves to defeating TABOR. 
The other measure on the ballot in 1992 to garner considerable attention was 
Amendment 6, an education proposal that, among other things, would have raised 
the state sales tax by one percent to increase funds for public schools. It was 
unpopular among voters, garnering just 46% percent of the vote.277 Arguments 
against the initiative ranged from fears that higher sales tax would deter Colorado 
tourism to concerns that the package of education reforms coupled to the tax hike 
was insufficiently robust. There was also the suggestion that the projected $300 
million school budget shortfall that had prompted the initiative had already been cut 
in half by a stronger-than-expected local economy, making the additional tax 
unnecessarily high.278 
Governor Romer, who in past years had been among TABOR’s most vocal 
opponents, focused most of his energy in 1992 on the campaigns for Amendment 6 
and against Amendment 2. TABOR became something of an afterthought. Bruce 
himself recognized the importance of these distractions and the general lack of 
attention directed at his amendment, commenting wryly, “The boring old tax 
limitation which usually loses isn’t getting the attention it usually does,” going on to 
gloat that the governor’s focus on other issues was a boon for his effort. “He’s 
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basically just given me the election,” Bruce crowed, “I’m thinking about calling a 
press conference and appointing him my honorary chairman.”279  
To the extent that TABOR did garner press coverage, the coverage tended to 
focus not on the substance of the proposal—which, at close to 1,800 words, remained 
complex, with consequences that were difficult to predict—but rather on an ongoing 
standoff between Bruce’s TABOR Committee and Secretary of State Natalie Meyer, 
who once again sought to keep the amendment off the ballot by invalidating 
signatures. Rather than use the mandated correction period to gather more 
signatures, as they had done in the past, in 1992 TABOR and its ally CUT took 
Meyer to court. This kept the story in the news while simultaneously casting 
TABOR sympathetically as an underdog fighting against allegedly corrupt officials. 
TABOR’s very complexity, which in past years had often been used against it, 
may also have contributed to its passage in 1992. With attention elsewhere, details 
of the proposal, which opponents described as “too lengthy and ambiguous,” full of 
“ponderous complexities,” with “kind of a devilish, counterproductive side to it,” 
received little scrutiny. Rather than send Bruce’s intended message that 
government tyranny in Colorado must end, it seems that many who voted for 
TABOR did so as a way of re-enforcing the very different message to lawmakers so 
clearly evidenced by their selective support for any number of tax increases over the 
preceding years: Coloradans liked having a direct say on individual tax proposals. 
The language that appeared on the ballot seemed aligned with this message: 
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Shall there be an amendment to the Colorado Constitution to require voter 
approval for certain state and local government tax revenue increases and 
debt; to restrict property, income, and other taxes; to limit the rate of 
increase in state and local government spending; to allow additional initiative 
and referendum elections; and to provide for the mailing of information to 
registered voters?280 
Only the full text of the amendment, which a voter would have had to make a special 
effort to locate, read, and understand, suggested the far more radical nature of 
Bruce’s project.  
In all events, Coloradans awoke on November 4, 1992 to discover with 
surprise that TABOR had passed by a clear, if slim, margin. On the morning of the 
vote, Bruce himself had predicted the amendment’s failure.281 In the days after the 
election, political observers, journalists, and Coloradans all seemed startled to 
discover that TABOR had, in fact, passed. Governor Romer offered the opinion that 
the state’s struggling economy had caused Coloradans to tighten their belts, 
although he predicted that it was “inevitable” that the pendulum would swing back 
once people got a taste of living under TABOR and the incessant special elections he 
predicted it would require.282 Others suggested that Coloradans had simply become 
fed up with “endless” new taxes, although one pollster pointed out that that was 
unlikely, citing recent voter approval for large projects such as the stadium and 
airport. Observers across the political spectrum, Democrats and Republicans alike, 
school superintendents and county commissioners, along with representatives of the 
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state’s major unions and business associations, agreed that the consequences for 
Colorado would be dire. 
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Chapter 5:  
“No Discrimination & No Special Rights”: The Politics of Moderation 
and the 1992 Election 
Even as Coloradans contemplated TABOR, two other issues dominated the 
1992 election cycle. Paramount, of course, was the three-way presidential contest 
between Republican incumbent George Bush, Democratic newcomer Bill Clinton, 
and independent insurgent Ross Perot. Almost as important in Colorado, however, 
was Amendment 2. Officially titled “Colorado No Protected Status for Sexual 
Orientation Amendment,” Amendment 2 garnered massive media and activist 
attention, both within Colorado and beyond, as the nation’s first constitutional 
amendment dealing with homosexuality. Approved by voters by a margin of 53% TO 
47%, the amendment made it illegal for any government entity in Colorado—city, 
county, or state—to offer protections from discrimination to gays and lesbians.283 In 
the wake of its passage, activists launched a nationwide boycott of the Rocky 
Mountain State, dubbing Colorado “The Hate State.” Gay rights advocates in Denver 
filed suit in federal district court and the amendment was immediately enjoined, 
pending a full appeals process. The case, Romer v. Evans, went all the way to the 
United States Supreme Court, where it ultimate became the basis of the court’s first 
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pro-gay rights ruling, holding that Amendment 2 denied gays and lesbians the equal 
protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment .284 
The 1992 election is often identified as a watershed moment in the Christian 
right’s rise to political power. At the same time that Coloradans passed Amendment 
2, the GOP made social conservatism the centerpiece of its campaign strategy. 
Standing before the crowds gathered in Houston’s Astrodome for the 1992 
Republican National Convention, conservative-Christian presidential candidate Pat 
Buchanan proclaimed to a prime time audience that, “There is a religious war going 
on in this country. It is a cultural war as critical to the kind of nation we shall be as 
the Cold War itself, for this war is for the soul of America.” The crowd went wild. 
The new GOP platform sounded the same theme, emphasizing “family values” as 
central to the Republican agenda for the nineties.  
But the issues surrounding both the 1992 presidential election and 
Amendment 2 were far murkier than simply the triumph of cultural conservatism, 
as was the very notion of the culture war itself. Even as Coloradans voted to enact 
both TABOR and Amendment 2, leading many observers to view Colorado as part of 
a conservative vanguard, voters in the Rocky Mountain State decisively rejected 
George Bush and the GOP’s unabashedly conservative “family values” platform. Bill 
Clinton became the first Democrat to carry Colorado since Johnson won the state in 
1964. Voters in the Rocky Mountain State decisively rejected George Bush and the 
GOP’s conservative family values platform. With 39% of the vote, Bill Clinton 
became the first Democrat to carry Colorado since Lyndon Johnson in 1964. Clinton 
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got 39% of the vote. Ross Perot got another 23%, for a total of 62% to Bush’s 35%.285 
Significantly, Perot was socially moderate. For example in his campaign book United 
We Stand: How We Can Take Back Our Country, he wrote about his pro-choice 
stance on abortion and other issues that put him at odds with the GOP.286 Clinton, 
meanwhile, campaigned on an explicitly moderate and “pragmatic” fiscal platform 
that, in fact, had much in common with Perot’s, suggesting that the nearly two-
thirds of voters who supported them had more in common with each other than 
either group had with Bush voters.287 While most commentators have understood 
the election of a self-styled New Democrat and passage of an anti-gay constitutional 
amendment in the same election as paradoxical, they were, in fact, both extensions 
of the new political culture that had been percolating among the electorate since the 
late 1960s. 
An in-depth examination of Amendment 2, and the history of gay rights 
politics in Colorado more broadly, raises several questions: What can be learned 
from the make up of the coalitions for and against Amendment 2? How prevalent 
were conservative, Christian Right ideas among the voting public, and were voters 
responsive to these arguments? What does the fight over Amendment 2 reveal about 
broader debates—within Colorado and the nation—over questions of political power, 
local control, individual freedom, and government transparency? Ultimately, the 
Amendment 2 saga reveals the failure of arguments explicitly against homosexuality 
to move voters. At the ostensible height of family values fervor in the United States, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
285 1992 Abstract Book, Colorado Secretary of State, (copy on file with author). 
286 Ross Perot, United We Stand: How We Can Take Back Our Country (Hyperion 1992), pp. 
93–94. 
287 Clinton and Gore, Putting People First. 
	  
	  
193	  
family values arguments in Colorado were remarkably unsuccessful at attracting 
votes. Instead, the amendment’s success relied on a series of racialized arguments 
about privilege and economic access. The answers to these questions reveal the 
predominance of market-oriented and quality of life ideas—not a burgeoning 
cultural conservatism—in shaping public responses to both these constitutional 
amendments and the presidential race. 
* * * 
Amendment 2 was the culmination of a decades-long debate within Colorado 
over the standing of gays and lesbians: were they, in fact, a minority and, as such, 
deserving of laws protecting them from discrimination or were they merely a “special 
interest group” seeking “special privileges”? Was the whole matter of sexual 
orientation an appropriate arena for state action of any kind? 
In 1973, the Boulder city council passed Colorado’s first local ordinance 
banning discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. The measure was written 
at the behest of local gay advocacy groups by Penfield Tate, Boulder’s first black city 
council member who, shortly thereafter, was elected mayor. The ordinance was a 
broad anti-discrimination measure that included sexual orientation in a list of 
protected categories. The backlash was immediate, sparking an effort to persuade 
Boulder’s city council to remove the new sexual orientation provision from the civil 
rights ordinance. Two weeks before the council vote, four hundred people crowded 
the Boulder municipal building for a public hearing on the issue, filling every 
available inch of floor space in the council chambers and spilling over into the lobby, 
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where they watched the three-hour proceedings via closed circuit television. The 
forty-four speakers for and against reflected a range of opinion. Some, like Hilma 
Skinner, a leader of the repeal effort, opposed the inclusion of sexual orientation on 
religious and moral grounds. By keeping sexual orientation in the ordinance, she 
warned, Boulder would be transformed into a “sex deviate mecca that will become as 
corrupt and vile as Sodom and Gommorah and Pompeii.” The city’s new name, she 
predicted, would be “Lesbian Homoville.” Others quoted the Bible and pledged to go 
to jail before they would compromise their faith by hiring gays or lesbians.288 
Moral and religious arguments, however, were in the distinct minority. 
Instead, most of the arguments revolved around the needs of local business and the 
status of homosexuals. Foreshadowing what would become central themes in the 
pro-Amendment 2 campaign two decades later, the Boulder Chamber of Commerce 
issued a statement in advance of the hearing distancing themselves from religious 
arguments but nevertheless stating their opposition to the ordinance. “[W]e do not 
wish to become involved in a discussion of the moral aspects of the issue,” the 
Chamber’s board of directors protested, “and we base our opposition solely on the 
infringement of the rights of any employer to select those who work for him 
according to his own standards and judgments.” They went on to add, “We believe 
that any employer has the right to hire a homosexual if he is willing to do so, but we 
do not feel that he should be denied the right not to hire such a person.”289 During 
the hearing, opposition leader and local businessman Frank Cernich sounded much 
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the same note, insisting that the ordinance threatened the free association rights of 
employers. Taking a different tack that would also become familiar in the later 
campaign, other opponents argued that homosexuals did not meet the criteria of a 
real minority but, rather, were more analogous to people suffering from alcohol or 
drug problems.290 
When the vote came on March 5, 1974, a majority of Boulder council 
members refused to remove sexual orientation from the civil rights ordinance. In 
response, opponents took the matter to the citizens of Boulder, who voted decisively 
to repeal the protections for gays and lesbians. That fall, they demanded a recall 
election and succeeded in removing both Councilman Tim Fuller, a supporter of the 
ordinance who was himself gay, and Tate. 
Although the battle in Boulder ended in defeat both for the non-
discrimination measure and its advocates, it was nevertheless on the leading edge of 
a national legal movement for gay rights. In 1972, just one year before Boulder city 
council initially passed its non-discrimination ordinance, East Lansing, Michigan, 
became the first city in the nation to enact civil rights protections for gays and 
lesbians, followed quickly by Ann Arbor and San Francisco. When debate over the 
Boulder ordinance began, the American Psychiatric Association had not yet removed 
homosexuality as a disorder from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM). 
That groundbreaking decision came even as Boulderites were preparing to vote on 
the repeal. In the years immediately following the showdown in Boulder, only one 
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other Colorado municipality took up the question of gay rights. In 1977, as Anita 
Bryant waged her Save Our Children campaign to repeal Dade County, Florida’s 
non-discrimination law, citizens of Aspen quietly enacted an ordinance prohibiting 
discrimination in employment, housing, public services and public accommodation 
on the basis of, among other things, sexual orientation.291 
The Aspen ordinance, which passed by a decisive majority, was among the 
most far-reaching in the nation. For the next decade, it remained the only gay rights 
ordinance in Colorado. But then, in the late 1980s, gay rights activists launched a 
new round of efforts to pass local anti-discrimination ordinances. First Boulder 
voters passed a law in 1987 adding sexual orientation back into the city’s civil rights 
ordinance. By the time of that campaign, the terms of debate, along with the 
political climate, had shifted. Against the backdrop of the emerging AIDS crisis, the 
prominence of homosexuality as a topic of conversation—and the sense of urgency 
that permeated those discussions—had grown. Over and over, Boulder gay rights 
activists hammered home the importance of nondiscrimination laws in the fight 
against the disease. Under the headline “Discrimination Spreads A.I.D.S.,” the 
Equality Protection Coalition, which spearheaded the initiative campaign, argued 
that those at risk for AIDS would be unlikely to get tested or to participate in 
prevention programs if they feared that coming forward would expose them to 
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discrimination on the basis of their sexual orientation. “If you want to help stamp 
out A.I.D.S. and prevent the spread of this killer disease,” the advertisement 
suggested, “You must ensure lesbian/gay rights.” A vote for the ordinance, they 
argued, was a vote for life.292 
 
Figure 9. Equality Protection Coalition Campaign Ads, 1987. 
Other differences between the 1987 Boulder campaign and earlier conflicts 
pointed towards a cultural shift on the issue of homosexuality. Where the 1974 
campaign had prominently featured local small businessmen and the Chamber of 
Commerce arguing against protections for gays and lesbians, by 1987the business 
community had switched sides. Proponents of expanding the anti-discrimination law 
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could argue that banning discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation was 
essential for the future of Boulder’s economy and for continuing to attract businesses 
to the area, highlighting the fact that many large corporations had personnel 
policies banning discrimination based on sexual orientation. “What do Continental 
Airlines, AT&T, Adolph Coors and Rockwell International have in common?” one 
newspaper advertisement asked. The answer, “They all prohibit discrimination on 
the basis of sexual orientation.” Such policies were, they argued, good for business. 
As Boulder’s Equal Protection Coalition explained 
Employees who don’t have to waste time hiding their personal lives 
from their employers have more energy to put into doing their jobs. 
That helps everyone. If Boulder wants to maintain and attract 
businesses on the cutting edge, those that are leaders in the field of 
ideas, Boulder must accept all people. Ending discrimination is good 
for Boulder business.293 
Where the earlier campaign portrayed Boulder as a leader in pioneering anti-
discrimination, by 1987 proponents of the new ordinance could warn that over fifty 
U.S. cities already had such laws on the books and that, unless the ordinance 
passed, Boulder would soon fall behind. 
Three years later, in 1990 and 1991, similar arguments emerged in the battle 
over Denver’s non-discrimination ordinance. With the support of over two dozen 
community organizations including church groups, professional associations, major 
corporations, black and Hispanic community organizations, civic associations, and 
the Greater Denver Chamber of Commerce, the Equal Protection Ordinance 
Coalition (EPOC) quietly worked to persuade Denver officials that a new, stronger 
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civil rights law that included protections for gays and lesbians was needed. These 
efforts bore fruit when, in 1990, the Denver city council adopted a measure known as 
the Comprehensive Anti-Discrimination Ordinance, which added several new 
categories, including sexual orientation, to the city’s list of protected classes.294 As 
had happened before in Boulder and elsewhere, opponents, themselves mostly not 
Denver residents, launched an effort to remove sexual orientation from the new law 
by bringing the matter to a popular vote in a city-wide referendum, known as 
Initiative #1. Citizens for Sensible Rights (CSR), as they called themselves, argued 
that the public should decide such an important change to the city’s civil rights. 
Ultimately, however, CSR failed to persuade a majority of Denver voters that 
protecting gays and lesbians from discrimination in housing and employment 
constituted a credible threat to Denver citizens, losing 55% to 45%.295 
Although Initiative #1 failed by a wide margin, the campaign surrounding it 
is worth examining as a prelude to the Amendment 2 battle the following year. For 
both opponents and supporters of the anti-discrimination ordinance, the rhetoric and 
strategies used, along with the organizational structure of their campaigns, bore 
important similarities to the subsequent campaign. In the wake of the 
Comprehensive Anti-Discrimination Ordinance’s passage, conservative activists 
from across the Front Range converged on Denver to push for repeal. Although CSR 
described itself as a “grassroots coalition of Denver residents” that had “risen up to 
oppose this law,” the truth was somewhat different. In fact, as EPOC and their allies 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
294 “Shall an Ordinance of the City and County of Denver be Adopted to Permit 
Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation—Could this really happen???” Box 6, Folder 26, 
Equality Colorado Records, Western History & Genealogy Division, Denver Public Library. 
295 Steve Lipsher, “Election loss won’t end battle over gay rights,” Denver Post, May 23, 1991. 
	  
	  
200	  
were quick to point out, CSR was a local subsidiary of the Traditional Values 
Coalition, an organization founded by Orange County, California fundamentalist 
and national family values crusader Lou Sheldon to lobby nationwide for what it 
called traditional Christian values. Moreover, because many of the “local” activists 
working for repeal were not residents of Denver, they were themselves ineligible to 
vote in the popular referendum for which they worked.296 EPOC described the CSR 
operatives as carpetbaggers who had “singled out the gay and lesbian community as 
being unworthy of equal rights.” They characterized Initiative #1 as part of a 
national “Hate Campaign,” pushed by people that “don’t care about Denver or 
Colorado” but, rather, “seek to create fear and hysteria where none exist.”297 
 
 
 
Figure 10. “Don’t Legalize Discrimination,” EPOC advertisement, 1991. 
As they had in Boulder, Denver gay rights advocates argued that including 
sexual orientation among the city’s protected classes, in addition to being fair and 
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right, also was good for business. In a letter to supporters on behalf of EPOC, 
Patricia Schroeder, Denver’s Democratic Congresswoman and honorary EPOC co-
chair, brought the two themes together. Highlighting the importance of non-
discrimination to Denver’s business climate, Schroeder exhorted voters to keep 
sexual orientation as part of the city’s ordinance. “Denver’s anti-discrimination 
ordinance is comprehensive for a reason,” she argued, “Discrimination based on any 
of the characteristics listed in the ordinance is not only wrong, it is counter to a safe, 
productive, non-violent community and healthy business environment.” Schroeder 
went on to underscore the threat that repeal posed to Denver’s home rule and local 
control, noting that outsiders, namely suburbanites aided by Lou Sheldon’s 
Traditional Values Coalition, led the Initiative #1 charge. Calling opponents of the 
Comprehensive Anti-Discrimination Ordinance “arch-conservatives,” she warned, 
“They have money, and they have time.”298 
Indeed, Sheldon himself—who was often referred to as “Son of Falwell” in a 
nod to Christian Right political icon Jerry Falwell—participated directly, flying to 
Denver to host campaign meetings and strategy sessions. The centerpiece of his 
proposed strategy, which CSR adopted, was two pronged: attacking homosexuals as 
a special interest group rather than a “true minority” and warning of the threat that 
gays and lesbians posed both to families and public health. As CSR frequently put it 
in leaflets, advertisements, and other materials distributed throughout the 
campaign, “The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that homosexuality is a behavior, 
not a minority. Therefore, homosexuality is not deserving of special recognition and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
298 Patricia Schroeder to Concerned Friends, April 15, 1991, Box 6, Folder 26, Equality 
Colorado Records, Western History & Genealogy Division, Denver Public Library. 
	  
	  
202	  
privileges. Homosexual behavior does not equate minority status.” The group’s 
tagline, “Equal rights for all, special rights for none,” neatly encapsulated this 
message.299 
Sheldon and CSR made frequent direct appeals to Hispanic and, especially, 
black Denverites in an effort to “divide and conquer.” One EPOC activist who 
attended Sheldon’s pro-Initiative #1 strategy session reported that he recommended 
reaching out directly to these and other racial or ethnic minority groups in Denver. 
“You do everything within your power to show them what is happening to the hard-
earned minority status that blacks and asians and hispanics have sought to have 
and rightly have,” [sic] the observer quoted Sheldon as saying, and tell them, “Now 
comes the aggressors (gays) who are trying to snatch and piggyback that civil 
right.”300 CSR took Sheldon’s message to heart, blanketing minority neighborhoods 
across Denver with leaflets. “All Americans are already guaranteed equal protection, 
human rights, under the U.S. Constitution and the Bill of Rights,” CSR argued. Civil 
rights laws, then, were special, “powerful laws which are reserved for only oppressed 
groups who have suffered real discrimination because of racial or ethnic traits they 
CANNOT change.” By contrast, the leaflet argued, gays were not a true minority 
and “have NEVER known the discrimination of sharecropping, slavery, separate 
schools and ghettoes which true minorities have endured, for which Civil Rights 
were made!” Rather, homosexuals were a powerful special interest group that had 
succeeded in duping Denver into providing legal protections to which they were not 
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entitled.301 The same leaflet warned, “Homosexual ‘Equal Protection’ really means 
‘economic protection’ which divides, defiles, and destroys affirmative action 
opportunities and set asides for blacks, hispanics and other truly underprivileged 
minorities” [sic]. Warning that “Homosexuals demand abnormal sex should have the 
same privileges as skin color,” CSR predicted that including sexual orientation in 
the city’s anti-discrimination ordinance would have a direct, detrimental impact on 
black and Hispanic Denverites.302 
But while much of the CSR literature employed these more secular-seeming 
formulations against including sexual orientation in the Denver ordinance, the 
group’s distaste for and moral objections to homosexuality, as well as the religious 
underpinnings of their stance, were also very much on display. In addition to 
emphasizing the difference between homosexuality and such “genuine bases of 
minority status” as race and gender, which they argued were “God given and 
unchangeable,” CSR warned that including gays and lesbians in the anti-
discrimination ordinance was part of a far-reaching “homosexual agenda” that posed 
a dire threat to children, families, and public health.303 In pamphlets and 
advertisements, CSR consistently claimed that the equal rights ordinance was part 
of a broad effort by gays as an elite special interest group to “force their abnormal 
lifestyle on us” through manipulation and lies. The Comprehensive Anti-
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Discrimination Ordinance itself was, as CSR described it, “a sex law giving special 
recognition and privileges to homosexuals” and was the product of years of secret 
negotiation between Denver City Council and the powerful homosexual lobby.  
While most of CSR’s rhetoric emphasized secular arguments against 
providing legal protections for homosexuality, other CSR arguments in support of 
Initiative 1 made CSR’s ties to the Christian Right abundantly clear. Under the 
headline “Restore Sensible Rights to Denver,” for example, accompanied by the 
image of a bald eagle flying across the American flag, a CSR flyer exhorted citizens 
to “Make a stand for traditional family values, civil rights, and religious freedom.” 
After warning that the Denver anti-discrimination ordinance was a gateway to 
further licentiousness and the normalization of aberrant sexual behavior, CSR’s 
proposed solution began, “Pray God’s witness will be seen in the Church’s stand 
against sexual perversion.”304 
The religious caste of CSR’s campaign materials and their alarmist, 
conspiratorial tone did not play well with Denver voters. On election day, Denverites 
defeated Initiative #1 by ten percentage points.305 By the following year’s 
Amendment 2 campaign, CSR had learned its lesson, eliminating almost all 
discussion of homosexuality itself as dangerous or morally objectionable and 
employing more measured tones in presenting the civil rights and economic 
arguments that formed the bulk of the proponents’ campaign. 
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At around the same time that gay rights advocates succeeded in passing and 
then defending the Denver anti-discrimination ordinance, activists in Ft. Collins and 
Colorado Springs proposed local anti-discrimination ordinances, both of which 
failed.306 It was in this context of increasing discussion of homosexuality and the 
relationship between sexual orientation and citizenship that Amendment 2 emerged 
as a direct response to the Denver, Ft. Collins, and Colorado Springs ordinance 
campaigns. Until shortly before the election in November 1992, polls indicated that 
Amendment 2 would fail, yet voters ultimately passed it by nearly seven percentage 
points, 53.4% to 46.6%.307 
* * * 
 Amendment 2 was the product of a Colorado Springs-based organization, 
Colorado for Family Values (CFV), that was offshoot of Lou Sheldon’s Traditional 
Values Coalition. Additional support came from a host of national Christian Right 
organizations, many of them headquartered in Colorado Springs and represented on 
CFV’s board. Over the preceding two years, Colorado Springs had become a magnet 
for Evangelical religious and political groups, earning the moniker “Evangelical 
Vatican” because of the density of Christian Right ministries and organizations 
headquartered there. Although the Springs, as the city was called, had always been 
fiscally conservative, social views in the sleepy town at the southern end of the 
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metropolitan Front Range were historically varied, what many long-time residents 
described as “live and let live.” During the 1980s, for example, Springs residents 
backed both arch-conservative Republican U.S. Senator Bill Armstrong and 
iconoclastic, pro-abortion rights Democratic Governor Dick Lamm.  
By the early 1990s, however, reeling from a crash in the local real estate 
market, city fathers were eager to attract new business to the area. Adopting a 
“clean growth” strategy intended to align with the city’s reputation as a good place to 
do business and enjoy the outdoors, Springs business leaders, organized through the 
Economic Development Corporation, sought to lure national non-profits by offering a 
variety of incentives. A four-million dollar grant drew But in August 1991, just 
ahead of the Amendment 2 campaign, Focus on the Family, one of the leading 
national parachurch organizations involved in promoting the Christian Right’s 
political agenda, moved its national headquarters, and 400 employees, to the 
Springs.308 Other like-minded groups quickly followed. 
CFV also drew support from a network of Christian Right groups around the 
country. In drafting Amendment 2, for example, CFV worked closely with the 
National Legal Foundation, of Virginia Beach, Virginia, an organization whose 
mission was “to prayerfully create and implement innovative strategies that, 
through decisive action, will cause America’s public policy and legal system to 
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support and facilitate God’s purpose for her.”309 In short, the push for Amendment 2 
not only drew support from, but was also a product of, an organized strategy on the 
part of national right-wing religious groups to shape local law and policy across the 
United States.310 
CFV and its allies were not the only ones to make Amendment 2 a national 
issue. Even as opponents attacked the pro-2 forces as out-of-towners bent on 
undermining local control, anti-2 activists were, themselves, enmeshed in a national 
network of gay rights organizations. Opponents drew legal help from what was then 
called the National Gay Task Force, later renamed the National Gay and Lesbian 
Task Force, and from Lambda Legal, another gay advocacy group, as well as from 
the ACLU. And the whole country, in a very real sense, was watching. Journalists 
from every major network, newspaper, and newsmagazine covered both the 
Amendment 2 campaign and the aftermath of the initiative’s passage. As the first 
national effort to constitutionally limit gay rights (or, for that matter, to deal with 
sexual orientation in any way), Amendment 2 was among the most talked about 
issues of the 1992 election cycle. In the wake of the amendment’s passage, gay rights 
activists launched a national boycott of Colorado, the impact of which was keenly 
felt throughout the Rocky Mountain State in terms of lost revenue from tourism, 
conferences, and more. While the Amendment 2 fight was, in one sense, an intensely 
local and particular political struggle, in another, it was a proxy war in a much 
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larger, national struggle over the status of gay men and women and, more broadly, 
over the role of religion in American political life. 
* * * 
The coalition that emerged against the Amendment 2 is very revealing and 
suggests some new directions for thinking about the politics of homosexuality in the 
United States. In particular the role of the business community in backing the anti-
amendment cause and the interracial, interethnic nature of the gay rights coalition 
merit further attention. 
In contemporary discussion of homosexuality and gay rights politics, 
especially marriage equality, it seems to be taken as a given that African Americans 
and Latinos are disproportionately culturally disposed to oppose any expansion of 
rights or legal protections for gays and lesbians.311 For example, higher than average 
black turnout in the 2008 election is often cited as the reason for the success of 
California’s Proposition 8, which banned same sex marriage in that state.312 Indeed, 
while Proposition 8 carried with 52% of the vote, exit polling showed that 70% of 
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African Americans supported the measure.313 And while 74% of Latino voters voted 
for Barack Obama, 53% supported Proposition 8.314 By the same token, beginning in 
the 1960s, “organized labor, and the working class more generally, came to be 
associated with a conservative defense of the status quo and white male privilege.”315 
But the evidence from Colorado suggests a far more nuanced and rich history of 
collaboration, mutual support, and intersectionality.  
Blacks, Hispanics, and organized labor were crucial allies for gays and 
lesbians in all of Colorado’s gay rights battles, beginning with Mayor Penfield Tate’s 
support of Boulder’s gay rights ordinance. Indeed, Tate’s support of the gay and 
lesbian community was directly responsible for his recall. During both the Denver 
ordinance campaign and the campaign to stop Amendment 2, Denver’s black and 
Hispanic leaders also overwhelmingly gave their support to the gay rights side, 
rejecting CFV’s argument that legal recognition of gay rights undermined the cause 
of equality for racial and ethnic minorities. The vote on the Denver ordinance was 
held on the same day as the first round of the Denver mayoral election, in which the 
top two candidates were black. That election became, in part, a contest over which of 
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them—District Attorney Norm Early or City Auditor Wellington Webb—was the 
greater and longer-term supporter of gay rights. Members of the Colorado Civil 
Rights Commission came out against Amendment 2, as did both the local and 
national NAACP. Jesse Jackson came to march in Denver against the amendment, 
telling voters, “Some people say unless we discriminate against gay and lesbian 
people, somehow our rights as African Americans or Latino Americans are lessened. 
That’s not true. It is immoral. Discrimination is wrong. Amendment #2 is wrong.” 
Coretta Scott King lent her endorsement and that of the King Center to the gay 
rights cause.  
The leadership of Denver’s large Hispanic community was similarly to be 
found overwhelmingly on the pro-gay side. Under the banner “Libertad y justicia 
para todos—sin excepción” (Liberty and justice for all — without exception), a full-
page advertisement against the amendment signed by every major Hispanic 
organization and political figure in Colorado urged citizens to vote no on two. “If the 
civil rights, privacy, privileges and protections of citizens can be restricted because 
of sexual orientation,” the Colorado Hispanic League asked, “what protects 
Hispanics from similar initiatives based on equally arbitrary reasons?”316 Prominent 
Colorado Hispanic leaders were actively involved in EPOC, serving on the board and 
as co-chairs of the campaign. These included, among others, nationally prominent 
Democrat Polly Baca, sitting Denver Mayor Federico Pena, and, until his death 
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shortly before the election, legendary Colorado civil rights activist Rick Castro.317 
For their part, too, Colorado unions also rallied to the gay rights cause, signing on to 
the EPOC campaign and proclaiming forcefully to their own rank and file, “Nobody 
should be fired just because they’re black or white or brown or gray…Or gay.”318  
These alliances, which were so important to the Denver ordinance and 
Amendment 2 fights, were the product of years of collaborative organizing on the 
parts of blacks, gays, and Hispanics as well as organized labor. Since the mid-
seventies, they had been united in a local and national boycott of the Golden, 
Colorado-based Coors Brewing Company in an effort to force the brewery, known for 
its support of conservative political causes, to put an end to a long history of 
discrimination and unfair labor practices. By the early 1990s, Coors had long-since 
adopted company-wide practices banning discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation in an effort to separate gays and lesbians from their minority allies. But 
the Coors family’s continued support for anti-gay political causes prompted many in 
the gay community to continue shunning the brewer. The boycott experience helped 
to solidify relationships among gays, blacks, Hispanics, and organized labor that 
proved vital to the campaign against Amendment 2, as local and national unions, 
minority rights organizations and leaders lent their support to the gay rights cause 
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and were, in fact, among the most active participants in anti-Amendment 2 
activism.319 This history of intersectional alliances among gays and lesbians, blacks, 
Hispanics, and labor defies conventional understandings of the relationships among 
these groups, revealing them, at least in some important cases, to have been 
valuable political partners rather than competitors or antagonists. 
Yet even as such alliances suggested the possibility of a more radical, 
intersectional gay and lesbian politics, the business community’s embrace of gay 
rights pulled in other directions. Just as in the 1987 Boulder ordinance drive and the 
subsequent Denver struggle, many of the state’s most influential businesses and 
business groups made the strategic choice to array themselves on the pro-gay side.  
CFV routinely portrayed Amendment 2 as an asset to Colorado businesses, 
targeting them directly throughout the campaign. Their fundamental argument was 
that, for business owners already overburdened by state rules and regulations, “‘gay 
rights’ adds another substantial layer of liability and responsibility in favor of a 
group that already enjoys substantial income and professional privileges!” Among 
the “burdens” CFV warned that business owners would face if gay rights were 
codified in Colorado were being forced to build separate bathrooms for gay and 
lesbian employees, losing the ability to pursue harassment claims against them, and 
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being forced to hire applicants on the basis of their professed sexual orientation 
without being able to prove whether the individual in question were truly gay.320 
 
Figure 11. EPOC “Vote NO on 2” flyer. 
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Colorado business leaders were unpersuaded. In a full-page advertisement in 
the Denver Post published just before the election, some seventy-five local businesses 
announced their opposition to Amendment 2 (see Figure 11).321 Major national 
corporations with offices in Colorado also joined the anti-amendment chorus. Apple 
Computers, for example, took out an advertisement in local papers announcing the 
company’s view that, “Employment discrimination wastes vitally needed talent,” and 
urging Coloradans to vote no.322 
After Amendment 2passed, with gay rights activists successfully 
orchestrating a massive national boycott against “The Hate State,” Colorado 
business leaders were at pains to distance themselves from the measure. The 
Greater Denver Chamber of Commerce quickly reiterated its opposition, recalling 
the group’s active participation in the fight against the amendment and, before that, 
in the campaign supporting Denver’s anti-discrimination ordinance. As a further 
show of support, the Chamber acknowledged that it was in the process of developing 
an anti-discrimination pledge for local corporations to sign, announced plans to 
dedicate staff and volunteer resources to legal efforts to overturn the amendment, 
and touted its involvement in a statewide coalition of business, religious, and 
community organizations dedicated to the amendment’s repeal. In explaining why 
the business community chose to defy the apparent will of Colorado voters, the 
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Chamber argued that “Colorado voters were duped” by a “cleverly developed ‘stealth’ 
media campaign” orchestrated by far-right religious groups.323 
In a telling move that indicated the extent to which support for gay rights 
was, by 1992, already becoming mainstream, even the largely conservative and 
Republican Colorado Springs business community worked actively against 
Amendment 2. Following the amendment’s passage, prominent Springs attorney 
Greg Walta, himself an Evangelical and long-time resident, went so far as to draft 
an alternative measure, which he and other local business leaders hoped might win 
enough votes to replace Amendment 2. They positioned their initiative, titled “No 
Special Rights or Discrimination in Employment, Housing and Public 
Accommodations Based on Sexual Orientation,” as a compromise that would 
guarantee statewide protections from discrimination for gays and lesbians while 
simultaneously banning them from any preferred legal status, affirmative action, or 
quotas. The measure had the backing of Colorado Springs’ most influential business 
leaders, notably including Bill Hybl who, as CEO of the El Pomar Foundation, had 
orchestrated the four million dollar grant that drew Focus on the Family to the area 
in the first place. Backers, concerned by the boycott of Colorado and the growing 
national association between the Springs and the religious right, sought to distance 
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themselves both from Amendment 2 specifically and from the religious right more 
generally.324 
* * * 
In the wake of Amendment 2’s passage, observers across the country were 
quick to point to Colorado, either in triumph or despair, as a vanguard in a national 
battle over morality, “family values,” and the role of religion in politics and 
governance. One letter to the editor of the Rocky Mountain News, written by a 
despairing former Colorado resident just days after the election, summed up the 
dominant understanding of the Amendment 2 victory: “I can’t believe that the 
majority of Colorado people I lived and worked around actually voted to discriminate 
against a minority of fellow Coloradans,” Wes Simmons lamented from his new 
home in Massachusetts, “I never realized how strong a hold the right-wing Christian 
Fundamentalists have on the state. Colorado has now become a place of hatred and 
bigotry instead of natural beauty and friendly people. Viewed from a distance, it 
looks like Colorado stands right in line behind Idaho and the Aryan Nations.”325 But 
on the ground the reality was notably different. But on the ground the reality was 
notability different. Whether or not the Chamber of Commerce was right in saying 
that Colorado voters had been duped into voting for Amendment 2, the pro-
amendment rhetoric from CFV and its allies, at least insofar as it was directed at 
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the general public, was not overtly anti-gay. Nevertheless, the Colorado minority, 
labor, and business communities sought to distance themselves from Amendment 2 
and seemed to regard the growing presence of the religious right in Colorado as a 
costly embarrassment. 
As Colorado business leaders had been quick to realize, arguments rooted in 
“family values” did not win elections. National public opinion polling revealed that, 
in the run up to the 1992 election, voters were overwhelmingly preoccupied with the 
economy: 43% listed it as their number one concern. “Family values,” the rubric 
under which issues like homosexuality and Amendment 2 fell, came in a distant 
fourth, with just 15% of voters listing it as their top priority. Indeed, in their 
postmortems following the election, many observers both inside and outside the 
GOP, pointed to what they argued was an excessive focus on family values, both at 
the Republican National Convention that year and throughout the campaign, as the 
primary reason for Bush’s defeat in the presidential race.  
In Colorado, the same held true. Focus groups conducted in the weeks leading 
up to the November 3 election revealed that sizable majorities believed that 
discrimination against gays and lesbians in employment and housing should be 
illegal. Sixty-eight percent of respondents agreed with the statement, “No population 
group should be singled out for discrimination as this amendment does.” Even voters 
who said they had moral or religious objections to homosexuality said they 
supported basic rights for gays, believed gays and lesbians to be the subjects of 
discrimination, and dubbed CFV and their supporters extremists. Among those who 
said they would oppose legalized same-sex marriage or adoption by same-sex 
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couples, a majority saw these issues as unrelated to the amendment, making any 
efforts by CFV to portray Amendment 2 as a bulwark against these possibilities 
unfruitful.326  
A second Colorado-based public opinion firm reached similar findings. In a 
report issued shortly before the election, Talmey-Drake concluded, “Supporters of 
the Colorado for Family Values anti-gay rights initiative have assumed they were 
speaking of a ‘silent majority’ who believe homosexuality is morally wrong. The 
assumption is shakey” [sic]. The report went on to note that, were the election held 
at the time of the poll, the Family Values initiative would lose by a 52% to 38% 
margin. Even more significantly, their polling suggested that the amendment would 
lose almost as badly among voters who expressed strong moral opposition to 
homosexuality as among the electorate as a whole. Trying to make sense of these 
results, researchers surmised that voters’ resistance to morality-based arguments 
for the amendment stemmed from a growing general belief that consenting adults 
had a right to privacy in their sexual conduct without interference from government, 
business, or their fellow citizens.327 The failure of efforts to repeal Denver’s 
Comprehensive Anti-Discrimination Ordinance the previous year suggested much 
the same conclusion. After all, Citizens for Sensible Rights, which had peppered its 
campaign materials with references to homosexuality as immoral, a “perversion,” 
and a “deviant sex practice,” lost decisively. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
326 Miller Research Group, Pre-election focus groups, Box 5, Folder “Correspondence, Memos 
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 Recognizing, or at least fearing, that family values arguments were 
remarkably unsuccessful at attracting a majority of voters, the proponents of 
Amendment 2 generally avoided moral arguments against homosexuality in making 
their case. CFV insisted that “Amendment 2 doesn’t hinge on religion or morality. 
And it certainly isn’t about hatred. It’s about fairness.”328 Or, as a CFV television 
advertisement in support of Amendment 2 put it, “OK, I think I’ve got it. 
Homosexuals have equal rights; they want special rights. That’s not fair. I’m voting 
yes on Amendment 2.”329 The purpose of Amendment 2, CFV argued, was to prevent 
an already privileged group from taking advantage of hard working, well-meaning 
Coloradans. This framing was fundamental to the entire Amendment 2 enterprise. 
Indeed, the very wording of the amendment reflected this careful rhetorical strategy. 
In a letter to CFV offering feedback on proposed language for the amendment, Brian 
McCormick, a staff attorney at the conservative Virginia Beach National Legal 
Foundation, argued against a possible draft that referred to gay marriage, reasoning 
that, while the public was inhospitable to “special privileges” for homosexuals, it was 
receptive to pleas “to be ‘treated just like everyone else’”: 
While homosexuals do not get far by asking the electorate for special 
privileges, they do get a good deal of sympathy by asking to be 
”treated just like everyone else.” The presupposition here is that if two 
people love each other they ought to be able to marry, and if two men 
or two women ‘love’ each other they ought to be able to marry. Since 
same sex marriages are not recognized in Colorado at present, I feel 
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that the clause regarding their legal recognition hurts the initiative 
without really adding anything to it.330 
CFV took McCormick’s advice. Amendment 2’s final version did not mention 
of same-sex marriage nor did it argue directly against homosexuality per se. This 
choice allowed CFV to argue that the proposed amendment did not “remove any 
basic civil rights granted to homosexual individuals under the U.S. Constitution,” 
but rather “only prohibits homosexual desires or practices…from being a basis for 
legal protected class status in the State of Colorado.” 331The final text read: 
Shall there be an amendment to Article II of the Colorado 
Constitution to prohibit the state of Colorado and any of its political 
subdivisions from adopting or enforcing any law or policy which 
provides that homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual orientation, conduct, or 
relationships constitutes or entitles a person to claim any minority or 
protected status, quota preferences, or discrimination. 
By framing the question as one of protected minority status and quotas, CFV 
distanced the initiative from controversial questions about morality, relying instead 
on a series of radicalized arguments about privilege and economic access. 
Indeed Colorado for Family Values primarily relied on economic arguments 
in selling Amendment 2 to voters. In a climate of shrinking job opportunities and 
rising unemployment, CFV co-director Kevin Tebedo held up the specter of 
affirmative action, suggesting that, without Amendment 2, “employers soon will be 
required to hire homosexuals by quota,” with the result that, someday in the not too 
distant future, white men would have to “lie and say they are homosexual just to get 
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a job.”332 This affirmative action argument proved especially potent for CFV, as it 
both spoke particularly to white male voters concerned about their own employment 
insecurity and also provided a familiar language for dismissing charges that support 
for Amendment 2 was motivated by anti-gay bias. Just as it became possible to say, 
“I’m not racist—I just don’t see why they should get a leg up when I’ve worked hard 
for everything I’ve got,” so, too, it became possible to say “I don’t have a problem 
with gays. I just don’t think they should have any extra advantages.” In fact, none of 
the anti-discrimination ordinances passed or proposed in Colorado had ever 
suggested any sort of gay affirmative action, yet CFV was extraordinarily effective 
at persuading voters that gay rights posed a serious threat to their own economic 
security and that “A ‘yes’ vote on Amendment 2 is a vote against special rights for 
GAY SPECIAL INTERESTS.”333 The reference to quotas in the text of the 
Amendment was specifically intended to conjure these old, usually racialized, 
economic fears among white, and especially white male, voters. 
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Figure 12. “A Job is Not a Special Right,” EPOC advertisement, 1992. 
* * * 
The racial undercurrents in the language surrounding Amendment 2 
highlight the ways in both sides in the Amendment 2 campaign used race in making 
their cases about sexual orientation. The language of rights, equality, fairness, and 
color blindness that grew up over decades of civil rights struggle was repurposed and 
deployed in the early 1990s in debates over gay rights generally and Amendment 2 
in particular. It was an uneasy but, nevertheless, effective appropriation that 
operated in several ways.  
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Figure 13. CFV flyer, “Yes On 2 the ‘Stop Special Rights’ Amendment.” 
On the one hand, by arguing that any law protecting gays from 
discrimination was tantamount to affirmative action, CFV and its allies sought to 
appear as sympathetic champions of the rights of “genuine” minorities. They did this 
overtly, as we have seen, in general press releases and media appearances as well as 
in campaign materials specifically targeted at black and Hispanic Coloradans (see 
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Figure 12). The explicit message was that “real” minorities like blacks, Hispanics, or 
the disabled were entitled to the kinds of protections and benefits they received and 
that, by demanding similar protections for a group that wasn’t a real minority, gay 
rights advocates were harming genuine minority groups. As one black pastor and 
CFV supporter put it, “The freedom bus that went to Selma was never meant to go 
on to Sodom.”334 By repeatedly describing gays as affluent and white, CFV and their 
allies sought to divide gays from the groups that they termed genuine minorities. 
In one particularly stark example of this strategy, CFV blanketed both white 
and African American communities across the state with leaflets purporting to 
reveal the dangers of allowing gay rights laws. One of the most potent anti-
Amendment 2 arguments in the campaign had been that, by constitutionally 
banning any government entity in Colorado from passing future gay rights laws, the 
measure effectively ran an end-run around the principles of home rule and local 
control. In response, CFV told a cautionary tale: “Remember the detestable ‘Jim 
Crow’ laws that used to oppress African Americans decades ago in the Deep South?” 
the leaflet asked. Those, CFV explained, were home rule laws, “designed to keep 
people of color ‘in their place.’” Fortunately, as a result of activism and legislation 
during the 1960s, civil rights were no longer subject to local whims but, rather, were 
decided at the state and national level. By insisting on the right of local communities 
to pass gay rights ordinances, CFV argued, “militant homosexuals….have pushed 
their agenda for years exactly the way the old racists did: through friendly city 
councils, the least democratic, least responsive of all governing bodies.” Amendment 
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2, then, was a safeguard for civil rights, helping “all Colorado citizens make sure 
civil rights are never ‘Jim-Crow-ised’ again.” Finally, the leaflet suggested, “the next 
time a militant gay tries to tell you Amendment 2 destroys ‘home rule,’ ask them: 
Should Colorado towns be able to vote in ‘Jim Crow’ laws again? NO WAY! VOTE 
‘YES!’ ON AMENDMENT 2.”335 In this formulation, gay rights activists were 
tantamount to segregationists and voting to block future gay rights measures like 
the anti-discrimination ordinances in Aspen, Boulder, and Denver was a means for 
African Americans to protect themselves. At the same time, the leaflet suggested, 
any white voter who rejected Amendment 2 was, effectively, supporting a return to 
legalized racism. 
This sort of rhetoric, which ostensibly demonstrated CFV’s commitment to 
minority rights, also contained an implicit, far less politically correct message for 
white voters. Affirmative action had long been among the most reviled and least 
understood manifestations of the civil rights movement’s legal and policy successes 
(indeed, even many self-professed liberals objected to it). By linking gay rights to 
affirmative action and quotas, however erroneously, CFV sought to create an 
association between racial minorities and gays, thereby planting the suggestion for 
white voters that gays were yet another minority group demanding special benefits 
while middle-class whites were forced to struggle. 
The pro-gay rights side, meanwhile, was doing a similar dance. On the one 
hand, it actively sought—and found—solidarity with minority communities. 
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Supporters of gay rights explicitly positioned their cause as the latest chapter in a 
thirty-year history of civil rights struggle and progress in the United States and 
Colorado. On the other hand, leaders of the Equality Protection Ordinance Coalition 
and, later, Equality Colorado felt pressure to distance themselves from the tensions 
and animosities surrounding unpopular programs like affirmative action, which 
required them, in turn, to make arguments that distinguished sexual orientation 
from race. 
* * * 
Ultimately, CFV’s efforts to frame gay rights as a threat both to the civil 
rights of (supposedly) genuine minorities and, simultaneously, to white Americans 
overwhelmed by minority rights claims proved effective. On election day, fifty-three 
percent of voters pulled the lever for the Family Values initiative, making Colorado 
the first state in the nation to put the fraught matter of sexual orientation and its 
legal and social standing into its constitution. Post election polls confirmed the 
success of CFV’s strategy. As one voter who supported Amendment 2 explained in a 
letter to the Rocky Mountain News, “It should be reasonably clear that the passage 
of Amendment 2 is a message from the tax paying majority saying, ‘we are tired of 
special interest groups and their woes.’” Indeed, after decades of mounting 
frustration with what many saw as the growing influence of special interests in state 
politics and the pressures of a struggling economy, for many Coloradans 
Amendment 2 offered an opportunity to make their feelings of disfranchisement 
heard. 
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But observers outside Colorado, unfamiliar with the context and background 
to the referendum campaign, took Amendment 2’s passage as an indication of 
Coloradans’ negative attitudes towards homosexuality. Certainly, homophobia was a 
factor. In 1992, when Amendment 2 passed, homosexuality was the subject of 
intense debate. Bill Clinton’s apparent support for gay rights was a major issue in 
the presidential election that year, AIDS was a pressing national crisis, and citizens 
across the country were engaged at both the national and local levels in debates and 
electoral struggles over anti-gay discrimination, gay and lesbian teachers, 
homosexuality in school curricula, gays in the military, and more. Both in the run-
up to the election and in its aftermath, the Amendment—and Colorado—were in the 
national spotlight. Many viewed Amendment 2, the subsequent boycott of Colorado, 
and the eventual Supreme Court case as among the opening salvos of the “culture 
wars” that have become the iconic representation of American politics in the 
nineties. 
But what happened in Colorado and, indeed, nationally was more interesting 
and subtle than homophobia alone. The ways in which Colorado for Family Values, 
an unabashedly rightwing Christian organization with clear ties to the national 
Christian Right, sought to sanitize its campaign and to make affirmative action or 
quotas the issue, rather than homosexuality, speaks to what was, at the time, a 
widely understood truth among religious conservatives: family values didn’t win 
elections. Outside of an admittedly sizable cadre of true believers for whom family 
values were the number one political issue, most voters simply did not rank it as a 
major factor in choosing whom to vote for. Moreover, many voters were turned off by 
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what they perceived as the Religious Right’s moralizing tone. The forty-three 
percent of voters nationally who pulled the lever for Clinton/Gore overwhelmingly 
reported moderate or even center-left social views and said that the economy and 
jobs were their number one concern. Similarly, among the nineteen percent of voters 
who supported independent Ross Perot for president that year—whose candidacy 
was often blamed for “throwing” the election to Clinton by attracting voters who 
would otherwise have gone Republican—an overwhelming majority articulated 
views that were fiscally conservative but socially well to the left of the GOP’s 1992 
family values platform. 
Colorado, despite the passage of Amendment 2 and the severely tax-limiting 
Taxpayers Bill of Rights, more-or-less mirrored the nation. While Bill Clinton did 
slightly worse in Colorado, with thirty-nine percent of the vote, and Ross Perot 
slightly better, with twenty-three percent, Clinton did carry the state and their 
combined Colorado total of 62% equaled their combined national total. These results 
fit with the general trend of voters in Colorado—since the 1970s—towards self-
described “moderate” or “centrist” view points and a demand for greater 
accountability and transparency in government. Moreover, it fits with national 
trends, as during the 1970s, eighties, and nineties—in fact, up until 2010—more 
Americans identified as “moderate” than as either liberal or conservative. 
In this political climate, it is no accident that a constitutional amendment 
billed as preventing affirmative action and “special rights,” an amendment requiring 
voter approval of any new tax revenues in Colorado, and a presidential nominee who 
campaigned on redefining the Democratic Party as a party of moderation and 
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centrism, preaching “opportunity, responsibility, community,” could all succeed. The 
story of Colorado’s Amendment 2, then, is a national story in more ways than has 
been realized. Exploring the Amendment 2 campaign and putting it both in a 
broader national context and in a much deeper context of political change in 
Colorado itself begins to illuminate the contours of a political realignment in the late 
twentieth century that challenges the simple notion of conservative ascendance and 
liberal decline. What emerges instead is a far more nuanced and contested politics of 
the center with which both parties had to grapple in their quest for continued 
relevance and electoral success. Moreover, it calls into question the pervasive 
understanding of Newt Gingrich’s 1994 “Republican Revolution” as a popular rebuke 
to Democrats and a culturally conservative mandate for the GOP. Indeed, far from 
representing opposing impulses in American politics, Clinton’s election and the 
Contract with America two years later together marked the fullest expression of the 
new market-oriented paradigm in American politics. 
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Conclusion 
Two years after Bill Clinton’s narrow victory in the 1992 presidential 
election, Americans ushered in the first Republican House majority in forty years. 
The GOP immediately trumpeted their success as a triumph for conservatism, 
framing their victory as proof that the nation was conservative and that the new 
Congress had a popular mandate to advance its ideologically conservative agenda. 
Leaders of the Religious Right were quick to embrace this narrative, portraying the 
Republicans’ success as proof of widespread popular support for the conservative 
social program they called “family values.” Standing shoulder to shoulder with 
House Speaker Newt Gingrich and members of the Republican Congress several 
months after the midterm elections, Ralph Reed, executive director of the rightwing 
Christian Coalition, announced, “As religious conservatives, we have finally gained 
what we have always sought—a place at the table, a sense of legitimacy and a voice 
in the conversation.”336 
The reality, however, was quite different. When, as House minority leader, 
Gingrich set about devising an electoral strategy for the 1994 midterms, he did so 
not by targeting conservatives but, rather, by explicitly courting those voters who 
had supported Ross Perot in 1992. Gingrich modeled his Contract with America, 
signed by close to four hundred Republican Congressmen and Congressional 
hopefuls, on Perot’s “Checklist for All Federal Candidates”; he convened focus groups 
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of Perot voters to identify the combination of issues and language most likely to win 
their votes. Arguing that a winning message was more important than ideological 
purity, Gingrich declared that, “There will be no social issues,” and sought to 
distance the GOP Congressional campaign from the 1992 platform’s emphasis on 
family values, which many observers and party strategists blamed for George Bush’s 
defeat. As Joe Gaylord, together with Gingrich one of the Contract’s chief architects, 
explained, the very term “contract” was chosen because these focus groups revealed 
that Perot supporters, who prized reform and accountability above all, understood a 
contract as more binding than a platform. Similarly, to signal a departure from 
partisanship, the word Republican did not appear in the title, or indeed, the 
document as a whole. 337 
In short, the Republicans’ strategy was designed to appeal precisely to the 
moderate, quality of life voters who had emerged over the preceding decades of 
metropolitan politics and come to dominate the electorate. Just as Clinton and Gore, 
in their book Putting People First, pledged to move beyond partisanship, promising, 
“Our policies are neither liberal nor conservative, neither Democratic nor 
Republican. They are new. They are different. We are confident they will work,” so 
Gingrich sought to present the GOP as the party of moderate, pragmatic solutions 
that would restore transparency to Washington and put government in the hands of 
the people.338 In the end, Scammon and Wattenberg’s 1970 prediction that the 
winning party would be the one that “can hold the center ground on an attitudinal 
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battlefield,” proved accurate.339 For while Americans may have been “moving 
vigorously right, left, and center all at once,” it was the center that seemed, 
ultimately, to prevail.  
Instead, the pragmatic, individualist, market-oriented politics that emerged 
at the metropolitan grassroots from the 1970s onwards had, by the early nineties, 
come to dominate American political culture, leaving both Democrats and 
Republicans scrambling to remake themselves in its image. For Republicans, this 
meant distancing themselves in general elections from the language of both 
economic and social conservatism. In Colorado, this strategic framing made possible 
the eventual passage of TABOR, a radically anti-government initiative that backers, 
themselves unabashedly conservative, succeeded in portraying to the public as a 
moderate effort to make government more popularly accountable. Similarly, 
proponents of the successful anti-gay rights Amendment 2 presented it as a 
moderate attempt to prevent gays and lesbians from gaining "special rights" above 
and beyond the equal rights they ostensibly already enjoyed. Democrats, meanwhile, 
embarked on a project of wholesale reinvention. Sensing that the old New Deal, 
Keyensian prescriptions that had held their winning coalition together were no 
longer effective, they gradually embraced a neoliberal rhetoric and policy agenda 
more in line with the public mood. When Al Gore described himself as a "raging 
moderate" and Bill Clinton promised to "put the power of the presidency to work for 
the American people," they were but the latest in a succession of neoliberal 
Democrats prominently including Coloradans Tim Wirth, Gary Hart, and Dick 
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Lamm, to articulate the new Democratic agenda as one of transparency, 
accountability, and common sense that transcended traditional ideological or 
partisan bounds.340 
Underlying this political shift was an equally seismic transformation in the 
political, economic, and demographic circumstances of most Americans, rooted in the 
emergence of metropolitan areas as the primary locus of postwar American life. The 
rapid expansion of metropolitan areas in this period across the United States threw 
into question a previously established political order, creating new opportunities for 
a range of constituencies to compete for control of metropolitan resources, spaces, 
and decision-making. Moreover, through engagement with these intensely local 
conflicts, residents of Greater Denver and other similar places began to articulate a 
new political ethos that took hold at the grassroots and ultimately came to redefine 
politics and policy at the highest levels within both the major political parties. 
Conventional narratives have tended to view the final third of the twentieth 
century in ideological terms: the post-New Deal liberal consensus giving way to the 
New Right and the rising dominance of the GOP. Recent scholarship has 
substantially debunked the notion of a postwar liberal consensus, at least at the 
grassroots, and of racial backlash driving the post-sixties rightward shift. Scholars 
have, however, with few exceptions, continued to focus on both the emergence of 
grassroots movement conservatism and conservatism’s rise within the newly 
ascendant GOP. In so doing, they have failed to adequately account for the 
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complexity of American politics in the late twentieth century, especially but not 
exclusively at the grassroots in the rapidly expanding metropolises that became 
home to a decisive majority of the population from the 1970s onwards.341 
To the extent that current scholarship has recognized the importance to 
political engagement of changes in metropolitan space, it has tended to see such 
spatial differentiation as a boon to Republicans, who successfully capitalized on 
grassroots suburban politics to attract a majority of suburban voters to their fold. 
Yet in Colorado, the politics of race and place were more complex, demonstrating the 
ways in which the new metropolitan realities influenced both identity and political 
engagement for citizens of all political stripes. The same debates that dominated 
political debate in Denver played out in metropolitan areas across the nation, from 
other booming Sunbelt cities embroiled in their own annexation conflicts, to cities 
and towns up and down the Northeast Corridor, to places like Portland and Seattle 
in the Pacific Northwest or the Twin Cities in Minnesota, which pioneered anti-
sprawl policies in this period. Recent American political history cannot be 
understood outside the context of the major structural changes in metropolitan 
geography and political economy that transformed American life at that time.  
The evidence from Denver points to a far more nuanced, less partisan politics 
than has yet been realized. This history lacks the neat inevitability of rising 
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conservatism that most tellings have imposed on this recent period in America’s 
past. Instead, it suggests the state of flux in which boosters, activists, and 
government officials at every level found themselves as they struggled to adapt to 
the new realities of metropolitan geography and political economy in late twentieth 
century America. Understanding this perspective is key to explaining the emergence 
of the individualist, market-based political culture that lies at the heart of the 
transformation in American politics, at the grassroots and within both the 
Democratic and Republican parties.342 
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